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Introduction
Peripheries and  
rural/urban transitions  
in the Gauteng City-Region
S A L LY P E B E R DY A N D P H I L I P H A R R I S O N
Gauteng Province is home to three of the major 
metropolitan municipalities in the country as well 
as seven local municipalities. They include cities, 
growing and declining towns of various sizes, small 
villages, ex-homeland areas as well as mining, farming 
and conservation areas. With a population of 13.2 
million in 2015, and home to 24 per cent of the national 
population, Gauteng is the most populous and densely 
populated province in the country (Statistics South 
Africa (StatsSA), 2015: 1). In 2015, Gauteng produced 
34 per cent of South Africa’s GDP and contributed 
10 per cent of the GDP of Africa (Gauteng Provincial 
Government (GPG), 2016: no page number). The 
Gauteng City-Region (GCR) sits within Gauteng, 
but its reach extends beyond the boundaries of the 
province. The Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
(GCRO) and the National Research Foundation’s  
South African Research Chair (NRF SARChI) 
in Spatial Analysis and City Planning (SA&CP) 
embarked on a research project to explore the 
demographic and socio-spatial dynamics and place-
economies of peripheral areas of Gauteng and the 
GCR. This work was a response to a strong focus in 
the existing literature on the physical and economic 
core of the province, the City of Johannesburg, in 
particular. It comes from a clear recognition that 
despite the wealth of Gauteng and the GCR, and their 
role in driving the national economy, there are places 
of relative peripherality which require the attention  
of policy makers. 
This report has two parts, separately authored.  
The parts address different dimensions of 
peripherality in Gauteng, recognising that the concept 
of peripheries may be investigated from various 
perspectives. The first part, authored by Sally Peberdy 
of the GCRO, explores peripheries in terms of uneven 
or unequal development, using the concept of periphery 
to mean spaces of low economic development and 
socio-economic marginalisation. These spaces could 
be in the geographic centre or edge of the city-region, 
or in various intermediary spaces, including those 
sitting outside the urban core of the city-region 
and province. The second part, authored by Philip 
Harrison and Yasmeen Dinath, asks the empirical 
question, what is happening along the geographic 
edge of the spatial construct that we refer to as the 
GCR? While geographic peripherality may coincide 
with economic and social marginalisation, this is not 
necessarily the case. Both parts reveal that space is 
not static and so needs to be explored in terms of its 
temporality. Places which may have been peripheral 
historically may shift to having a core role, and vice 
versa. They also reveal that notions of the periphery 
are relational, and need to be understood in terms of 
scale. Thus, although Gauteng and the GCR are core 
economic areas of South Africa and the continent, it 
is possible for peripheral areas to exist within them. 
Similarly, areas of peripherality within Gauteng and 
the GCR may be relatively central within a national or 
sub-regional context.
The first part, which investigates the demographic 
and socio-economic dynamics of peripheral areas 
in Gauteng, explores the question through the lens 
of theories of uneven development. Theories of 
uneven development, which are usually applied at a 
larger scale, allow engagement with the processes 
that create peripheral areas, but they intrinsically 
create a binary construction of spaces. However, 
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This work was a response to 
a strong focus in the existing 
literature on the physical and 
economic core of the province, the 
City of Johannesburg, in particular. 
It comes from a clear recognition 
that despite the wealth of Gauteng 
and the GCR, and their role in 
driving the national economy, 
there are places of relative 
peripherality which require the 
attention of policy makers. 
“
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as this report demonstrates, investigations of core 
and peripheral areas can be nuanced and allow for 
understanding of different ways that places may be 
peripheral. Core and peripheral areas are usually 
defined using economic and demographic criteria, 
but it is also possible to explore how peripheralisation 
of places, and the people who live in them, may occur 
in other ways. The first part uses economic, land use 
and population density to initially identify core and 
peripheral areas in Gauteng. It then explores how 
these are reflected in other ways that spaces may be 
peripheral, and how other forms of demographic and 
socio-economic peripherality are expressed spatially. 
These include: demographically; educationally; 
through types and conditions of employment 
including income; housing; access to services; how 
people live in places including participation in civil 
society, social cohesion and quality of life; as well as 
access to transport and connections to other places. 
Based on an essentially binary construction of space 
divided into core and peripheral areas, Part A also 
grapples with the legacy of apartheid residential 
spatial geographies and the role of the state in 
creating, sustaining and ameliorating peripherality in 
multiple forms.
The second part is concerned with understanding 
dynamics of change along the spatial periphery 
of Gauteng and the wider GCR. It locates these 
dynamics within a mainly geographical literature 
on understandings of edge cities, perimetropolitan 
areas, agglomeration, and spatial edges. It identifies 
categories of settlements in peripheral areas in the 
GCR including: zones of displaced urbanisation 
or former homeland areas in the north of the 
GCR (Babelegi); mining and ex-mining towns in 
the south-west of the province (Carletonville-
Khutsong); industrialising ex-mining areas (Nigel 
and Heidelberg); state-led industrial towns on the 
edge of the GCR (the Vaal triangle); agricultural 
service centres in farming areas (Bronkhorstspruit-
Ekangala); and recreational and tourist hubs 
(Hartbeespoort). The report uses rich case studies 
to explore transitions in the economies of these 
places. It highlights the importance of history and 
timing, the role of the state, and even, at times, 
individuals, in the development and/or decline of 
specific place-economies in peripheral areas of the 
GCR. In doing so, it also identifies possibilities for 
their re-invention. 
Both parts of this report identify the need to 
engage with the role of history in shaping the socio-
economic lives of residents and place-economies. 
Similarly, and notwithstanding the silence in much 
of the literature on uneven development, both reports 
demonstrate the need to explore the role of the state 
in shaping peripheral areas and place-economies 
as well as the lives of the people who live in them 
– whether through action or inaction. Although 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
013
INTRODUCTION
they use different approaches to understanding the 
dynamics of the demographics and socio-economics 
of core and peripheral areas in Gauteng, as well 
as transitions in the place-economies of different 
urban spaces in the GCR, both parts of the report 
enrich our understanding of peripheral areas in 
Gauteng and the GCR. 
The report sits in a policy context where 
provincial government, municipalities, and the 
metropolitan local governments of the province, have 
launched a number of initiatives to encourage growth 
and shift the distribution of economic activity in the 
province. These include transport initiatives to move 
goods and people into, out of, and within the province 
more efficiently. On a larger scale, these include the 
introduction of upgraded toll-roads (or highways) 
and the Gautrain project. On a more localised level, 
they include the development of rapid transit systems 
within metros to move people around more efficiently 
and to enable access to core areas for people living 
in the periphery. Development corridors and nodes 
have been identified to grow new economically 
productive spaces, increasing the diversity of 
economic activities and, with the approval of proposed 
mega-human settlements, new cities in peripheral 
areas of the province are even envisioned (Makhura, 
2015). These reports will assist in understanding 
how the policies of provincial, metro and municipal 
governments will affect and be affected by the 
demographic and socio-economic dynamics of core 
and peripheral areas of the provinces, as well as how 
they may affect transitions in the place-economies of 
peripheral areas. 
References:
GAUTENG PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
(GPG). (2016). The Economy of Gauteng. 
Available at www.gautengonline.gov.za/
Business/Pages/TheEconomyofGauteng.aspx, 
accessed 24 March 2016.
MAKHURA, D. (2015). State of the Province Address 
– 2015. Available at http://www.brandsouthafrica.
com/news/1158-moving-gauteng-forward-
in-2015-the-state-of-the-province-address, 
accessed 5 April 2015.
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (StatsSA). 
(2015). Mid-year Population Estimates 2015, 
Statistical Release P0302. Statistics South 
Africa: Pretoria.
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Part A
Uneven development – core and  
periphery in Gauteng
S A L LY P E B E R DY
Executive summary
Gauteng is the richest, most productive, most populous 
and densely-populated province in the country.  
Yet, although the province produces the highest 
proportion of the country’s gross value added (GVA), 
and gross domestic product (GDP), and with its 
relatively strong, productive economy, it is not an even 
space. This report examines uneven development in 
Gauteng and the Gauteng City-Region (GCR), focusing 
on the socio-economic and demographic dynamics of 
core and peripheral areas.
Peripheries are imagined in various ways. 
Theories of uneven development and marginalisation 
which focus on the processes of capital accumulation 
in shaping core and peripheral areas, underpin the 
discussion. These highlight how peripheral economies 
and areas produce raw materials, particularly 
minerals, agricultural products and labour, for the 
core. Meanwhile core economies, home to secondary 
and tertiary sectors, refine and manufacture products 
produced in the periphery. 
This report demonstrates that significant efforts 
have been made by the state to reduce inequalities 
between core and peripheral areas in the province, 
particularly in the areas of education, housing and 
service provision. However these efforts appear to 
be more visible in the peripheral areas located in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria (rather than the greater 
Tshwane area). Furthermore, at times peripheral areas 
may be marginalised by the state, and core–periphery 
relationships may even be reinforced when the state 
focuses on promoting development and services 
in core areas, for instance in the location of new 
government housing. 
Some spaces are peripheral in some ways and not 
in other ways. Peripheral areas can be economically, 
socially, demographically, politically and culturally 
marginal. This report uses economic and population 
density criteria to delineate core and peripheral areas 
in Gauteng. Peripherality and its spatial expression 
are explored using demographic, migration, income 
and employment, housing, services, connectivity and 
household goods criteria. Some spaces were found 
to be peripheral in one area, but core in another. 
Expressions of core and periphery in Gauteng are 
complicated by the history of apartheid and social and 
spatial engineering. Also sitting behind the discussion 
is migration. Gauteng is the focus of internal and 
international migration in South Africa. Between 1996 
and 2011, the population of Gauteng increased by 64 
per cent. Over half (52 per cent) of this increase was a 
result of in-migration. The rapidly growing population 
presents challenges to government when trying to 
reduce inequalities.
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Space itself may be primordially 
given, but the organization, 
use, and meaning of space is a 
product of social translation, 
transformation and experience.
(Soja, 1980: 210)
“
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In summary, Part A of the report found: 
1. Demographics:
Populations in the core and peripheral areas of a 
country should have similar age and household 
structures. However, demographically peripheral 
areas are characterised by populations with 
relatively high proportions of elderly people and 
children, large households, and female headed 
households. The demographics of Gauteng at times 
challenge accepted wisdom around the population 
profiles of core and peripheral areas, particularly 
in terms of population density and proportions of 
female headed households. The legacy of apartheid 
complicates the picture as apartheid spatial 
planning and inequalities persist in the spatial 
demographics of the province. However, overall, the 
demographic index constructed shows that peripheral 
areas are more likely to be home to vulnerable 
households and populations.
2. Migration and mobility:
Gauteng is the focus of internal and international 
migration in South Africa. In 2011, 36 per cent of 
the population was internal migrants from other 
provinces and 10 per cent international migrants. 
Residents of the province are highly mobile. Peripheral 
areas are associated with being sources of cheap labour 
for production, and having high rates of migration and 
mobility. Migrants are likely to be found in peripheral 
areas within or surrounding the core as low-paid 
labour for production in the core. Overall, peripheral 
areas in Gauteng show high rates of in-migration 
and act as sources of labour for the core. However 
old township and rural areas which are peripheral in 
other ways are less likely to have mobile residents and 
to house migrants.
3. Education:
Peripheral areas are more likely to have low levels of 
education, an uneven distribution of schools, weak 
schools, pupils who have to travel long distances to 
school, poor attendance at school and little access 
to institutions of higher education. Low-performing 
secondary schools are most likely to be found in 
peripheral areas of the province. Learners in the 
periphery are more likely to have to travel long 
distances to school. Although the population of the 
core is more educated, government has made great 
strides in improving access to education across the 
province and peripheral areas since 1994. Between 
1996 and 2011 the proportion of the population of 
the periphery with no schooling fell from 17 per 
cent to 5 per cent, and the proportion who had 
matriculated rose from 13 per cent in 1996 to 24 
per cent in 2011. Despite this progress, the levels 
of education across the province pose a significant 
challenge to the state’s plans to promote high-skilled 
economic development. 
4. Employment and income:
Peripheral areas have higher rates of low income 
and insecure employment as well as unemployment, 
than core areas. Although peripheral areas of the 
province are disadvantaged in terms of income and 
employment, the data shows significant congruity 
in many core and peripheral areas in the province 
regarding employment and income. This may be for 
three reasons. First, areas which are home to black 
Africans and with high rates of unemployment are 
located in peripheral areas within the core as well as 
within the wider periphery. Second, people may be 
employed in core areas but live in peripheral areas. 
Thus, although the province is the core of the country, 
and it contains a clearly economically defined core, the 
cheap labour force needed for capital accumulation 
is located in peripheral areas both within and on the 
doorstep of the core. Third, perhaps reflecting low 
incomes in the province, mining areas of the West 
Rand, which are peripheral in many other ways, are 
not peripheral in regard to income and employment. 
Indicating that the processes underpinning uneven 
development have not been challenged, there has 
been little change in rates of employment, sectors 
of employment or income profiles of core and 
peripheral areas since 1996.
5. Housing:
Housing and the services people receive are indicators 
of socio-economic disadvantage, marginality and 
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peripherality. In the South African context, the 
situation is complicated by the spatial and housing 
legacy of apartheid, which led to areas with poor 
dwellings and informal settlements in the core of the 
province. At the same time, post-apartheid attempts 
to redress and tackle housing shortages have led 
to the development of new low-cost government 
housing that is largely on the periphery of the GCR 
and at some distance from economic centres where 
employment opportunities are most likely to be 
found. This is problematic as residents remain 
relatively spatially isolated from opportunities 
in the core. Households in the periphery are more 
likely to live in informal housing (28 per cent) than 
those in the core (15 per cent). They are more likely 
to live in one or two rooms. Despite in-migration, 
government has made significant progress in 
diminishing housing inequality between core and 
peripheral areas. 
6. Access to services: 
Access to services, including water, energy, sanitation, 
and refuse removal, is related to the kind of housing 
people live in, the infrastructure and services 
provided by parastatals, metros, municipalities and 
provincial government, as well as their affordability. 
The provision of infrastructure and services, or 
the lack thereof, is a measure of peripherality. Even 
though access to all services has improved across the 
province since 1996, access is still much poorer in 
peripheral than in core areas. While most of the core 
has adequate services, large swathes of the periphery 
are still underserviced. 
7. Satisfaction with government, 
participation in politics, and 
attitudes to democracy:
A lack of access to government is another indicator 
of peripherality. Residents of the periphery of the 
province are not disadvantaged in this regard and 
they are more likely to participate in community 
meetings. There was relatively little difference in 
the attitudes of residents in the core and periphery to 
politics and democracy. 
8. Living in core and peripheral 
areas in Gauteng:
People living in peripheral areas are least likely to have 
amenities including supermarkets, bakeries and banks 
within 750 metres of their home. They were less likely 
to feel safe at home or walking in their area during 
the day or at night than residents of the core. The lack 
of ownership of household goods is also an indicator 
of poverty and inequality. Households in peripheral 
areas are less likely to own radios, televisions, stoves, 
fridges or cars. Likewise, levels of social cohesion 
as evidenced in racial attitudes, homophobia and 
xenophobia are roughly similar, regardless of 
where people live.
9. Transport and connectivity:
Understandings of uneven development emphasise the 
flows of people and commodities from peripheral areas 
to core areas. Residents in the periphery are spatially 
marginalised and they frequently lack connectivity. 
An examination of transport patterns show that 
they reflect core–periphery relationships. People in 
peripheral areas travel to core areas for work, to look 
for work, to shop, and for leisure activities, and yet they 
have less access to good roads and public transport. 
There is some evidence of smaller localised shopping 
cores located in the periphery of the province. People 
in the periphery are least likely to have a car, radio, 
television, computer or to be able to access the internet 
from home or work other than from a cell phone. There 
is limited movement for any purpose except leisure 
from the core to the periphery. 
There is evidence that government has made some 
improvements to service delivery in both core and 
peripheral areas despite high rates of in-migration, 
thereby reducing inequalities between core and 
peripheral areas in some facets of socio-economic 
life. However, although spatial development 
plans do pay attention to some peripheral areas, 
data on housing, employment and income shows 
that they have not challenged the processes that 
underpin uneven development. Therefore patterns 
of uneven development in these spheres are 
likely to persist.
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1. Introduction
There has been an under-emphasis in the city-
region literature on how new territorial forms are 
constructed politically and reproduced through 
everyday acts and struggles around consumption 
and social reproduction. An especially notable 
lacuna is serious treatment of the role of the 
state and an associated politics of distribution 
constructed around various sites, spaces and 
scales across the city-region. In some respects, 
this silence on matters of politics and collective 
social agency arises from a tendency to reify the 
city-region itself as an agent of wealth creation 
and distribution. This comes at the expense 
of knowledge about the people, interests, and 
socio-political agents who populate and work 
in city-regions. 
(Jonas and Ward, 2007: 170, cited in Etherington 
and Jones, 2009: 250)
Images of the province of Gauteng depict skyscrapers, 
malls, bustling streets and taxi ranks, and dense built 
environments joined by major highways connecting 
the province to other parts of the country and 
the continent. Yet Gauteng also includes mining, 
agricultural, conservation and unproductive land, as 
well as small towns, informal settlements, and other 
built-up spaces sometimes referred to as peripheral 
areas. The Gauteng City-Region (GCR) sits within the 
boundaries of Gauteng Province but extends beyond 
them. It brings together cities, towns and urban nodes 
that are linked together even though some of them 
are located in neighbouring provinces. Gauteng is the 
richest province in the country, and has the largest 
population, but the smallest land area. The 2015 
mid-year population estimates put the population 
at over 13.2 million people (Stats SA, 2015). In 2015, 
the province produced 34 per cent of the national 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Gauteng Provincial 
Government (GPG), 2016: no page number).  
This puts it among the top five economies on the 
continent (which include South Africa as a whole) 
(GPG, 2016). Although urban land use only covered 
18.4 per cent of the province in 2009, it had grown 
from 12.6 per cent in 1991 (GPG, 2014: 24). Gauteng 
produces the highest proportion of the country’s GVA 
and GDP, has a strong, productive economy, and is 
home to some of the wealthiest people in South Africa, 
but it is not an even space.
This project emanates from a desire to 
understand this uneven development in Gauteng, 
in particular, to understand the socio-economic 
and demographic dynamics of core and peripheral 
areas in Gauteng and the GCR. This part of the 
report starts with a discussion of the concepts 
of core and periphery and identifies some of the 
key relevant spatial development frameworks 
operating in South Africa. It then describes the 
methodology used here to define core and peripheral 
areas, and create indexes of peripherality. Using 
a binary construction of core and periphery, the 
paper then goes on to look at the demography and 
socio-economics of core and peripheral areas in 
Gauteng. The report concludes by examining what 
the research tells us about uneven development 
and the dynamics of socio-economic change in 
Gauteng and the GCR. 
Before going any further, it is necessary to  
enter a caveat. As in the rest of the country, the  
legacy of apartheid lives on in Gauteng in racialised 
and gendered experiences. It is not possible to  
explore the multiple ways that race and gender  
affect the experiences of residents of Gauteng  
and the GCR in this report, or how they 
interact with the lives of people living in core 
and peripheral areas of the province. Yet, they 
are apparent in the spatial distribution of 
uneven development. 
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1.1 Exploring the core and periphery
Peripheries are literally the ‘perimeter’, the outer 
edges or boundaries of an area. Some scholars who 
examine inequality and urban spatiality use the 
term in this way (Kundu et al., 2002; Simone, 2007; 
Pileček and Jančák, 2011; Mabin et al., 2013). But 
peripheral areas are also spaces which may be 
economically, socially, demographically, politically 
and/or culturally marginal, in relation to core areas 
(Harvey, 1970, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979; Amin, 
1976; Soja, 1980, 1999; Smith, 1986, 1997; Pileček 
and Jančák, 2011). 
Notions of core and periphery originated with 
Wallerstein (1974, 1979) in an attempt to explain 
uneven development in global economies. Building 
on theories of underdevelopment, he used what 
is called ‘world system theory’ to explain uneven 
development. Simply put, world system theory argues 
that the core areas of the capitalist world economy 
extract the surplus value in labour and resources 
found in peripheral areas of the global economy. 
Uneven development enables the process of capital 
accumulation to concentrate in the core (Wallerstein, 
1974, 1979; Smith, 1986, 1997). Peripheral economies 
are the producers of raw materials – particularly 
agricultural products and minerals and labour. Core 
economies, as home to the secondary sectors, refine 
and manufacture products from the raw materials and 
agricultural products produced in the periphery. They 
are also home to financial services, wholesale, retail 
and hospitality services, and other tertiary sector 
economic activities. 
Although notions of core and periphery imply a binary 
construction of space, they are not separate spaces 
but a spatial expression of processes which reflect 
connections between places (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979; 
Soja, 1980; Chirot and Hall, 1982; Smith, 1986, 1997). 
For Wallerstein (1974, 1979) and others (Soja, 1980; 
Smith, 1986, 1997; Brenner, 2013), uneven development 
is an expression of the processes of capital 
accumulation and so is part of how the global  
economy works. Thus, uneven spaces reflect the 
“production of space” by capital (Smith, 2008).  
But spaces cannot always be neatly divided into core 
and periphery (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979; Sorinel, 
2010). The semi-periphery, which sits between 
the core and periphery, has characteristics of both 
and occupies shifting positions within the global 
economy. These areas may be declining core areas 
or peripheral areas with an increasingly important 
economic and social role (Terlouw, 1993, 2002; Sorinel, 
2010). Areas that sit outside the world economy, 
engaged with it but of little relevance, or sometimes 
excluded, are considered to be external (Smith 
1997; Sorinel, 2010).
Some scholars argue that the binary of core and 
periphery has “lost its relevance in a world of flows 
and complexity” (Van Hamme and Pion, 2012: 65) and 
look to networks and network theory to explain uneven 
development (Castells, 1996). Although these authors 
have focused on “flows of people and capital” and flows 
of raw materials, they are concerned with patterns 
of consumption and communication (Reynaud, 1981, 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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cited in Pileček and Jančák, 2011: 44). As Van Hamme 
and Pion (2012) argue, this approach relies on market-
force drivers and trade networks for understanding 
uneven development, and it denies the importance of 
states as major regulatory powers. It also moves away 
from understanding how uneven development enables 
capital accumulation in the context of globalisation. 
However, it is difficult to see a significant difference 
in the conclusions these authors draw about the 
spatial outcomes or the processes shaping uneven 
development in a globalised economy, beyond the 
emphasis on networks and consumption (Van Hamme 
and Pion, 2012). As in world system theory, in network 
theory spaces reflect their role in a capitalist global 
economy. Some are central to it, some play a more 
tangential role, and others are largely excluded. 
However, that very exclusion reflects their role, or 
lack of it, in the global economy. ‘New regionalism’ 
in geography also follows understandings of uneven 
development, again emphasising processes shaping 
regions, connections within them and the spaces that 
sit outside (Smith, 1986, 1997; Soja, 1999; Brenner, 
2013; Harrison, 2013).
Scale is important. Most of the focus of research has 
been on global relationships and includes middle and 
low income countries as part of the periphery. More 
recent literature focusing on uneven development 
at a regional or national level has centred on Europe 
(Eastern and Western) and North America. Although 
there are some exceptions (Kundu et al., 2002; 
Barton et al., 2008; Eraydin, 2011; Felzenstein et 
al., 2013), middle and low income countries and 
regions outside Europe have largely been pushed 
to the periphery of the debate, or discussions have 
been framed within the context of their place in the 
periphery or semi-periphery of the global economy. 
Core–periphery relationships within national 
boundaries, or at sub-national scales, have received 
much less attention.
Although much of the discussion of uneven 
development takes place at a global level, some scholars 
have tried to understand uneven development at more 
local levels (Massey, 1979; Harrison, 2013; Pain, 2008; 
Etherington and Jones, 2009), including within the 
context of city-regions (Pain, 2008; Etherington and 
Jones, 2009; Roy, 2009; Harrison, 2013;). Etherington 
“As in world system theory, in network theory 
spaces reflect their role in a capitalist global 
economy. Some are central to it, some play a 
more tangential role, and others are largely 
excluded. However, that very exclusion reflects 
their role, or lack of it, in the global economy.”
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and Jones (2009: 249) argue that the growth of  
city-regions, and the interest in them, is because they 
“are coming to function as the basic motors of the 
global economy”. Gauteng and the GCR can be seen as 
core regions, not only of South Africa, but also of Africa 
as a whole. Etherington and Jones (2009: 251) argue 
that because of the focus on external linkages and 
economic development:
city-regional strategies tend to pay scant attention 
to the distributional consequences of competitive 
policies – there is little focus on the nature and 
extent of poverty and social inequality, the need 
to establish poverty reduction targets and any 
assessment of how policies are likely to reduce 
poverty rates. 
Therefore, the following questions could be 
asked: what are the spatial effects of competitive 
policies in city-regions, including the GCR, and 
the development of core and peripheral areas? 
Do the processes of accumulation in Gauteng 
and the GCR create demographic and socio-
economically core and peripheral areas within 
the province and the city-region? How, where, 
and in what ways? And are there connections 
between these spaces? 
Core and peripheral areas are also relational. 
Areas defined as peripheral may be core when seen 
in relationship to areas around them (Holston and 
Caldeira, 2008; Caldeira, 2009). Similarly, peripheral 
areas may exist within core areas, for instance 
Alexandra in Johannesburg. There may also be 
differences within areas that would be defined as 
peripheral, for instance agricultural areas, where parts 
may be defined as core in relation to neighbouring 
agricultural areas (Wanmali and Islam, 1997). Thus, 
conceptions of core and periphery are relational as 
well as related to scale (Barton et al., 2008; Caldeira, 
2009; Harmse, 2009). Development and growth 
occur unevenly and so understanding core and 
peripheral areas within the GCR, and the relationships 
between them, is intrinsic to understanding spatial 
differences and inequalities and may point to ways 
of reducing them.
Surprisingly absent from much of the discussion 
is the role of the state in the processes that affect the 
shape of uneven development (Chirot and Hall, 1982; 
Etherington and Jones, 2009; Wibbels, 2009; Roy, 
2011; Harrison, 2013). Yet, nation states implement 
policies – economic, trade, social and spatial – that 
have an impact on the shape and development of 
core and peripheral areas, and may even introduce 
specific spatial development policies. So, it can be 
argued that “the nation-state – with its supposed 
monopoly over sovereignty – remains a key institution 
in structuring spatial order” (Ong, 1999: 215-7, cited 
in Roy, 2011: 234), and that its role extends beyond 
the nation state to provincial and local levels. The 
state and history are particularly important in the 
South African context. Significant in the work of 
Wallerstein (1974, 1979) and others concerned with 
uneven development is an understanding of history. 
Processes take place over time and exchanges take 
place across and within national boundaries. The 
socio-economic engineering of the apartheid state 
created particular space economies in South Africa’s 
rural and urban areas, which cannot always be 
translated as core and peripheral (Makhulu, 2010). 
Apartheid urban geographies created racialised spaces 
with high-density settlements on the edges of cities, 
but the working lives of the inhabitants of these spaces 
were located in the centres and white suburbs of core 
areas. Thus, the apartheid state socially engineered 
apartheid-specific core and periphery relationships 
that are still inscribed on South Africa’s landscapes. 
In contemporary South Africa, the National Spatial 
Development Perspective (NSDP, 2007) identifies how 
the South African state proposes to reduce spatial 
disparities with a spatial development plan. At smaller 
scales, South African provincial, metro and municipal 
governments, including Gauteng, have also introduced 
spatial development plans. 
However, Smith (1986: 92) argues that 
regional policies merely modify because they “treat 
underdevelopment, industrial decline, unemployment, 
poverty, and so forth, as spatial problems rather than 
social, political and economic ones, they never advance 
beyond superficial prescriptions”. As he argues, it is 
necessary to understand that without changes to the 
processes that have created unequal spaces, there can 
be no fundamental change. Smith’s comments reflect 
Soja’s (1980: 213) observation that many scholars 
concerned with understanding uneven development 
see urban planning as a tool of the state “serving the 
dominant classes by organizing and reorganizing 
urban space for the benefit of capital accumulation 
and crisis management”. It is evident from the 
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proposed solutions in the existing South African 
spatial development plans, including the Gauteng 
Spatial Development Framework (GPG, 2011), that 
developing networks of connectivity to reduce spatial 
inequalities is considered to be important. These 
are large-scale infrastructure projects, which, while 
valuable and likely to have some effect on ameliorating 
apartheid geographies, do little more than apply spatial 
band-aids to what are systemic underlying problems 
(Smith, 1986). 
Understandings of uneven development have 
focused on economic processes shaping uneven 
spaces. Yet peripherality is also experienced socially 
and culturally (Appadurai, 1986; Smith, 1997; Soja, 
1999; Stiglitz et al., 2009; Pileček and Jančák, 
2011; Roy, 2011). Other scholars have framed the 
discussion using the concept of ‘marginality’ where 
marginality, whether social, cultural or spatial, but 
also emerges from economic and social processes 
(Mehretu et al., 2000; Gurung and Kollmair, 2005). 
Mehretu et al. (2000: 89) suggest that marginality “is 
a complex condition of disadvantage that individuals 
and communities may experience because of 
vulnerabilities which may arise from inequitable 
environmental, ethnic, cultural, social, political 
and economic factors”. They articulate various 
ways that individuals and communities can be 
marginalised. They identify contingent, systemic, 
collateral and leveraged marginality, which can be 
experienced at various scales and with different 
spatial implications (Mehretu et al., 2000: 91; see 
also Gurung and Kollmair, 2005). However, they 
essentially see marginalisation as a result of the 
processes of capital accumulation or “the dynamics 
of the free market” (Mehretu et al., 2000: 90). They 
suggest that individuals and communities may also be 
marginalised by prejudice as well as by being socially 
or geographically close to marginal communities 
(Mehretu et al., 2000). Although the terminology is 
of marginality, the emphasis is again on economic 
processes shaping inequalities. However, the focus 
is on the impact on individuals and communities, 
and the social economy of marginalisation (Gurung 
and Kollmair, 2005). Mehretu et al. (2000) therefore 
emphasise the need to examine local situations, and 
the processes that cause marginality, for developing 
effective policy interventions. 
Pileček and Jančák (2011) argue that analytical 
frameworks identifying core and peripheral areas 
can be divided into those that consider them to be 
‘objective’ realities and those that consider them and 
the relationships between them to be ‘subjective’ 
realities. Following Leimgruber (1994), Pileček and 
Jančák identify six basic approaches to defining 
peripheral areas. The first, an ‘objective’ approach, 
echoing the modelling geographers of the 1950s 
and 1960s, identifies peripheral areas as those on 
the boundaries of a region, country, province, or 
otherwise spatially-defined area. A key determining 
factor in this perspective is distance from the 
centre or core. 
Peripherality may also be measured using 
social factors whereby it is associated with the 
marginalisation of social groups. This approach is 
concerned with questions of integration and power 
and focuses on those outside the social groups that 
hold power. So, access to power becomes an important 
determinant of marginality. In this approach, 
concerns relate to gender, ethnicity and race, and the 
focus is on low-income areas and “micro-peripheral 
areas” in spaces which, when viewed on a larger 
scale, may be perceived as core (Pileček and Jančák, 
2011: 47). Relatedly, cultural indicators may also be 
used to define peripherality whereby peripherality is 
associated with the segregation of cultural minorities. 
Spaces may also be considered as politically peripheral 
“Peripherality may also be measured using 
social factors whereby it is associated with 
the marginalisation of social groups. This 
approach is concerned with questions of 
integration and power and focuses on those 
outside the social groups that hold power.”
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(Pileček and Jančák, 2011) – when they are outside 
the interests of the political and decision-making 
processes of the state, whether at national, provincial 
or local levels, or they are physically situated far from 
them – limiting access to the state. In these cases, 
the interests of places that are seen as politically 
peripheral are subordinate to the interests of the core. 
Ecological approaches reverse what is core and what 
is peripheral: conservation areas and unused (and 
relatively pristine) land are seen as core, while areas 
of high human activity, built up areas, and those with 
environmental degradation, are seen as peripheral 
(Pileček and Jančák, 2011).
Economically peripheral areas are usually defined 
using GDP and type of economy. The GDP of peripheral 
areas is primarily produced through the primary 
sector and that of the core through the secondary and 
tertiary economic sectors (Gurung and Kollmair, 
2005; Harrison and Jones, 2009; Pileček and Jančák, 
2011). Peripheral areas are likely to be distant from 
core areas and markets, have poor or underdeveloped 
infrastructure and low levels of connectivity. The 
population is likely to have low levels of education, 
or lower levels than those in the core, higher levels 
of unemployment and underemployment, with poor 
working conditions. Usually, the population is more 
dispersed or has lower population densities than in 
the core. However, as apartheid spatial settlement 
patterns still persist in South Africa, densely 
populated areas can be found in the periphery and 
and low-density settlements in the core. The quality 
of life of people living in peripheral areas is usually 
considered to be lower than that of people living in core 
areas (Oppong et al., 1988). 
Economic indicators are commonly used 
to identify peripheral areas, whether at global, 
continental, regional, national or local scales. Pileček 
and Jančák (2011) suggest that using economic 
indicators alone affects how the boundaries of core and 
peripheral areas are drawn. So, although this study 
has used economic indicators by using the proportion 
of GVA produced in the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors for a defined area (mesozones), it has 
also used other social and socio-economic indicators 
to understand better which parts of Gauteng are 
peripheral, and in what ways. 
As Etherington and Jones (2009: 250) suggest, 
understanding “the links between economic, social 
and political governance, labour control, service 
provision, welfare policies, democracy, the politics 
of the urban environment and sustainability” 
allows for “a more rounded and holistic view of 
sub-national state territorialities”. In the process 
of trying to understand uneven development and 
core and peripheral areas in Gauteng and the GCR, 
this report endeavours to create an understanding 
of the city-region that extends beyond its functional 
economic extent, and looks at inequalities, unevenness 
and the multiple ways that they are experienced by 
its residents across the province, and where this 
is experienced.
1.2 Identifying core and periphery 
in the South African context
The Gauteng City-Region, the core region of the 
country, ranks as one of the largest economies on the 
continent. Although ranked as a world city and a global 
city-region, it is relatively small when considered 
against other city-regions in the world economy 
(Greenberg, 2010). Little explicit attention has been 
paid to uneven development within the framework 
of core and peripheral areas at provincial or national 
scales in South Africa. The South African Cities 
Network (SACN, 2012) looked at secondary cities, 
but it was concerned primarily with the relationships 
between South Africa’s larger urban centres, and 
not with understandings of core and periphery. A 
study by the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) for the SACN, the Presidency, 
and the Department of Local and Provincial 
Government (van Huyssteen and Botha, 2008), clearly 
identifies the GCR as the economic core of South 
Africa, which is leading the way in GVA (Figure 1), 
and scoring highest in accessibility to economic 
activity and services centres (van Huyssteen and 
Botha, 2008: 13-17).
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 1: Total Gross Value Added (GVA), South Africa, 2009 
SOURC E :  Map produced by CSIR; Quantec 2009   
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Harmse is one of the few South African researchers 
to have explored unequal distribution of “income 
employment opportunities, urbanisation, 
industrialisation and general levels of development” 
(2009: 60). She argues that the level or size of the 
spatial unit influences results, and suggests that for 
best results “relatively small spatial units should be 
used” (Harmse, 2009: 60). However, since her study 
was a national study, she used development regions 
based on metropolitan areas, district management 
areas and local municipalities. Based on data from 
Census 2001, she used sixteen variables to identify 
“highly-developed core regions”, “upward transitional 
regions”, “downward transitional regions”, and 
“special problem regions in need of development 
assistance” (Harmse, 2009: 61). The variables used 
included population density, birth rate, dependency 
ratios, income, employment, sector of GVA, land use, 
housing type, and services/infrastructure (electricity, 
water and refuse removal). Harmse found that in 
2001, 69.2 per cent of gross national income (GNI) 
was earned by people in highly-developed core regions 
that housed 38 per cent of the population on 5.5 per 
cent of the land area of the country (Harmse, 2009: 
61). Only 2 per cent of GNI was earned by people in 
“special problem regions” that housed 15 per cent 
of the total population, on nearly 10 per cent of the 
country’s land area. Although only 3.5 per cent of 
people in the areas identified as special problem 
regions lived in urban areas, population densities and 
dependency ratios were high. Less than 1 per cent of 
the population in these areas was employed in the 
formal sector, compared to 21 per cent of the national 
population (Harmse, 2009: 61). The core of the country 
was found to be Gauteng (Figure 1). Evaluating 
sectoral contributions to the GVA of the province 
indicates its role as a core area. In 2010, the tertiary 
sector contributed 71.1 per cent of the total GVA, the 
secondary sector, 24.8 per cent and the primary just 
4.1 per cent (GPG, 2012: 27). 
Various plans have been developed since 1994 
to deal with the spatial inequalities left by apartheid 
socio-economic ideologies, and to address on-going 
and newly developing spatial inequalities. These 
include the ten year Integrated Sustainable Rural 
Development Programme (2000) and the National 
Spatial Development Perspective (2007). Both of 
these focused on state investment in rural areas 
to build their economies. The latter plan included 
focused investment in industrial agglomerations and 
“Various plans have been developed since 1994 to 
deal with the spatial inequalities left by apartheid 
socio-economic ideologies, and to address on-
going and newly developing spatial inequalities.”
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economic development corridors, which are likely to 
increase core–periphery differentials (Greenberg, 
2010). Although these plans may seem balanced in 
terms of trying to marry investment in peripheral 
and core areas, both lack clear understanding of 
the implications of the processes that have shaped 
South Africa’s uneven geographies, particularly 
socio-economic inequalities in space (Greenberg, 
2010). The plans also failed to consider adequately the 
processes of demographic change (urbanisation), and 
processes of how and where capital decides to locate. 
When trying to understand relationships between 
the space economy and spatial development planning, 
the processes shaping the space economy, and those 
with the potential to do so, may be overlooked (SACN, 
2013). The National Development Plan (NPC, 2011) 
has a more nuanced perspective on the underpinnings 
of uneven development, but remains focused on 
development plans and interventions that ameliorate 
rather than challenge the processes underpinning 
uneven development. While it accepts and accounts for 
on-going urbanisation in South Africa far more than 
its predecessors did (NPC, 2011), it remains wedded 
to the current economic growth path and so seems 
destined to perpetuate uneven development, whatever 
its intentions. 
In many ways, the Gauteng Spatial Development 
Framework (2011) echoes these initiatives and 
shows how they may be implemented. It emphasises 
infrastructural development, transporting raw 
materials and goods faster to their destinations, 
moving people quicker to work and employment 
opportunities, as well as improving the lives of 
poorer and marginalised residents through targeted 
settlement upgrading (GPG, 2011: 18). Much of the 
focus is on enabling the economy and the development 
of township economies, nodes and corridors, some of 
which are located in peripheral areas of the GCR. But 
when read closely, these spatial development plans 
reflect Soja’s (1980: 213) statement that in the “urban 
spatial problematic” a city is seen “not only in terms 
of its role as a centre of production and accumulation, 
but also as the control point for the reproduction of 
capitalist society in terms of labour power, exchange 
and consumption”. So urban planning in Gauteng 
can also be seen as a tool of the state “serving the 
dominant classes by organizing and reorganizing 
urban space for the benefit of capital accumulation and 
crisis management” (Soja, 1980: 213). Although the 
intention of the Gauteng spatial development policies 
is to alleviate the marginalisation of some residents, as 
this chapter will show, they are fundamentally about 
moving workers from the periphery more quickly and 
efficiently to the core. Some of the province’s other 
plans, like developing mega human settlements, imply 
that intended reorganisations of space will continue 
to prioritise the needs of capital, which underpinned 
socio-economic unequal development and 
peripheralisation in the past. 
“Much of the focus is on enabling the economy 
and the development of township economies, 
nodes and corridors, some of which are 
located in peripheral areas of the GCR.”
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2. Methodology
Various methodologies have been used to identify 
core and peripheral areas. Most have been developed 
to enable international comparisons between 
countries or between and within regions at the 
scale of the European Union. Some methodologies 
use single indicators, while others use composite 
indicators or indexes. In a study of the European 
Union, Villaverde and Maza (2011) found both single 
and composite indicators had value in determining 
spatial inequalities. Stiglitz et al. (2009) highlight the 
need to use other indicators in addition to economic 
indicators to understand social, cultural and economic 
well-being and inequalities as well as their spatial 
representation. Similarly, Pileček and Jančák (2011) 
conclude that the richest understandings come from 
researchers who use multiple indicators. While 
economic indicators are most commonly used as 
the basis for identifying core and peripheral areas, 
Mehretu et al. (2000) and Gurung and Kollmair 
(2005) suggest indicators for identifying social and 
cultural peripherality. 
Areas usually considered as core have high 
proportions of their GVA produced in the financial 
and manufacturing sectors and a high concentration 
of businesses. The GVA of peripheral areas is 
concentrated in the mining and agricultural 
sectors and they usually have lower concentrations 
of business activity. Land use in core areas is 
largely urban or built-up and population density 
is usually high. Peripheral areas consist largely of 
agricultural, conservation or otherwise unused 
land, with lower building densities and lower 
population densities.
To understand whether uneven development is 
taking place, how and where, the core and peripheral 
areas of Gauteng first needed to be identified. 
Initially, economic and land-use criteria, along with 
population density measures, were used to identify 
core and peripheral areas in Gauteng. Then other 
socio-economic and demographic criteria were used to 
create a series of indexes of peripherality to look at how 
these were reflected in the economically-defined core 
and peripheral areas.
The index to identify core and peripheral areas 
in Gauteng was created using data from four sources. 
First, the CSIR Geospatial Analysis Platform 
(CSIR-GAP) project (www.gap.csir.co.za) was used. 
This divides South Africa into approximately 50 
km square (7 km by 7 km) mesozones. The source 
of GVA in 2009, was identified for each mesozone, 
using eight categories. The proportions of GVA per 
mesozone produced in the agricultural, and mining 
and quarrying sectors, as a percentage of the total 
GVA of the mesozone, as well as the percentage of 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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agricultural and conservation land, were inverted 
as they are indicators of peripherality. Second, using 
AfriGIS data from 2010 that plots the number of 
businesses per kilometre, the percentage of businesses 
per mesozone was calculated. Third, land-use data was 
gathered using GTI 2.5m land-cover data from 2010. 
Fourth, data on population distribution for 2010 was 
obtained from Lightstone Demprokey X. Mesozones 
with high scores were counted as core areas and those 
with low scores were considered peripheral. This index 
was then mapped using ArcGIS and natural breaks. 
The boundaries between core and peripheral areas 
were then drawn.
The index to identify core and 
peripheral areas was created using the 
above data sources in the following equation 
(Damon, 2012: 5): 
([Perc_TotGv] + [S3_Prop] + [S8_Prop] +  
[S2_Prop_in] + [S1_Prop_in] + [PERC_BUS] +  
[P_Rec2_in] + [P_Rec3_in] + [Perc_Rec1] 
+ [Perc_TotPo])/10
Where:
Perc_TotGv = percentage of total GVA for Gauteng
S3_Prop = proportion of the GVA for the mesozone 
produced in the manufacturing sector
S8_Prop = proportion of the GVA for the mesozone 
produced in the financial sector
S2_Prop_in = proportion of the GVA for the  
mesozone produced in the mining sector as an  
inverted % of the total GVA of the mesozone
S1_Prop_in = proportion of the GVA for the mesozone 
produced in the agriculture sector as an inverted 
% of the total GVA of the mesozone
PERC_BUS = percentage of AfriGIS business  
for Gauteng per mesozone
P_Rec2_in = inverted percentage of 
agricultural land per mesozone
P_Rec3_in = inverted percentage of 
conservation land per mesozone
Perc_Rec1 = percentage of urban land per mesozone
Perc_TotPo = percentage of total population of 
Gauteng and divided by 10
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Figure 2: Core and periphery binary index
0 0.2 0.9 - 1.5
0.1 0.3 - 0.4 1.6 - 2.8
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23.7 - 33 39.7 - 49
20 - 25.9 32.7 - 38.9
26 - 32.6 39 - 48.2
Demographic index (% share of total Gauteng 
population per mesozone)
Core and periphery index
(economic, demographic 
and land cover indexes)
Economic index (% share of total Gauteng GVA, % 
GVA manufacturing, % GVA fi nance, inverted % 
GVA mining, inverted % GVA agriculture, % share 
of businesses per mesozone)
Demographic index
Economic index
Core and periphery index
S O U R C E S :  CSIR GAP mesozones, Afrigis Bizcount (2010)
S O U R C E S :  CSIR GAP mesozones, 
Afrigis Bizcount (2010),
GTI 2.5m Land Cover (2010), 
Lightstone Demprokey X (2010)
S O U R C E S :  CSIR GAP mesozones,
Lightstone DemProkey X (2010)
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Core Periphery
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Once the boundaries between core and peripheral 
areas were drawn, Gauteng electoral wards (as at 
2011) were assigned as core or periphery. There 
are 483 electoral wards in Gauteng, of which 267 
fall in the core and 216 in the periphery. Electoral 
wards in densely-populated areas can be spatially 
small, while those in rural and conservation areas 
can be extensive.The population of wards ranges 
from an outlier with under 1 000 residents to one 
with over 43 000 residents. In 2011, 36 per cent of 
the population, and 36 per cent of households in 
Gauteng, lived in the peripheral areas identified in this 
study (Census, 2011).
Having created a boundary between core and 
peripheral areas in Gauteng, and sorted Gauteng 
2011 electoral wards into the core and peripheral 
areas identified using mesozones, a binary analysis of 
relevant Census 2011 data and data from the GCRO 
Quality of Life (QoL) 2015 and 2013 surveys was made 
at ward level. As economic values are not the only 
indicators of peripherality – there are various ways 
that areas and the people who live in them may be 
marginalised – and in order to see what is happening 
in spheres other than economic production and 
population density, a series of socio-economic indexes 
were created. The decision as to which indicators 
to use were informed by the work of Villaverde and 
Maza (2011), Pileček and Jančák (2011), Stiglitz et al. 
(2009), Gurung and Kollmair (2005), and Mehretu 
et al. (2000). The indexes created were demographic, 
migration, income and employment, housing, services, 
connectivity and household goods. Connectivity and 
peripherality was also explored by mapping residents’ 
trips (commuting, shopping and leisure) within the 
province using QoL 2013. The main sources of data for 
the indexes were Census 2011 and the GCRO Quality of 
Life 2015 and 2013 surveys. The QoL 2013 survey was 
based on a representative sample of 27 494 residents in 
Gauteng and the QoL 2015 survey on a representative 
sample of 30 000 residents of the province  
(see www.gcro.ac.za).
“As economic values are not the only indicators of 
peripherality – there are various ways that areas and 
the people who live in them may be marginalised – and 
in order to see what is happening in spheres other 
than economic production and population density, a 
series of socio-economic indexes were created.”
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3. Demography
3.1 Uneven demographies
Ostensibly, the populations of core and peripheral 
areas in the same country should be similar in age 
and household structure. However, demographically 
marginal or peripheral areas are characterised by 
populations with high proportions of elderly people 
and children, large households, and relatively high 
proportions of female headed households.  
A demographic index was created using 
Census 2011 data by adding the proportion 
of the population of 65 years and older, the 
proportion of the population under 19 years, the 
proportion of households of 6 or more people, 
and the proportion of female headed households, 
per ward (Figure 3).
Photograph by Mark Momberg
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Figure 3: Demographic index
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Demographic index
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Figure 3 shows that overall, based on the demographic 
index there are not clear distinctions between core and 
peripheral areas. While the most marginal areas of 
the province are located in peripheral areas, sections 
of core areas also show demographic peripherality. 
In part, these distributions reflect the legacy of 
apartheid geographies. 
Internationally, one of the first indicators of 
core areas is that they have a high proportion of 
the population of a given area, and they are densely 
populated. It was not clear whether and how this 
would apply in the South African context. Apartheid 
forced black South Africans into designated areas 
and townships, which enabled the development of 
densely-populated formal and informal settlements.1 
Most of these areas were located on the outskirts of 
then designated white urban areas, and in the case of 
what were called ‘homelands’, on the boundaries of 
what is now Gauteng. Post-apartheid development of 
government housing has also often take place on the 
outskirts of urban areas where land is cheaper. Thus 
parts of some peripheral areas of the province are 
densely populated. 
So, although some areas of high population 
density are located within the core of the province, 
others lie outside the core. Similarly, there are areas 
of low density in core areas, although the lowest 
density areas are in the periphery (Figure 4). Most 
of the wards with the highest population density in 
the core are spaces that, in the following analysis, 
appear as socio-economically peripheral, despite being 
within the core. This reflects apartheid geographies 
and the location of townships and former homeland 
areas. It also challenges most of the literature, 
which associates higher population densities with 
core areas and lower population densities with 
peripheral areas. 
1. Here the term ‘black’ includes black Africans, as well as coloured, Indian and Asian South Africans, as all were affected by forced 
removals to designated areas during apartheid. Elsewhere the racial (or population group) categories used by 
StatisticsSouth Africa (StatsSA) are used: black African, coloured, Indian/Asian and white.
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Figure 4: Population density (per sq kilometre)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 555 3047 - 4906 9842 - 13254 Core
556 - 1658 4907 - 7108 13255 - 22156 Gauteng municipalities
1659 - 3046 7109 - 9841 22157 - 66909
Population density per sq kilometre
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Overall, the sex profiles of core and peripheral 
areas are similar, with core areas showing a male to 
female ratio of 50:50 and peripheral areas a ratio of 
51:49. Municipalities in the peripheral areas of the 
province with mining economies and associated 
in-migration of mineworkers, have higher populations 
of men. For example, in Mogale City and Westonaria, 
men constitute 54 per cent and 56 per cent of the 
population, respectively. 
Table 1: Proportion of population by race, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Black 
African Coloured Indian or Asian White Other
Core 74 3 3 19 1
Periphery 83 4 3 9 1
The racial profiles of the populations of the peripheral 
and core areas of the province are different  
(Table 1). In 2011, black Africans constituted a 
higher proportion of the population in peripheral 
areas (83 per cent compared to 74 per cent in the 
core) while whites constituted almost a fifth (19 
per cent) of residents in core areas and less than a 
tenth (9 per cent) in peripheral areas (Census, 2011). 
Although ethnic or racial minorities are usually 
associated with peripherality, in the South African 
context, the white minority remains in a position 
of economic power and advantage. Thus, areas 
with higher proportions of the historically and still 
disadvantaged black population are more likely to be 
peripheral or marginal. 
In the context of HIV/AIDS, high numbers of 
child-headed households indicate vulnerability. 
Census 2011 found a similar proportion of household 
heads aged under 16 years in core and peripheral  
areas (0.1 per cent), but there were stark 
concentrations in some wards, mainly in  
peripheral areas or on the edge of the core  
(Figure 5). Although higher numbers of elderly  
people is seen as a marker of peripherality, a  
higher proportion of the population in the core 
was aged over 65 years (5 per cent) than in the 
periphery (3 per cent) (Table 2 and Figure 6). This 
reflects apartheid patterns of settlement, different 
age profiles by race, and the more affluent areas 
of the province. White, middle class, and wealthy 
people are likely to live longer than black working-
class people (Census, 2011). Wards with higher 
proportions of elderly people were more likely to be 
found in the core, particularly the northern suburbs 
of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Pretoria, as 
well as in Midvaal.
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Figure 5: Number of household heads aged under 16 years per ward
SOURC E : Census, 2011
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8.1 - 19 36.1 - 69 Gauteng wards
No. of household heads aged under 16 years per ward
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Figure 6: Population aged 65+ years per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 3 7.1 - 12 Core
3.1 - 7 13 - 28 Gauteng wards
Population aged 65+ years per ward (%)
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Table 2: Population by age category, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
<19 years 20 - 34 years 35 - 64 years 65+ years
Core 30 34 32 5
Periphery 34 32 31 3
Photograph by Irene Lambrianos
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Figure 7: Population aged 19 years or under per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
1 - 17 29 - 34 Core
18 - 28 35 - 43 Gauteng wards
Population aged 19 years or under per ward (%)
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A high proportion of the population under 19 years 
of age is an indicator of peripherality since it is an 
indicator of dependency ratios. Wards with higher 
proportions of their populations aged under 19 
years were most likely to be found in peripheral 
areas (Figure 7). Similarly, a binary analysis of 
the populations shows a higher proportion of the 
population living in peripheral areas to be aged under 
19 years (34 per cent, compared to  
30 per cent in core areas) (Table 2). This is  
despite core areas being home to more universities  
and further education and training (FET) colleges,  
as well as a host of public and private schools. The  
only exceptions in the periphery are the mining areas 
of Westonaria and Merafong.
Table 3: Household size, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Core 30 24 16 14 7 4 2 1 1 1
Periphery 29 21 16 14 9 5 3 1 1 1
Photograph by Skhumbuzo Mtshali
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Figure 8: Single person households per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
9 - 24 33.1 - 51 Core
24.1 - 33 51.1 - 87 Gauteng wards
Single person households per ward (%)
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Figure 9: Households of 6+ persons per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 6 12 - 16 Core
6.1 - 11 17 - 28 Gauteng wards 
Household of 6+ persons per ward (%)
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Wards with the highest proportions of households 
of five or more members are most likely to lie in 
peripheral areas, although some lie in the township 
areas of the core – particularly Soweto and Katlehong, 
in the south of Ekurhuleni (Figure 9 and Table 3). 
When considered in a binary analysis, 11 per cent of 
households in the periphery are made up of six or more 
people, compared to 9 per cent in core areas  
(Table 3). But, as Figure 9 shows, the distribution 
of large households is not even across the 
periphery. While not usually considered an 
indicator of peripherality, a high proportion of 
single-person households occurs in parts of the 
periphery, particularly those associated with 
mining (Figure 8). 
Photograph by Mikey Rosato
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Figure 10: Female headed households per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
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21.1 - 31 39.1 - 51 Gauteng wards
Female headed households per ward (%)
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According to Census 2011, Gauteng has the lowest 
proportion of female headed households of any 
province (34 per cent, compared to the national figure 
of 41 per cent). Proportionally, there were slightly 
more female headed households in the core (35 per 
cent) than in the periphery (33 per cent) in 2011 
(Figure 10). However, although the proportions are 
similar, because of the larger number of households 
in the core, numerically there are nearly twice as 
many female headed households in core areas of 
the province than in peripheral areas. Although 
female headed households are considered to be 
more vulnerable than male headed households, the 
proportion of female headed households in the core 
and periphery of Gauteng should be considered 
within the context of changing gender relations and 
migration to the province. 
The demographics of Gauteng at times challenge 
some of the accepted wisdom around the population 
profiles of core and peripheral areas, particularly in 
terms of population density and proportions of female 
headed households. 
The legacy of apartheid complicates the picture 
since apartheid spatial planning and inequalities 
persist in the spatial demographics of the province. 
Nevertheless, overall, the demographic index 
constructed above shows that vulnerable populations 
and households are more likely to be located 
in peripheral areas.
3.2 Changing demographics
Gauteng has experienced significant population 
growth rates since 1996. The five years between  
1996 and 2001 saw the population of peripheral  
areas increase by over 25 per cent, and the core by 
17 per cent (Table 4). In the following decade the 
population increased across the province by almost  
a third, at a rate of 31 per cent. Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA, 2013: 12) attributes 52 per cent of the 
increase in the population of the province between 
2001 and 2011 to in-migration from other provinces 
and other countries.
Table 4: Population growth rates, Gauteng, 1996 - 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011
Core 17 31 52
Periphery 28 31 68
Total Gauteng 20 31 64
There were no significant changes in the age 
profiles of core and peripheral areas between 1996 
and 2011 (Census, 2011). However, there was a 
slight decline in the proportion of the population 
aged under 19 years and a slight increase in the 
proportion of the population of working age, 
in peripheral areas.
There were changes in the proportions of 
households headed by men and women in core and 
peripheral areas, indicating post-apartheid changes 
in urbanisation, the possibilities for movement, 
feminisation of migration streams, and perhaps 
gender relations. In 1996, 30 per cent of households 
in the core, and 28 per cent in the periphery, were 
headed by women, but by 2011, these proportions 
were 35 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. Perhaps 
reflecting the decline in the mining sector and/or 
changes in the social structures around mining, there 
was a 1 per cent increase in the proportion of women 
to men in peripheral areas between 1996 (52:48) 
and 2011 (51:49). 
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4. Migration and mobility
4.1 Uneven patterns of migration
Peripheral areas are associated with being the source 
of cheap labour for production. Most literature relating 
to understanding core–periphery relationships is 
on a global, or inter-nation state scale, where the 
focus is on countries considered to be peripheral 
providing labour for off-shore production and 
extraction for corporations based in countries 
in core areas. However, migration is sometimes 
considered at a different scale where core areas attract 
migrants as low-paid labour for production in the 
core (Balibar, 2007; Holston and Caldeira, 2008). 
These migrants are likely to be found in peripheral 
areas within or surrounding the core. Much of the 
literature associating migrant populations with 
peripheral areas refers to high-income countries in 
Europe and North America with aging populations. 
In these places, migrant populations are seen as 
identifiers of areas of peripherality. Thus, high 
rates of migration, mobility, and high proportions 
of migrants in the population, are associated with 
peripheral areas as peripheries are seen as labour 
pools for core areas. 
Using migration to identify peripheral areas 
and associating migrants with peripherality may 
be problematic in the context of Gauteng and South 
Africa. South Africa is an urbanising country. Census 
2011 was the first census in which over 50 per cent of 
the black population of the country was found to live 
in urban areas. Gauteng is the primary destination 
in South Africa of both internal and international 
migrants. Census 2011 found that almost half the 
population was born outside the province: 36 per 
cent of the population was born elsewhere in South 
Africa, and 10 per cent outside the country (Census, 
2011). However, the Community Survey of 2016 found 
that the numbers of both internal and international 
migrants, and the proportions they made up in the 
overall population, had fallen.2 It estimated that 65 
per cent of the population of the province was born 
in Gauteng, 27 per cent in another province and 8 per 
cent in another country (StatsSA, 2016: 28). Although 
migrants may find themselves on the spatial, social and 
economic margins of the city, evidence suggests that 
in Gauteng, they are not significantly economically 
disadvantaged compared to the Gauteng-born 
(Peberdy, 2013a). However, they may find themselves 
excluded and marginalised socially, particularly cross-
border migrants. The spatial distribution of migrants 
in Gauteng reflects what Wilson (2011:1) calls the 
“durability of the legacies of poverty and inequality” 
of apartheid, as well as the persistence of labour 
migration, particularly circular labour migration 
in post-apartheid South Africa and southern Africa 
(Peberdy, 2013a, 2013b). 
2. The Community Survey is designed to provide more up-to-date information on population and households. It is one of a number of surveys 
that Statistics South Africa undertakes between censuses, such as the Mid-year Population Estimates, the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 
the Survey of Employers and the Self-Employed. The purpose of the Community Survey is to provide updated information to policy makers for 
service-delivery uses. Community Survey 2016 interviewed 1.3 million households across South Africa. As in the censuses, all individuals in a 
household are enumerated. There are some differences in the questions asked in the two surveys, but the core questions are the same. This part 
of the report continues to use Census 2011 data as it can be disaggregated to ward level, unlike the data from the Community Survey.
055
PART A
Photograph by Gareth Pon
056
Figure 11: Migration index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Migration index
17.6 - 36.1 57.9 - 69.8 94.2 - 106.6 Core
36.2 - 47.7 69.9 - 81.7 106.7 - 126.9 Gauteng wards
47.8 - 57.8 81.8 - 94.1 127.0 - 169.0
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A migration index was created, despite reservations 
about the role of migration in an urbanising core being 
used to identify areas of peripherality in Gauteng 
(Figure 11). The index added together the proportions 
of the population, per ward, that had been born outside 
Gauteng (whether in another province or another 
country), and the proportion that had moved dwelling 
whether within or into the province since 2001  
(Figure 11). The population of the province is mobile. 
Figures 11 and 12 show that the core of the province 
is mobile and contains significant concentrations 
of migrants. Figure 12 demonstrates that migrants 
constitute significant proportions of the population 
of core areas, except in the areas on the edges. 
Significantly, older townships in core areas such as 
Soweto, Mamelodi and those in Emfuleni, which 
appear peripheral when socio-economic indicators are 
used but lie in the originally identified core area, show 
low rates of in-migration. Obviously peripheral areas 
associated with mining, show high rates of migrancy. 
High proportions of migrants in Midrand reflect its 
rapid development in the past decade and the growth 
of settlements like Diepsloot. Binary analysis of the 
populations of peripheral and core areas in Gauteng 
using Census 2011 data found that a higher proportion 
of the population in the core of the province was made 
up of migrants (Table 5). 
Table 5: Proportion of migrants in core and periphery, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Born in 
another province
Born in 
another country
Gauteng
born
Core 35 10 55
Periphery 34 8 58
“Binary analysis of the populations of peripheral 
and core areas in Gauteng using Census 2011 data 
found that a higher proportion of the population in 
the core of the province was made up of migrants.”
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Figure 12: Population born outside Gauteng per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 29 43.1 - 60 Core
29.1 - 43 60.1 - 96 Gauteng wards
Population born outside Gauteng per ward (%)
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Figure 13: Internal migrants per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 24 35.1 - 49 Core
24.1 - 35 49.1 - 75 Gauteng wards
Internal migrants per ward (%)
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When the index is broken down, a slightly different 
picture emerges. Figure 13 shows that the distribution 
of wards with high proportions of internal migrants 
is uneven in core and peripheral areas. The parts of 
the city of Tshwane that lie in the core are notable for 
the relatively high proportion of internal migrants 
compared to other parts of the core. There are some 
differences in the core and periphery between 
the proportions of migrants from the various 
provinces (Table 6).
Table 6: Origins of residents born in other provinces, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Western
Cape
Eastern
Cape
Northern
Cape
Free
State
Kwa-
Zulu-
Natal
North
West
Mpuma-
langa
Lim-
popo
Core 4 12 2 10 19 8 14 31
Periphery 1 16 2 13 15 11 13 30
With the exception of the mining areas of the West 
Rand, cross-border or international migrants are most 
likely to form higher proportions of the population 
of wards located in the core (Figure 14). There are 
differences in the origins of cross-border migrants 
found in core and peripheral areas: in peripheral 
areas there are higher proportions of migrants from 
the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), while in core areas of the province there are 
higher proportions of migrants from the rest of the 
continent outside the SADC and elsewhere in the 
world (Table 7). The high proportions of migrants 
from SADC countries in peripheral areas may 
reflect their more than a century long association 
of migrants with working in the gold mining and 
agricultural sectors. 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 14: Population born outside South Africa per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
1 - 7 15.1 - 28 Core
7.1 - 15 28.1 - 43 Gauteng wards
Population born outside South Africa per ward (%)
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Table 7: Regions of birth of international migrants, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
SADC Rest of Africa
United 
Kingdom 
and 
Europe
Asia North America
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean
Oceania
Core 74 12 7 5 1 0.5 1
Periphery 90 5 2 2 0.1 0 0.1
Table 8: Residents aged 10+ years who moved to dwelling between  
2001 – 2011, major metros (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Metro
City of Johannesburg (Gauteng) 38
City of Tshwane (Gauteng) 38
Ekurhuleni (Gauteng) 32
City of Cape Town (Western Cape) 31
eThekwini (KwaZulu-Natal) 20
Mobility is associated with peripherality, yet Gauteng 
and its metros, the richest province and the core of the 
country, have the most mobile populations in South 
Africa (Table 8). Tables 8 and 9, and Figure 15, showing 
people over the age of 10 years who moved to their place 
of dwelling between 2001 and 2011, demonstrate how 
mobile the population of the province is. These moves 
may have been within the province, from another 
province, or from another country. Moves of internal 
and international migrants may just have been within 
the province. Notable is that of those who were born 
in South Africa, in the decade 2001–2011, people who 
were born in Gauteng were the most likely to have 
moved home. And, nearly three quarters of the people 
in Gauteng who were born outside South Africa, moved 
in the same decade. This is likely to reflect the rates of 
cross-border migration to the province, particularly 
from the SADC, and more specifically from Zimbabwe, 
over the past decade, the impact of the xenophobic 
violence in the province of 2008, as well as residential 
mobility within the province.
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Table 9: Residents aged 10+ years who moved to dwelling between  
2001 – 2011 by place of birth, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Western 
Cape
Eastern 
Cape
Northern 
Cape
Free 
State
Kwa- 
Zulu-
Natal
North 
West Gauteng
Mpuma-
langa Limpopo
Outside 
South 
Africa
20 19 20 18 15 19 25 16 19 72
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 15: Proportion of residents aged 10+ years who moved  
to dwelling between 2001-2011, Gauteng, 2011
SOURC E : Census, 2011
5.4 - 21.4 36.4 - 52.7 Core
21.5 - 36.3 52.8 - 85.6 Gauteng wards
Proportion of residents per ward who moved to dwelling between 2001-2011
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Figure 15 shows how township areas, often located 
in the core, but peripheral in other ways, have some 
of the least mobile populations. This applies, in 
particular, to the established townships of Alexandra, 
Soweto, Mamelodi, Soshanguve and Sharpeville 
(Figure 15). Similarly, swathes of the periphery show 
a largely immobile population, particularly on the 
spatial boundaries of the province, including the old 
homeland areas on the north-western border. When 
a binary analysis was undertaken using Census 2011 
data, 37 per cent of the population of the core aged 
over 10 years, and 32 per cent of the periphery, had 
moved dwelling between 2001 and 2011. The high 
rate of mobility, particularly of those born in Gauteng, 
may reflect changing housing opportunities and new 
government housing developments. However, it could 
also relate to other kinds of mobility and the many 
reasons people move home. 
South Africa has a long history of internal 
and cross-border labour migration to support 
the extraction of commodities like gold, as well 
as other secondary economic activities. Crudely 
put, apartheid engineered a system where black 
workers were forced to live in labour reserves 
and travel to urban or other areas where their 
labour was required. The demise of apartheid has 
ostensibly allowed people to live wherever they want 
to (income and opportunities permitting) and to 
move to urban areas to explore economic and other 
opportunities. Thus, the cheap labour force of the 
wider national periphery has been able to come to 
the doorstep of capital located in the core of Gauteng. 
Peripheral areas in the province, which still act as 
sources of labour for the core, also show high rates 
of in-migration.
4.2 Changing dynamics of migration
Gauteng is the epicentre of migration in South Africa 
and over half (52 per cent) of the population growth 
between 2001 and 2011 was through in-migration 
(StatsSA, 2013: 12). When the cities of Johannesburg 
and Ekurhuleni are compared with two other metros 
in the country, Gauteng’s focus as the destination 
for migrants is evident. In 2011, 47 per cent of the 
population of Johannesburg and 45 per cent of the 
population of Ekurhuleni was internal or international 
migrants. However, only a third of the population 
of Cape Town (27 per cent internal, and 6 per cent 
international migrants), and 13 per cent of the 
population of eThekwini (10 per cent internal, and 
3 per cent international migrants) had been born 
outside those provinces (Census, 2011). Internal 
migration to the province and the GCR has been 
growing, particularly between 1996 and 2001, and has 
continued steadily. 
“The high rate of mobility, particularly of those born in 
Gauteng, may reflect changing housing opportunities 
and new government housing developments.” 
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Table 10: Regions of birth of international migrants, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
SADC 
countries
Rest of 
Africa Europe Asia
North 
America
Central
and South
America
Australia
and New
Zealand
1996
Core 47 4 38 4 2 4 1
Periphery 91 0.4 6 1 0.2 1 0.1
2001
Core 57 9 27 4 2 1 0.6
Periphery 92 1 5 1 0.2 0.3 0.1
2011
Core 78 9 6 6 0.1 0.4 0.3
Periphery 92 3 2 3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Photograph by Kamogelo Mokoena
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Patterns of cross-border migration to the province 
have changed considerably since 1996 (Table 10). 
There has been a significant increase in migration 
from other African countries, particularly to the 
core. The largest increase has been in the numbers of 
southern Africans in the province. In peripheral areas, 
the proportion of cross-border migrants born in SADC 
countries has barely changed since 1996, despite 
declining employment levels of SADC nationals on 
the gold mines. In the core areas of the GCR, however, 
the proportion of SADC nationals rose from less than 
half of cross-border migrants (47 per cent) in 1996, 
to over three quarters (78 per cent) in 2011. Part of 
this proportional increase can be ascribed to a fall 
in the numbers of migrants born in Europe, who 
constituted 38 per cent of cross-border migrants in 
1996, but only 6 per cent in 2011. Their numbers may 
have fallen owing to emigration, migration to other 
parts of South Africa, and death (an aging population). 
However, most of the change can be ascribed to new 
patterns of migration. 
Since 1996, there has been a notable increase 
in the presence of people born in the rest of Africa, 
beyond the SADC. The proportion of nationals from the 
rest of the continent outside the SADC doubled in core 
areas between 1996 and 2001 (Table 10). Cross-border 
migrants from outside the SADC, including people 
from the rest of Africa and the Indian subcontinent 
and Asia, began moving to peripheral areas between 
2001 and 2011 (Table 10). 
Theories of uneven development do not engage 
sufficiently with the relationship between urbanisation 
and migration, and core and peripheral areas. Yet, in 
Gauteng, it is possible to see how, as the core of South 
Africa’s economy the province and the city-region 
attract migrants, enabling the growth of a cheap labour 
force on the doorstep of capital. At the same time, 
the legacy of apartheid labour practices, particularly 
the circular migratory labour system, persists in the 
mining fields of the West Rand, where the mining 
sector attracts and employs (mainly) men from other 
provinces, particularly the Eastern Cape, on short-
term contracts. Workers from outside South Africa 
are not able to bring their families with them. Circular 
migration is also practiced by other international 
and internal migrants in the GCR and Gauteng. 
Thus, it is possible to see how the “spatial relations of 
production or the center–periphery structure” are not 
“separate and independent from the social relations of 
production” (Soja, 1980: 209).
The peripheral areas of the city-region, whether 
located outside the core or within the core, are home 
to new migrants, whether internal or cross-border, as 
well as to sections of the historically-disadvantaged 
black population born in the province. These residents 
are usually located in the old township areas of 
Gauteng, or in new informal settlements and RDP 
housing developments on the edges of cities, and 
sometimes in the urban core
“Theories of uneven development do not engage 
sufficiently with the relationship between 
urbanisation and migration, and core and peripheral 
areas. Yet, in Gauteng, it is possible to see how, as the 
core of South Africa’s economy the province and the 
city-region attract migrants, enabling the growth 
of a cheap labour force on the doorstep of capital.”
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5. Education
5.1 Uneven access to education
Education has an impact on the employment and 
income-earning opportunities of individuals and 
the development capacity of an area. Educational 
opportunities are not always distributed equally, 
however. Areas where there are poor distributions of 
schools, weak schools, poor attendance at school, long 
distances travelled to school, low levels of education, 
and little access to institutions of higher education,  
are likely to be peripheral. 
Gauteng is home to many institutions of higher 
education (HEIs). Four public universities lie within 
the boundaries of the province – the universities of 
Johannesburg, Pretoria, South Africa (Unisa) and 
the Witwatersrand – as well as the Vaal campus of 
North-West University, two universities of technology 
(Tshwane and Vaal), eleven further education and 
training (FET) colleges, and a private university.  
In 2010, there were also 60 private education colleges 
in the province (Nyar, 2013: 4). The main campuses 
of all of these institutions are located in the core 
of the GCR (Nyar, 2013). In addition, owing to 
institutional mergers, the University of Johannesburg 
also has campuses on the East Rand and in Soweto, 
and the University of Pretoria also has a campus in 
Mamelodi, essentially peripheral areas in the core of 
the province. Unisa is primarily a distance-learning 
institution for people from all over the province, 
as well as in the rest of the country and elsewhere 
in the world. Three FET colleges are located in the 
periphery (but on the edge of the core) in Klerksdorp, 
Randfontein and Springs. 
Excluding Unisa (on the grounds of it being 
a distance-learning institution), in 2010, 26 per 
cent of South Africa’s undergraduate students, 
and 37 per cent of the country’s postgraduate 
students, studied in the GCR (Nyar, 2013: 5). The 
GCR was also home to 49 per cent of the country’s 
academic staff in 2010 (Nyar, 2013: 11). The National 
Research Foundation’s South African Research 
Chairs Initiative (SARChI) promotes research and 
development in universities. Between 2006 and 
2012, 152 research chairs were appointed nationally, 
of which 47 were allocated in Gauteng (GCRO, 
2013b). The concentration of HEIs and investment 
in research chairs in Gauteng is reflected in, and 
perhaps reflects, its core status when considered 
on a national scale. However, the investment does 
not reflect the contribution of the province to 
national GDP (33 per cent) and the proportion of 
business (58 per cent) and government (23 per cent) 
investment in research and development in the 
province (GCRO, 2013a).
Table 11: Highest level of education, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
No 
schooling
Some 
primary
Completed 
primary
Some 
secondary
Completed 
secondary
Certificate 
or diploma
Tertiary 
degree or 
post-
graduate 
diploma
Higher 
degree 
(Masters/
PhD)
Core 3 16 4 29 30 11 6 1
Periphery 5 21 5 35 24 7 3 0,4
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“Education has an impact on the employment 
and income-earning opportunities of individuals 
and the development capacity of an area”
Photograph by Christian Scriba
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A binary analysis of Census 2011 data shows that 
there were differences in the highest educational level 
achieved by residents of the areas demarcated as core 
and peripheral in Gauteng. Residents in the periphery 
were more likely to have no schooling and just over 
a quarter had only some primary schooling or had 
completed primary school (26 per cent), compared to 
a fifth (20 per cent) in the core (Table 11). Residents 
in the periphery were less likely to have completed 
high school. They were also less likely to hold a 
certificate or diploma or have any other kind of tertiary 
education (10 per cent in the periphery and 18 per 
cent in the core). 
Census 2011 data on school attendance showed 
that pre-school attendance was lower in peripheral 
areas (79 per cent) compared to the core (84 per 
cent) (Table 12). Rates of attendance at school were 
slightly lower for children aged 13 to 18 years in 
peripheral areas, although the differences were 
not great (Tables 12 and 13). The figures for school 
attendance in the core are distorted by the higher 
proportion of youth in the core in tertiary education, 
which shrinks the proportions in other forms of 
education in the core. Table 12 shows that school 
attendance in core and peripheral areas is similar, 
with the exception of pre-school. Thus perhaps the 
unevenness seen in the highest levels of education 
achieved in core and peripheral areas might even 
out in future, notwithstanding the concentration of 
HEIs in the core. 
Table 12: Age in completed years and present school attendance, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
1 - 5 years 6 - 12 years 13 - 18 years 19 years
Core 84 96 90 60
Periphery 79 96 89 51
Photograph by Patrik Göthe
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Table 13: Type of educational institution attended, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Pre-school
including
day care;
crèche;
Grade R; 
Pre-Grade
R in an ECD 
centre
Ordinary 
school
 including
Grade R
 learners
 at a formal 
school;
Grade 1-12 
learners 
and 
learners 
in special 
classes
Special 
school
Further 
education 
and 
training 
college 
(FET)
Other 
college
Higher 
educational 
institution 
university/
university 
of 
technology
Adult
basic
education
and 
training
centre
(ABET)
Core 2 68 0.7 6 3 19 2
Periphery 1 80 0.7 4 2 10 2
Many learners in many densely-populated parts of 
peripheral areas, as well as those in less densely-
populated areas, have to travel long distances to school 
(Figures 16 and 17). Long  journeys are particularly 
arduous for children in primary school. Many of these 
schools may be large and may be overcrowded to 
accommodate the number of learners in the catchment 
area. Figure 18 shows that although some high-
performing secondary schools are found in peripheral 
areas, they are more likely to be found in the core. 
Conversely, the periphery is slightly more likely to be 
home to under-performing secondary schools. These 
experiences appear to be reflected in the satisfaction 
of residents with their local educational facilities. 
Only 62 per cent of residents in peripheral areas, 
and 73 per cent in core areas were satisfied, while 20 
per cent in the periphery and 13 per cent in the core 
were dissatisfied.
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Figure 16: Distribution of primary schools in Gauteng and distribution of the  
population aged between 6 and 18 years
SOURC E : Census, 2011; Gauteng Department of Education (2015)
Population aged between 6 and 18 years and primary schools in Gauteng (2015)
14 - 2088 3790 - 5579 8107 - 13294 Gauteng wards
2089 - 3789 5580 - 8106 Core Primary schools
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Figure 17: Distribution of all schools in Gauteng and distribution of the  
population aged between 6 and 18 years
SOURC E : Census, 2011; Gauteng Department of Education (2015)
14 - 2088 3790 - 5579 8107 - 13294 Gauteng wards
2089 - 3789 5580 - 8106 Core All schools
Population aged between 6 and 18 years and all schools in Gauteng (2015)
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Figure 18: Distribution of secondary schools in  
Gauteng with 2015 NSC examination pass rates
SOURC E : Census, 2011; Gauteng Department of Education (2015)
2015 NSC pass rate (%)
0.00 - 37.50 67.40 - 81.42 92.51 - 100.00 Gauteng municipalities
37.51 - 67.39 81.43 - 92.50 Core
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In South Africa, most state-run schools charge attendance fees. However, some schools are designated no-fee 
schools, to accommodate children whose parents are unable to pay school fees. These schools are found in parts 
of the periphery. In the core, they are located mainly in those areas which are considered socio-economically 
peripheral, mainly townships, informal settlements and former homeland areas (Figure 19). Independent schools 
are firmly located in the core (Figure 20).
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 19: Distribution of no-fee schools in Gauteng and distribution of the  
population aged between 6 and 18 years
SOURC E : Census, 2011; Gauteng Department of Education (2015)
Population aged between 6 and 18 years and no-fee schools in Gauteng (2015)
14 - 2088 3790 - 5579 8107 - 13294 Gauteng wards
2089 - 3789 5580 - 8106 Core No-fee schools
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Figure 20: Distribution of independent schools in Gauteng and distribution of the 
population aged between 6 and 18 years
SOURC E : Census, 2011; Gauteng Department of Education (2015)
Population aged between 6 and 18 years and independent schools in Gauteng (2015)
14 - 2088 3790 - 5579 8107 - 13294 Gauteng wards
2089 - 3789 5580 - 8106 Core Independent schools
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Lack of education is a problem for the individuals 
concerned as it affects their employment and earning 
capacities, but it also has other implications. Low 
levels of education affect the human capital of an area, 
and the scope to create particular kinds of employment 
in particular places. Areas with an educated 
population are more likely to attract investment in 
skilled and higher-paid employment, which is the focus 
of city-region and provincial investment and economic 
development plans for research and innovation hubs 
(GPG, 2011). This can perpetuate uneven development 
as peripheral areas are more likely to be seen as the 
places to locate primary sector, low-paid employment, 
and/or to be considered as low-paid labour reserves 
for core areas, while core areas attract investment 
in highly-skilled labour, and attract skilled labour 
to participate in tertiary economic activities, and 
they grow as a result.
5.2 Changes in education
Perhaps one of the most significant changes in both 
core and peripheral regions of the GCR since 1996 is 
the massive improvement in the levels of education 
achieved in the province. The proportion of the 
population with no schooling has fallen dramatically, 
particularly in peripheral areas (from 17 per cent 
in 1996 to 5 per cent in 2011 in the periphery, and 
from 12 per cent to 3 per cent in the core) (Table 14). 
The number of residents in the periphery with some 
secondary education has grown from a quarter to over 
a third. While only 13 per cent of people in peripheral 
areas had completed secondary school in 1996, almost 
a quarter had done so by 2011 (Table 14). The number of 
people with tertiary education doubled. Improvements 
were also seen in the core, particularly in higher 
education. Although there has been a significant 
improvement in the educational levels achieved by 
residents in Gauteng – whichever part of the province 
they live in – by 2011 only 29 per cent of residents in the 
core and 24 per cent in the periphery had completed 
secondary school. Furthermore, only 18 per cent in the 
core and 10 per cent in the periphery had any form of 
tertiary education (Table 14). 
Photograph by Nzolo Bidla
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Table 14: Highest level of education, Gauteng, 1996, 2001, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
No schooling Some primary
Complete 
primary
Some 
secondary
Grade 12/
Std 10 Higher
1996
Core 12 24 9 26 20 9
Periphery 17 31 10 25 13 4
2001
Core 8 19 6 31 24 11
Periphery 12 26 7 33 17 5
2011
Core 3 16 4 30 29 18
Periphery 5 21 5 35 24 10
Transformation in education in the GCR since 
1994 has been taking place in other ways as well. 
There has been an increase in enrolments at 
institutions of higher education, although it is not 
possible to know where the students come from 
(Nyar, 2013: 8). This has been accompanied by 
transformations in the student body. In 1995, black 
African women and men comprised only 19 per cent 
and 20 per cent, respectively, of students enrolled 
in universities (Nyar, 2013: 10). By 2010, 40 per 
cent of students enrolled in universities in the GCR 
were black African women, but black African men 
comprised only 29 per cent of enrolled students 
(Nyar, 2013: 10). 
The improvement in the highest education levels 
achieved in the periphery, as well as similarities in 
enrolment levels for specific age groups, indicates that 
this aspect of uneven development is being addressed. 
So, although disparities between core and peripheral 
areas continue, they are not as stark as they were in the 
past. However, the distribution of schools and location 
of low and high-performing schools indicates that 
many students in the periphery have to travel far to get 
an education, in what may be an underperforming and 
overcrowded school. Although the population of the 
province is increasingly educated, the low proportion 
of the population that has completed secondary school 
challenges the state’s plans to promote high-skilled 
economic development. If these plans succeed, the 
less educated portion of the population, who are 
more likely to live in peripheral areas and socio-
economically peripheral areas within the core, are 
likely to be excluded.
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6. Employment and income
Economic indicators were used to identify core 
and peripheral areas. World system theory and 
network theorists (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979; 
Soja, 1980; Smith, 1986, 1997; Etherington and 
Jones, 2009; Pileček and Jančák, 2011) argue that 
peripheral areas act as labour-force reserves for 
core areas, supplying cheap labour, often in the form 
of migrants, or as locations where commodities 
are extracted using low-paid labour. In a global 
economy, peripheral areas are places where goods 
can be manufactured with low labour costs, for 
export, enabling higher rates of capital accumulation 
(Smith, 1986, 1997).
The association of core areas with secondary  
and tertiary sector economic activities, and peripheral 
areas with primary sector activities, obviously  
affects employment opportunities and profiles. 
Peripheral areas are also associated with having  
lower incomes and insecure employment, as 
well as higher rates of unemployment than in 
the core. The peripheral areas of Gauteng are 
home to mining and agricultural activities, 
and the core is home to secondary and tertiary 
level activities. 
An index of employment and income was 
created and mapped to see which areas of Gauteng 
are peripheral in regards to employment and income 
(Figure 21). The index included the proportions of 
individuals earning between R0–R1 600 per month, 
adults employed in the informal sector, in private 
households, and those who were unemployed, per 
ward. These indicators were chosen because informal 
sector participation suggests an inability to get work 
in the formal sector. Working in private households 
suggests insecure employment, and low incomes 
indicate employment vulnerability or unemployment. 
As data for the sector of GVA had been used to define 
core and peripheral areas, and because comparable 
Census 2011 data was not available, data on sector 
of employment was not included. The income and 
employment index clearly shows that peripheral areas 
are proportionally more likely to be home to people 
working in insecure sectors and with no or very low 
incomes (Figure 21). 
Photograph by Simphiwe Tshabalala
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Figure 21: Income and employment index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Income and employment index
0 61.1 - 71 91.1 - 100 Core
0.1 - 49 71.1 - 81 100.1 - 109 Gauteng wards
49.1 - 61 81.1 - 91 109.1 - 121
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Areas that are peripheral in terms of income and 
employment can be found in core areas, particularly 
on the edges of the core in old township areas. The 
southwest of Johannesburg (Soweto) and Alexandra, 
the centre of Ekurhuleni (Wadeville/Reiger Park/
Ramaphosa), Katlehong, the northeast of Pretoria, 
as well as parts of the Vaal Triangle (Emfuleni) on 
the southern borders of the province, are notable 
in this regard (Figure 21). This peripheralisation 
of employment and income reflects apartheid 
geographies and the location of mainly black 
African and coloured townships on the edges of 
cities. There is a swathe of green across the core 
indicating greater employment and income prospects 
there (Figure 21). The mining areas of the West 
Rand are notable for scoring relatively high on the 
income and employment index, but are peripheral 
in many other ways. 
6.1 Employment
The data shows significant congruity in many areas as 
regards employment for individuals living in core and 
peripheral areas. This may be for three reasons. First, 
peripheral areas, home to black Africans with high 
rates of unemployment, are located within the core as 
well as within the wider periphery. Second, residents 
of the periphery may be employed in core areas. Thus, 
although the province is the core of the country and it 
contains a clear economically-defined core, the cheap 
labour force needed for capital accumulation is located 
in peripheral areas on the doorstep of the core, and 
sometimes within it. 
“...although the province is the core of the country 
and it contains a clear economically-defined 
core, the cheap labour force needed for capital 
accumulation is located in peripheral areas on the 
doorstep of the core, and sometimes within it.”
Photograph by Papama Tungeli
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Figure 22: Population unemployed per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
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7.1 - 14 20.1 - 32 Gauteng wards
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Unemployment rates are high. Figure 22 shows the 
legacy of apartheid geographies that forcefully pushed 
and restricted black residents to townships on the 
edges of the core where high rates of unemployment 
are still found. Soweto, Alexandra in Johannesburg, 
Mamelodi, Midrand and the centre and edges of 
Ekurhuleni appear as red/orange spaces in the core 
(Figure 22). Overall, in 2011, a higher proportion of 
individuals living in peripheral areas was unemployed 
or discouraged work-seekers (35 per cent, compared 
to 27 per cent in the core) (Table 15 and Figure 22). 
When asked whether it was easier or harder for 
someone like them to find jobs in 2015 than five years 
previously, more than seven out of ten respondents 
said it was harder (GCRO QoL, 2015). However, 
a higher proportion of residents in the periphery 
(76 per cent) than in the core (71 per cent), said it 
was harder. Nearly one in five residents, regardless 
of where they lived, agreed with the statement 
that they “are not needed by the South African 
economy” (GCRO QoL, 2015).
Table 15: Employment status of individuals, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Employed Unemployed Discouraged work-seeker
Core 73 23 4
Periphery 66 29 6
Table 16: Sector of employment, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Formal sector Informal sector Private households Do not know
Core 78 8 12 2
Periphery 74 11 13 2
NOTE : This table represents those in employment.
In terms of type of employment, people in peripheral areas were proportionally more likely to be employed in the 
informal sector and private households (Table 16 and Figures 23 and 24), both insecure types of employment 
which usually lack benefits.
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Figure 23: Working population employed in private households per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 3 6.1 - 10 Core
3.1 - 6 10.1 - 15 Gauteng wards
Working population employed in private households per ward (%)
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Figure 24: Working population employed in informal sector per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 2 4.1 - 9 Core
2.1 - 4 9.1 - 47 Gauteng wards 
Working population employed in informal sector per ward (%)
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Table 17: Detailed sectors of employment, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Core Periphery
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 2 3
Community, social and personal services 6 6
Construction 9 10
Electricity, gas and water supply 4 4
Financial, insurance, real estate and business services 11 5
Manufacturing 10 10
Mining and quarrying 3 7
Private households 11 11
Public sector/government 11 10
Transport, storage and communication 7 6
Wholesale and retail trade 14 13
Other 13 14
Somewhat surprisingly, given the GVA values 
produced per sector per mesozone, the employment 
profiles of respondents in the GCRO Quality of Life 
2015 survey are not remarkably different (Table 
17). However, a higher proportion of respondents in 
peripheral areas was employed in primary sectors, 
particularly agriculture and mining and quarrying. 
A greater proportion of residents in the core was 
employed in the financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services sector (Table 17).3 The use of 
labour brokers may affect the proportion of people 
employed in the financial and manufacturing sectors 
(Tregenna, 2007). 
6.1.1 Employment conditions
The working conditions of residents in core and 
peripheral areas interviewed in the GCRO 2013 
Quality of Life survey were largely similar (GCRO, 
2013a). This challenges most literature which suggests 
that the working conditions of people in peripheral 
areas, as a labour reserve, are poorer than in core 
areas (Smith, 1997; Etherington and Jones, 2009). 
However, in Gauteng many residents of the periphery 
work in core areas, and the findings could also reflect 
South Africa’s relatively strong labour laws. There 
was little difference in the number of hours worked 
per week (Table 18), but people in the periphery were 
3. Census 2011 found a higher proportion of people in Gauteng employed in private households than the GCRO Quality of Life 2015  
survey found. The discrepancy is probably due to where and when the interviews took place.
088
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
Table 18: Hours worked per week, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013 
0 - 19 
hours
20 - 39 
hours
40 
hours
41 - 45 
hours
46 - 50 
hours
51 - 60 
hours
61+ 
hours
Core 6 12 29 25 14 10 5
Periphery 7 14 29 23 13 9 4
NOTE :  This question was not asked in the QoL 2015 survey.
Table 19: Type of employment contracts, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013
Indefinite 
contract
Fixed-term 
contract
Tempo-
rary post 
through 
agency
Appren-
ticeship 
or training 
scheme
No 
contract Other Don’t know
Core 39 22 2 0.4 26 5 6
Periphery 31 24 3 0.3 31 5 6
NOTE :  This question was not asked in the QoL 2015 survey.
Overall, the Quality of Life 2013 survey did not find 
stark differences in salaries and other employment 
provisions in core and peripheral areas of Gauteng 
(Tables 20 and 21). However, respondents living 
in peripheral areas were slightly less likely to have 
medical aid, pensions schemes, and annual bonuses 
(Table 20). They were also less likely to have access 
to training and education, paid leave and housing 
subsidies (Table 21).
slightly more likely to work shorter weeks, and those 
in the core, longer weeks. The type of contracts people 
have is also an indicator of working conditions and 
job security. The GCRO Quality of Life 2013 survey 
found that people in core areas were more likely 
to have indefinite contracts, while respondents in 
peripheral areas were more likely to have insecure 
employment, working without a contract or on fixed-
term contracts (Table 19). 
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Table 20: Salary provisions received, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013
Overtime 
payments Medical aid
Pension/
provident fund
Performance 
bonus
Annual bonus/
13th cheque
cheque
Core 41 31 47 26 47
Periphery 42 27 45 27 40
NOTE :  This question was not asked in the QoL 2015 survey.
Table 21: Employment provisions received, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013
Training 
and education
Paid leave/
sick leave Family leave Housing subsidy
Transport 
allowance
Core 57 58 50 16 12
Periphery 55 55 47 15 13
NOTE :  This question was not asked in the QoL 2015 survey.
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey did not ask 
such detailed questions about residents’ working 
conditions. It did ask how satisfied residents were with 
working conditions in their job. More than one in five 
(21 per cent) in the core were ‘very satisfied’ with their 
working conditions, compared to only 16 per cent in the 
periphery. Just over half (54 per cent) of residents in 
the core were ‘satisfied’, compared with 52 per cent in 
the periphery. People living in the periphery were more 
likely to be dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their 
working conditions than those in the core (21 per cent 
and 13 per cent, respectively).
6.1.2 Entrepreneurship
Gauteng, and the City of Johannesburg in particular, 
are often seen as the hubs of South African business 
and commerce. The GCRO Quality of Life surveys 
ask questions about business ownership. In 2013, the 
survey found 11 per cent of residents in both core and 
peripheral areas owned a business. However, reflecting 
national trends, by 2015 only 8 per cent said they 
owned a business (Kelley et al., 2016). Business owners 
who lived in the periphery (72 per cent) were much 
more likely to operate in the informal sector than those 
in the core (61 per cent). 
About 15 per cent of people in both areas said 
they had ever tried to start a business. Business 
owners in the periphery seemed to find it a little 
harder to make their businesses a success (Table 
22). There was relatively little difference in the ages 
of businesses (Table 23) and no major differences in 
the sources of start-up capital business owners used 
(Table 24). Although 29 per cent of business owners 
in the core and 25 per cent in the periphery knew of 
government departments or services that provided 
support for small businesses, only 0.6 per cent in the 
core and 0.3 per cent in the periphery had used a loan 
from a government agency as their primary source of 
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start-up capital (GCRO QoL, 2015). Business owners 
in the periphery were much more likely to express 
dissatisfaction with government support for small 
business (44 per cent) than those in the core (37 per 
cent). There were no significant differences in the 
main constraints experienced by business owners, 
however. But, although crime and theft were named as 
the major constraint by business owners regardless of 
where they lived, those living in the periphery (18 per 
cent) were slightly more likely than those in the core 
(15 per cent) to cite them as the main constraint to 
their business.
Table 22: Success and failure of businesses, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Core Periphery
Too early to tell 13 17
Failed 45 46
Business is a success 28 25
Business was a success and I sold/stopped it 7 5
My business brings in some money but not enough so I have to do other  
things to bring in income 7 6
Table 23: Age of businesses, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Up to 1 
year 2 years 3 - 4 years 5 - 6 years 7 - 10 years 11 - 15 years 16+ years
Core 15 13 17 18 18 10 10
Periphery 14 14 19 17 16 11 10
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Table 24: Primary source of start-up capital, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Personal 
savings Bank loan
Profit 
from other 
business
Usurers/
mashonisa
Loan from 
relatives
Business 
credit
Loan from 
govern-
ment 
agency
Other 
source
Core 77 9 2 0 4 1 1 5
Periphery 78 7 3 1 4 1 0 4
6.2 Income
As elsewhere, in Gauteng income reflects a person’s 
type of employment and level of education (GCRO 
QoL, 2015). Data from both Census 2011 and the 
GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey show that income 
is also still strongly related to race, with black African 
individual and household incomes remaining stable 
or increasing only slightly over time, and white 
incomes remaining disproportionately high and 
increasing at a higher rate. Households in peripheral 
areas are proportionately more likely to earn less 
than households in core areas, and less likely to 
fall into the higher income brackets (Census, 2011; 
GCRO QoL, 2015). In 2011, the annual incomes of 43 
per cent of households in peripheral areas, and 32 
per cent in core areas, were R38 200 or less (Table 
25). A similar but more stark picture is found when 
individual incomes are considered (Table 26). Figure 
25 shows the distribution of people earning between 
R0–1 600 per month and clearly demonstrates 
that these residents are most likely to be found in 
peripheral areas of Gauteng, and in the old black 
African townships on the edges of the core. The 
mining areas of the West Rand in the periphery are 
an exception, as higher proportions of the population 
are employed there. 
Table 25: Annual household incomes, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
No 
income
R1 
– 
R4 800
R4 801 
–
 R9 600
R9 601 
–
 R19 600
R19 601 
– 
R38 200
R38 201 
– 
R76 400
R76 401 
– 
R153 800
R153 801 
– 
R307 600
R307 601 
– 
R614 400
R614 001
or more 
Core 16 3 4 10 15 14 12 11 9 6
Periphery 17 4 6 14 19 15 9 7 5 3
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Table 26: Monthly individual incomes, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
No 
income
R1 
– 
R400
R401
–
R800
R801 
– 
R1 600
R1 601 
– 
R3 200
R3 201 
– 
R6 400
R6 401
 – 
R12 800
R12 801 
– 
R25 600
R25 601 
– 
R51 200
R51 201 
– 
R102 400
R102 401
or more
Core 44 8 3 9 10 8 7 6 3 1 0.6
Periphery 48 13 3 10 9 6 5 3 2 1 0.3
Photograph by Holger Deppe
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Figure 25: Percentage of population earning R0 - R1 600 per month per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 40 57.1 - 72 Core
40.1 - 57 72.1 - 88 Gauteng wards
Percentage of population earning R0 - R1 600 per month per ward (%)
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
merafong
randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
0 10 20 40
094
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
Income from formal and informal employment is 
important in both core and peripheral areas (Table 27). 
In the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, of those who 
were employed, a higher percentage of residents in the 
core than in the periphery were employed full or part 
time in the formal sector (69 per cent compared to 64 
per cent in the periphery), while a higher percentage 
of residents in the periphery than in the core were 
employed in the informal sector (26 per cent compared 
to 21 per cent in the core). However, the informal sector 
was an important source of income for households in 
all areas, with 32 per cent of households in peripheral 
areas, and 30 per cent in core areas, deriving at least 
part of their household income from the informal 
sector (Table 27). Households in the core were more 
likely to have assets like rental dwellings and savings 
and investments from which they derived income 
(Table 27). As a significant proportion of residents 
are migrants, it was not surprising that in the GCRO 
Quality of Life 2015 survey, 22 per cent of respondents 
in the core, and 20 per cent in peripheral areas, 
gave support or money to another household living 
elsewhere, and, 25 per cent of residents in the core, 
and 22 per cent in the periphery, received support 
or remittances from family elsewhere (Table 27). 
Government grants provided income to 45 per cent of 
households in peripheral areas and 37 per cent in core 
areas (Table 27). 
Table 27: Source of household income, Gauteng, 2015 (%)4
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Formal 
employment
Informal 
employment
Government 
grants 
(including 
pensions)
Support 
from 
family/
remittances
Support 
from 
friends
Renting 
dwelling/
flat/
garage 
etc.
Savings/
returns 
from 
investment
Core 54 30 38 25 9 12 25
Periphery 46 32 45 22 8 8 16
NOTE :  Multiple response question.
The proportion of respondents saying their household received income from the formal sector, is lower than the proportion  
of those who were employed who said they worked in the formal sector, because the former includes all respondents regardless of  
whether they were in employment or not.
Photograph by Lelani du Preez
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Despite low incomes, and in some cases perhaps 
because of them, some residents in Gauteng are in 
debt. The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey found 
42 per cent of residents in the core, and 36 per cent 
in the periphery, said they had debt owing. This is a 
significant increase since the GCRO Quality of Life 
2013 survey, when 31 per cent of residents in the core 
and 28 per cent in the periphery had debt owing.  
The 2013 survey found that residents in the core  
were more likely to owe debt on potential  
assets such as a property or a vehicle  
(Table 28).5 A substantial proportion of residents 
in the province carried debt, but those in the 
periphery, although slightly less likely to have debt, 
were more likely to owe money without gaining 
tangible assets in return.
Table 28: Type of debt, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013
Bond/
mortgage
owing
Credit 
card owing
Vehicle
finance 
owing
Personal
 bank loan 
owing
Other 
loan owing
Friend/
family/
stokvel 
owing
Owe but 
not paying 
back
Core 19 28 15 25 60 8 19
Periphery 13 23 13 25 65 10 24
NOTE :  Multiple response question.
Table 29: Eating in Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Any time in past year 
adult in household gone 
hungry because there 
was not 
enough food
Any time in past 
year children in 
household gone hungry 
because there was 
not enough food
Any children in house-
hold benefitting from a 
school feeding scheme
Grows fruit and 
vegetables for own 
consumption 
Core 12 10 25 9
Periphery 15 14 37 15
5. No questions on kinds of debt owed were asked in the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey.
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For some households, in both core and peripheral 
areas of Gauteng, low incomes translate into missed 
meals and hunger. Good nutrition is important to 
childhood development, and physical growth and 
strength for both adults and children. The GCRO 
Quality of Life 2015 survey found a higher percentage 
of households in peripheral areas reported that 
members of the household had gone hungry from 
lack of food than in core areas (Table 29). Similarly, a 
higher proportion of households in the periphery had 
children who benefitted from a school feeding scheme, 
suggesting lower incomes. Relatively few households 
in either area grew fruit and vegetables for their 
own consumption, and virtually none grew produce 
to sell to others. However, the proportion of those 
growing food for their own households had grown 
between 2013 and 2015. 
In the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, 
residents in the core were more likely (35 per cent) 
than those in the periphery (26 per cent) to be 
satisfied with the amount of money they had available. 
Conversely, residents in the periphery (63 per cent) 
were more likely to be dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
than those in the core (50 per cent) (Table 30). The 
proportions of those who were dissatisfied with the 
amount of money available to them had declined since 
the GCRO Quality of Life 2013 survey, when this 
applied to 67 per cent of residents in the periphery, 
and 57 per cent in the core. Similarly, the proportion 
of residents in both core and periphery who were 
dissatisfied with their standard of living declined 
between 2013 and 2015 (Table 30). In 2013, a quarter 
of residents in the core and a third in the periphery 
were dissatisfied. More dramatically, the proportions 
who were very satisfied with their standard of living 
rose significantly in 2015 from 7 per cent in both core 
and periphery in 2013 (Table 30). A third of residents 
in the periphery were dissatisfied with their standard 
of living compared to a quarter in the core (25 per 
cent) (Table 30). 
Table 30: Satisfaction with amount of money and standard of living, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Satisfaction with amount of money available to respondent
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
Core 7 28 15 33 17
Periphery 4 22 12 41 22
Satisfaction with standard of living
Core 20 47 13 15 5
Periphery 15 46 13 19 7
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Overall, the employment and income data, when  
taken together, indicate that people living in  
peripheral areas are at a disadvantage. As the 
differences are not always dramatic, the data  
suggests that there is a blurring of lines between 
the labour pool of core and peripheral areas in the 
province. These lines are made more complex by  
the legacies of apartheid settlement patterns which 
mean that many people who live in the periphery  
work in core areas. Thus, on an intra-provincial 
scale, the data reinforces the idea that peripheral 
areas act as a labour pool for the core. The 
legacy of apartheid is also evident in on-going 
income and employment inequality in the 
province, and is therefore reflected in the income 
and employment data. 
 
6.3 Changes in employment 
and income
According to Census data, there do not seem to have 
been significant changes in employment between 1996 
and 2011. It is difficult to compare income levels as the 
buying power of the rand has changed with inflation 
over the past twenty years, as have the race profiles of 
the population which are reflected in income levels. 
Levels of employment and unemployment were not 
significantly different in the core and periphery in 1996 
and 2011. It is not clear what caused the significant 
growth in unemployment in both areas, recorded in 
the 2001 Census (Table 31). What is notable is that 
both core and peripheral areas have maintained levels 
of employment (at least in 1996 and 2011) in the face 
of a rapidly increasing population through natural 
growth and migration. 
Table 31: Employment and unemployment, Gauteng, 1996, 2001 and 2011 (%)
SOURC E : Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
Employed Unemployed Discouraged work-seeker
1996 Core 70 27 3
Periphery 67 29 4
2001 Core 61 33 6
Periphery 53 38 9
2011 Core 73 23 4
Periphery 66 28 6
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Table 32: Employment by sector, Gauteng, 1996, 2001 and 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001 (Quantec); GCRO QoL, 2015 
1996 2001 2015
Core Periphery Core Periphery Core Periphery
Agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing 1 4 1 5 2 3
Mining and quarrying 1 19 1 10 3 7
Manufacturing 14 12 14 14 10 10
Electricity, gas and water supply 1 1 1 1 4 4
Construction 6 7 5 7 9 10
Wholesale and retail trade 15 12 17 16 14 13
Transport, storage and  
communication 7 6 6 5 7 6
Financial, insurance, real estate 
and business services 14 7 16 9 11 5
Community, social and  
personal services 17 11 29 23 6 6
Private households 12 12 n/a n/a 11 11
Public sector/government n/a n/a n/a n/a 11 10
Other 12 9 9 11 13 14
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Although there appear to have been some changes in 
the categories in which people are employed, levels of 
unemployment, income disparities and inequalities 
appear to have remained relatively constant between 
core and peripheral areas as well as in the province as 
a whole between 1996 and 2011. These consistencies 
have been maintained within the context of a rapidly 
increasing population and in times of economic 
turmoil. But the ongoing high levels of unemployment 
and low incomes are of concern. This data also raises 
questions about the racialised nature of inequality 
in the province. Furthermore, it suggests that since 
Gauteng is a core area, capital does not need to look 
beyond the borders of the province for a cheap labour 
force because it has one on its doorstep, and even, in 
places, within it. This labour force is made up, in part, 
of people from beyond the borders of the province, 
and from outside the country, who have moved 
into the province. 
7. Housing
7.1 Uneven patterns in housing
Housing, and the services people receive, are 
indicators of socio-economic disadvantage, 
marginality and peripherality. In South Africa,  
the situation is complicated by the spatial and housing 
legacies of apartheid, which have led to households 
living in poor dwellings and informal settlements in 
areas that lie in the core of the province, as well as 
outside in peripheral areas. At the same time, post-
apartheid attempts to tackle and redress housing 
shortages have mostly been in the form of low-cost 
government housing developments, usually referred 
to as RDP housing. These developments mostly 
occur in peripheral areas and on the edges of cities of 
the GCR, where land is cheap. They are often some 
distance from economic centres where employment 
opportunities are most likely to be found (Figure 26). 
These developments have enabled many residents 
in the province to own their own home, either by 
being ‘given’ a house, or making a contribution to the 
cost, which is supplemented by government. Thus, 
outright home ownership has grown significantly in 
the province since 1994, particularly among black 
African residents. 
Photograph by Amanda van der Walt
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Figure 26: Public housing programmes and distance to major economic centres, 2008
SOURC E : GCRO Map of the Month, February 2014 (www.gcro.ac.za)
Public housing programmes (2008)  
and distance (km) to major economic centres
0.2 - 4.9 18.1 - 21.2 Major economic centres
5.0 - 8.7 21.3 - 25.2 Municipalities
8.8 - 11.8 25.3 - 30.0 Former apartheid townships
11.9 - 14.9 30.1 - 35.7
15.0 - 18.0 35.8 - 50.0
Major  
economic 
centres
Mean distance (km) from 
public housing to the 
nearest economic centre
Boksburg 14.6
Centurion 13.7
Johannesburg 20.3
Midrand 7.8
Pretoria 25.7
Sandton 17.3
Vereeniging 17.3
Gauteng 17.8
kilometres
0 10 20 40
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Figure 27: Housing index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Housing index
0 - 46 86.1 - 106 152.1 - 182 Core
46.1 - 67 106.1 - 128 182.1 - 228 Gauteng wards
67.1 - 86 128.1 - 152 228.1 - 326
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A housing index was created, using Census 2011 data, 
by adding together the proportions of households living 
in non-formal6 housing (informal dwellings, caravans, 
tents), in 1 to 2 rooms, and in rented accommodation 
(Figure 23). Rented accommodation was chosen as a 
signifier of peripherality because, although living  
in rented accommodation does not necessarily mean 
that a household is vulnerable, households that live  
in rented accommodation lack security of tenure.  
A single person household living in 1 or 2 rooms may 
not have marginal housing conditions, or certainly 
not as marginal as a larger household in the same 
amount of space. According to this index, a higher 
proportion of households in peripheral areas are 
vulnerable in terms of housing or live in peripheral 
areas in peripheral housing (Figure 27). However, 
pockets of housing peripherality can be found in core 
areas, in particular in Alexandra, Midrand and parts 
of Ekurhuleni. Some areas of high peripherality, 
in terms of housing, are found within but on the 
edges of core areas (for example, Soweto, Mamelodi 
and Tembisa). The swathes of red across the map 
in Westonaria, Mogale, Merafong and Lesedi, 
which lie in peripheral areas of the province, are 
notable. These areas may rank high on the index 
because of the mining industry so they are likely 
to have higher rates of small dwellings and rented 
accommodation. Informal settlements have also 
developed around the mines.
A lower proportion of households in the periphery 
live in enumerator areas with formal residential 
housing and are more likely to live in informal 
residential areas (Table 33). Not surprisingly, people 
in the periphery are more likely to live on farms, 
smallholdings and in areas with traditional housing. 
Collective living quarters (primarily hostels and 
compounds) provide a small amount of accommodation 
to residents in Gauteng. Collective living quarters 
in peripheral areas are likely a reflection of the 
mining economy. Hostels in the core were built by 
the apartheid state to accommodate South African 
migrant workers. 
Table 33: Enumeration area type by person, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Formal 
residential
Informal 
residential
Traditional 
residential
Collective 
living 
quarters
Industrial Smallholdings Farms Commercial Other
Core 87 8 0.2 2 0.5 0.5 0.0 2 0.3
Periphery 74 14 3 2 0.3 5 2 0.3 0.4
Although households in peripheral areas are as, or 
slightly more, likely to live in brick houses on separate 
stands (59 per cent) than those in core areas (58 per 
cent), overall they are less likely to live in formal 
dwellings (71 per cent, compared to 85 per cent in the 
core) (Table 34). Importantly, they are much more likely 
to live in an informal dwelling, whether in a backyard or 
an informal settlement. Over a quarter  
(29 per cent) of households did so in 2011 in the 
periphery, compared to 14 per cent of households in 
the core (Figure 29 and Table 34). Although seven 
per cent of households in the core lived in informal 
6. Non-formal refers to all kinds of non-formal housing – tents, caravans etc while informal housing does not include these forms of 
non-formal housing.
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Table 34: Dwelling type of households, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
House /
 brick 
concrete 
block 
structure 
on a 
separate 
stand or 
yard or 
farm
Cluster 
house, 
townhouse, 
semi-
detached 
house, 
house in a 
complex
Semi- 
detached 
house
Flat or 
apartment 
in a block 
of flats
House, flat 
room in 
backyard
Informal 
dwelling in 
backyard
Informal 
dwelling 
not in 
backyard 
e.g. in an 
informal 
settlement 
or on farm
Other
Core 58 7 1 10 7 7 7 3
Periphery 59 3 1 3 4 10 19 2
Photograph by Amanda van der Walt
dwellings in backyards in 2011, the highest proportions 
of those living in backyard dwellings lived in the 
periphery (Figure 28 and Table 34). Those who did so 
in the core were concentrated in historically-black 
townships. The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey 
indicated some improvements, as it found that 90 per 
cent of households in the core lived in formal housing, 
compared to 79 per cent in the periphery. However, 
this means that nearly one in five households in the 
periphery still lived in informal dwellings, compared to 
one in ten in the core.
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Figure 28: Backyard structures in Gauteng, 2010
SOURC E : GeoTerraImage landuse per building (2010); GeoTerraImage 10m landcover (2009)
Number of backyard structures per grid cell
1 - 85 562 - 803 2233 - 3181 Urban
86 - 212 804 - 1131 3182 - 5042
213 - 368 1132 - 1571 Core
369 - 561 1572 - 2232 Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 29: Households living in non-formal housing per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Households living in non-formal housing per ward (%)
0 - 14 31.01 - 56 Core
14.01 - 31 56.01 - 96 Gauteng wards
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Figure 30: Households living in 1 - 2 rooms per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Households living in 1 - 2 rooms per ward (%)
0 - 19 36.1 - 56 Core
19.1 - 36 56.1 - 90 Gauteng wards
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Living in formal dwellings does not necessarily guarantee good living conditions since overcrowding can occur. In 
2011, over a third of households in peripheral (36 per cent) and core (34 per cent) areas lived in one or two rooms, 
with as many as a fifth in both areas living in only one room (Figure 30). 
Photograph by Amanda van der Walt
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Figure 31: Households living in rented housing per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
1 - 24 41.1 - 63 Core
24.1 - 41 63.1 - 99 Gauteng wards
Households living in rented housing per ward (%)
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People living in core areas are more likely to rent their 
dwelling and are less likely to own their own home 
or to occupy property rent free (Table 35 and Figure 
31). Although households in core areas might then 
appear to be more marginal, paying for housing, and 
in a vulnerable situation as regards security of tenure, 
it may not be so. Housing occupied rent free may be 
provided by employers, or be informal housing. Both 
may be unstable in terms of security. Property that is 
owned and fully paid off includes government housing, 
which may not have the same asset value as privately 
built and marketed housing. Higher proportions of 
households in the core own property on which they 
are still paying a mortgage bond, but they may be 
acquiring property of greater asset value than people 
who do not have a bond and live in RDP housing. 
Perhaps because of this, and the higher rates of living in 
informal dwellings, a larger proportion of households 
in peripheral areas (54 per cent) is not concerned about 
paying for housing each month than households in core 
areas (38 per cent) (Table 35).
Table 35: Household tenure type, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Rented Owned but not yet paid off
Owned and 
fully paid off
Occupied 
rent free Other
Core 41 18 26 12 2
Periphery 29 14 31 23 3
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey provided 
more detailed information about the tenure status of 
residents in the core and peripheral areas of Gauteng 
(Table 36). There are some differences between what 
was found in the 2011 Census and the GCRO Quality 
of Life 2015 survey relating to the proportion of 
people who said they lived in rented accommodation 
and who occupied accommodation rent free, and 
the proportions of people who said their property 
was owned and fully paid off. Notwithstanding this, 
the data gathered by the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 
survey showed that a higher proportion of households 
in peripheral areas lived in RDP housing (24 per 
cent, compared to 10 per cent in the core) (Table 
36). This reflects where RDP housing has been built 
(Figure 29). Although people in peripheral areas 
have benefited from RDP housing, they are still 
more likely to live in informal housing than people 
in core areas. The higher proportion of people living 
in informal housing in peripheral areas may be 
reflected in levels of satisfaction with their housing. 
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey found that 
16 per cent of residents in the core were dissatisfied 
with their dwelling, compared to a quarter (25 per 
cent) in the periphery.
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Table 36: Tenure status of households, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Core Periphery
Owned, but paying off a bond 16 13
Owned, and fully paid off 31 25
Free RDP house 10 24
Transfer of title deed of existing government house 5 3
Private rental 23 14
Renting from government (municipal/council rental) 5 3
Rent free 6 10
Occupation of vacant dwelling 2 5
Other 2 3
Overall, the data shows that, notwithstanding the 
presence of RDP housing, households in peripheral 
areas are disadvantaged in that they are significantly 
more likely to live in informal dwellings. The 
location of RDP housing in the periphery and in 
peripheral areas on the edges of the core, where 
some eligible residents already lived, indicates a 
perpetuation of peripherality in terms of housing for 
many residents. This is because places of potential 
employment are some distance away, and the houses 
themselves, although welcome, do not have significant 
asset value beyond having four brick walls and 
a roof. Nevertheless, and importantly, they are a 
place to call home. 
7.2 Changes in housing
Not surprisingly, given the increase in population 
in both the core and the periphery, there has been 
an expansion of urban areas since 1994, as well 
as of residential developments (Figure 32). There 
are areas which show growth, mostly on the edges 
of the core, with some reflecting the development 
of new government housing, but there was little 
evidence of dramatic urban sprawl from the 
core into the periphery between 2001 and 2010. 
There is little evidence of the ‘swallowing’ of 
peripheral towns and villages into the core, except 
perhaps in Midrand.
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Figure 32: Changes in residential growth, Gauteng, 2001 - 2010
SOURC E : GCRO Map of the Month, November 2013 (www.gcro.ac.za)
Formal houses Townhouse units Estate/security units
56 - 523 53 - 431 50 - 201 Core
524 - 990 432 - 809 202 - 352 Gauteng municipalities
991 - 1 457 810 - 1 187 353 - 503 CSIR National 2000 land cover (urban)
1 458 - 1 925 1 188 - 1 565 504 - 654
1 926 - 2 392 1 566 - 1 942 655 - 805
New residential development per km2
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Table 37: Dwelling type (households), Gauteng, 1996, 2001 and 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
House or 
brick 
structure
on 
separate
stand
Flat in 
block 
of flats
Town/
cluster/
semi-
detached
house
Room/
flatlet 
on shared 
prop erty
House/
flat/
room in 
backyard
Informal 
dwelling/
shack in 
backyard
Informal 
dwelling/
shack 
elsewhere
Other
1996
Core 50 10 6 2 12 8 11 2
Periphery 50 2 2 2 6 7 29 2
2001
Core 52 8 6 2 8 7 12 6
Periphery 49 2 1 1 4 6 25 12
2011
Core 58 10 9 1 7 7 8 2
Periphery 59 3 4 1 4 10 19 1
Despite the rapidly increasing population, the 
proportion of households living in informal housing 
across the province declined. However, in the core, 
while the proportion of households living in backyard 
houses, flats and rooms fell by half between 1996 and 
2011, the proportion living in informal dwellings 
in backyards has remained nearly the same (Table 
37). In the periphery, the proportion of households 
living in informal dwellings in backyards increased 
between 2001 and 2011. This could be a reflection, 
in part, of the growth in RDP housing and the 
creation of new opportunities for backyard informal 
dwellings, as households supplement their incomes. 
Although the proportion of households living in 
informal dwellings in backyards has remained 
stable in the core, and grown in the periphery, there 
has been a decline in the proportion of households 
living in informal dwellings in informal settlements, 
across the province (Table 37). This is particularly 
noticeable in the periphery where the proportion 
of households living in informal dwellings not in 
backyards, fell from 29 per cent in 1996, to 18 per cent 
in 2011 (Table 37). 
However, in 2011, 29 per cent of households 
in the periphery, and 15 per cent in the core, still 
lived in informal dwellings (Table 37). Indicating 
the challenges of providing housing in the face of 
rapid population growth, although the proportion 
of households living in informal dwellings has 
fallen, the number of households doing so has 
risen. In 1996, almost 210 000 households in the 
periphery, and 280 000 in the core, lived in informal 
dwellings. By 2011, these numbers had risen to 
over 350 000 in the periphery, and almost 390 
000 in the core. The greater rate of increase in the 
number of households in the periphery living in 
informal dwellings suggests the marginalisation of 
peripheral areas. 
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Changes in housing between 1996 and 2011 indicate 
that government is having some success in evening 
out some of the most glaring inequities in housing 
options between core and peripheral areas. However, 
the location of much of the new government housing is 
problematic since residents remain relatively spatially 
isolated from opportunities being created in the core 
(Figure 34). Similarly, mega human settlements 
proposed by the provincial government and the 
private sector are largely planned for outside the 
core, or on its edges (Figure 35). The development of 
security estates, townhouse and cluster developments 
for wealthy residents (and their visitors) only, is 
creating new exclusionary spaces in both core and 
peripheral areas where only they (and their visitors) 
can enter. Although this is particularly noticeable 
in core areas (Figure 33), as Phil Harrison and 
Yasmeen Dinath show in the next part of this report, 
cluster homes and security estates for high-income 
households are also being developed in peripheral 
areas, particularly around Hartbeespoort Dam (Long 
and Hoogendoorn, 2012). These developments are 
creating exclusionary spaces only available to the 
wealthy, while poor, usually black, residents, often 
dependent on the state to provide affordable housing 
rather than informal dwellings, are relegated to the 
margins. The growth of privately-owned spaces in 
the core, and the continued spatial marginalisation of 
residents in peripheral areas, even if in RDP housing, 
raises questions about connectivity, relationships 
between core and peripheral areas, and the right to the 
city (Harvey, 2008).
Photograph by Gareth Pon
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Figure 33: Fragmenting space: The development of privately-governed space in Gauteng
SOURC E : GCRO Map of the Month, September 2012 (www.gcro.ac.za)
AfriGIS: Gated communities, privately-governed public space, office parks,  
boomed-off areas and estates
25 - 282 881 - 1 659 2 528 - 4 305 Gauteng wards
283 - 880 1 660 - 2 527 > 10 071
Density of buildings (derived from Eskom SBC 2010)
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Figure 34: Planned housing developments and proximity to businesses
SOURC E : GCRO Map of the Month, May 2015 (www.gcro.ac.za)
Planned housing developments (housing units) Number of businesses per sq kilometre
1000 - 3500 15001 - 22366 1 - 5 48 - 64
3501 - 7472 22367 - 37000 6 - 12 65 - 82
7473 - 11000 37001 - 60000 13 - 23 83 - 103
11001 - 15000 24 - 35 104 - 130
Unemployment dot density 1 Dot = 100 unemployed 36 - 47 131 - 198
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Figure 35: Proposed and developing mega housing projects, 2015
SOURC E : Gauteng Department of Human Settlements, 2015
Gauteng housing mega project 2015 Periphery
Core Gauteng wards
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8. Access to services
8.1 Water, energy and sanitation
The focus of much of the literature on uneven 
development is on the core and peripheral areas of 
Europe and North America, whether viewed at a 
global or a local scale. In studies of these regions, little 
attention is paid to access to services because most 
households are provided with electricity, piped water 
into dwellings, sanitation and refuse removal services. 
However, in Gauteng, the provision of infrastructure 
and services, and access, or lack thereof, is a measure 
of peripherality. Access to services, including water, 
energy, sanitation and refuse removal, is related to 
the kind of housing people live in, the infrastructure 
and services provided by parastatals, metros, 
municipalities and provincial government, and how 
affordable those are. 
Having services provided is one thing, being 
able to pay for them, is quite another. Households 
across the province were found to have municipal 
service arrears (Table 38). However, households in 
peripheral areas were less likely to be in arrears or to 
have had their electricity or water cut off for non-
payment (Table 38). The proportions of households 
reporting municipal services arrears, services 
cut-offs and evictions, all increased between 2013 
and 2015, suggesting increasingly hard times for 
both households and municipalities (Table 38). 
The smaller increase in services cut-offs than in 
municipal services arrears may reflect the increasing 
roll-out of pre-paid electricity and water meters in 
the province.7 Higher rates of arrears and cut-offs 
in the core may indicate slower roll-out of pre-paid 
meters in these areas. It could also be because a higher 
proportion of residents in the core receive services that 
can be cut off. 
Table 38: Arrears, services cut-offs and evictions for non-payment,  
Gauteng, 2013 and 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013 and 2015
Municipal service 
arrears
Water cut off for 
non-payment
Electricity cut off 
for non-payment
Evicted for 
non-payment
2013
Core 12 4 7 1
Periphery 12 3 4 0
2015
Core 24 7 10 2
Periphery 21 5 8 2
7. People who pay for electricity or water on account are in arrears if they don’t pay their account, and may then be cut off from the particular 
services. With pre-paid services, the service stops when the money on the pre-paid card runs out. Arrears and cut-offs do not therefore apply 
to pre-paid services. 
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Figure 36: Services index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 10 49.1 - 72 134.1 - 185 Gauteng wards
10.1 - 27 72.1 - 99 185.1 - 252
27.1 - 49 99.1 - 134 Core
Services index
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A services index was created using Census 2011 data 
on the proportion of households, per ward, with access 
to water more than 200 m from their property, using 
fuel other than electricity or gas for cooking, and 
with no access to flush toilets. National government 
minimum standards aim to provide residents with 
piped water within 200m of their dwelling. Using 
these criteria, access to services is much poorer in 
peripheral areas (Figure 36). There are exceptions 
of poor access to services in core areas, such as in 
Wadeville/Reiger Park/Ramaphosa and surrounds in 
Ekurhuleni, which is a densely populated area, with a 
high proportion of informal housing. Alexandra also 
stands out as a yellow, underserviced ward, in a field 
of green in the core. It is notable that Soweto, which, 
though peripheral in many other ways, is relatively 
well supplied with services.
In 2011, households in core areas were more likely 
to have water provided by municipal or other formal 
water schemes than those in peripheral areas (Table 
39). While the proportions of households obtaining 
water from water vendors and water tankers may 
appear small (Table 39), over 10 000 households in the 
core and 7 600 in the periphery used water vendors, 
and nearly 26 000 households in the core and 42 500 
in the periphery, used water tankers in 2011 (Census, 
2011). So, considering capacity, regularity, reliability, 
inconvenience and, in the case of vendors, cost, 
continued reliance on these types of water provision is 
clearly a concern.
Table 39: Household water sources, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Regional/
local water 
scheme (operated 
by municipality
 or other water 
services provider)
Borehole Water vendor
Water 
tanker Spring Other
Core 96 1 0.4 1 0.1 1
Periphery 90 4 0.6 3 0.2 2
In 2011, the majority of wards where more than 21 per 
cent of households did not have access to piped tap 
water within 200 m of their dwelling, lay in peripheral 
areas of the province (Figure 37). Overall, over 7 per 
cent of households in the periphery, and three per cent 
in the core, faced this problem (Table 40). There were 
pockets in the core where, for many households, access 
to water did not meet the basic standards set out by 
national government (Figure 37). Almost a third of 
households in the periphery, and a quarter in the core, 
only had piped water in their yards (Table 40). This 
may reflect both apartheid era legacies and recent 
RDP house-building practices, where indoor plumbing 
is not always provided (Table 40). Not surprisingly, 
given differential access to water, according to the 
GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, residents in the 
periphery were twice as likely as those in the core to 
be dissatisfied with their water supply (16 per cent, 
compared to 8 per cent).
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Table 40: Household water supplies, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Piped 
(tap) 
water inside 
dwelling/ 
institution
Piped (tap) 
water 
in yard
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
less than 
200 m from 
dwelling/ 
institution
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
200 m– 
500 m 
from 
dwelling/ 
institution
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
500 m– 
1 000 m 
from 
dwelling/ 
institution
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
greater 
than 
1 000 m 
from 
dwelling/ 
institution
No 
access 
to piped 
(tap) 
water
Core 67 25 4 1 1 0.2 1
Periphery 52 31 9 3 1 0.4 3
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 37: Households with no access to water within 200m per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 6 21.1 - 72 Core
6.1 - 21 48.1 - 99 Gauteng wards
Households with no access to water within 200m per ward (%)
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Municipalities are replacing conventional electricity 
meters with pre-paid and smart meters to the extent 
that the proportion of households using ordinary meters 
fell in the core from 40 per cent in 2013, to 23 per cent 
in 2015. In the periphery, the proportion of households 
using ordinary meters fell from 19 per cent to 11 per 
cent between 2013 and 2015 (GCRO QoL, 2013, 2015). 
Households in peripheral areas (69 per cent) were more 
likely to use pre-paid meters than those in core areas 
(59 per cent) in 2015. The introduction of pre-paid 
meters for water and electricity, and the contracting out 
of service delivery and cut-offs, has led to accusations 
that the privatisation of these services has negative 
consequences for the poor (McDonald and Ruiters, 
2005; McDonald, 2008).
Photograph by Jhono Bennet
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Figure 38: Households not using electricity or gas for cooking per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 11 31.1 - 57 Core
11.1 - 31 57.1 - 94 Gauteng wards
Households not using electricity or gas for cooking per ward (%)
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Energy use in peripheral and core areas of the province 
differs (Figure 38). Use of fuels other than electricity 
and gas indicates a lack of access to these services, 
or an inability to pay for them. In 2011, wards where 
over 31 per cent of households used fuels other than 
electricity or gas for cooking were most likely to 
be in the periphery, with only one stand-out area, 
in Ekurhuleni, lying within the core (Figure 38). 
Households in peripheral areas were less likely to use 
electricity and much more likely to use paraffin and 
solid fuels for cooking, than those in core areas (Table 
41). Households that use paraffin and solid fuels are 
vulnerable to respiratory ailments and accidental 
fires. There was also a significant difference in the use 
of energy for lighting, with 15 per cent of households 
in peripheral areas using candles, compared to 6 per 
cent in the core (Table 41). This has implications 
for productivity, particularly for learners and 
students trying to study.
Table 41: Energy used for cooking and lighting (households), Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Energy used for cooking
Electricity Gas Paraffin Wood Coal Solar Other None
Core 88 3 8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1
Periphery 77 3 18 1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2
Energy used for lighting
Electricity Gas Paraffin Candles Solar None
Core 91 0.2 2 6 0.2 0.2
Periphery 80 0.2 4 15 0.2 0.3
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Figure 39: Households with no access to flush toilet per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 11 31.1 - 61 Core
10.1 - 31 61.1 - 94 Gauteng wards
Households with no access to flush toilet per ward (%)
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
merafong
randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
0 10 20 40
126
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
In 2011, the majority of wards where more than 31 per 
cent of households lacked access to a flush toilet lay in 
peripheral areas (Figure 39 and Table 42). Households 
in core areas were most likely to have access to 
flush toilets (90 per cent, compared to 76 per cent in 
peripheral areas) (Table 42). Households in peripheral 
areas were more likely to have to use pit toilets. In 
2011, approximately 2 per cent of households in core 
and peripheral areas still used the bucket system. 
This amounted to nearly 42 000 households in core 
areas, and over 27 000 in peripheral areas, who used 
buckets (Census, 2011). Over 21 000 households in both 
core and peripheral areas had no toilet facilities at all 
(Census, 2011). This has implications for sanitation 
and human dignity. Households in both informal 
settlements and formal housing sometimes have to 
share toilet facilities with a large number of other 
households (Table 43). The GCRO Quality of Life 2013 
survey found that 29 per cent of households in the core, 
and 27 per cent in the periphery, shared toilet facilities 
with other households (Table 43). Households in the 
core were proportionally more likely to share toilets 
with more than 1 or 2 households than those in the 
periphery (Table 43). 
Table 42: Household access to sanitation, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Flush toilet 
(connected 
to sewerage 
system)
Flush 
toilet 
(with 
septic 
tank)
Chemical 
toilet
Pit toilet 
with ven-
tilation 
(VIP)
Pit toilet 
without 
ventila-
tion
Bucket 
toilet None Other
Core 89 1 1 1 5 2 1 1
Periphery 72 4 2 5 13 2 2 1
Table 43: Households sharing toilets, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013
Number of other  
households sharing  
toilet facilities
1 2 3 4 5 6+
Households 
sharing toilet 
facilities (%)
Core 24 19 16 11 8 22 29
Periphery 33 21 14 6 7 19 27
NOTE : This question was not asked in GCRO QoL 2015.
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Refuse removal reflects the extent of services provided 
by the municipality, the extent of infrastructure 
available for refuse removal, and the commitment of 
municipalities and metros to particular areas of their 
jurisdiction. Lack of access to refuse removal services, 
and low rates of refuse removal, have implications 
for the health of communities where this occurs. The 
problem is even more acute in communities that lack 
transport to find alternative means and places to 
safely dispose their refuse. In 2011, the majority of 
households in core and peripheral areas of the province 
had regular weekly refuse removal services (Table 44). 
However, almost one in five households in peripheral 
areas did not. These households used their own or 
communal dumps, or had nowhere to dispose of their 
rubbish (Table 44). 
Table 44: Household refuse removal, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 2011
Removed 
by local 
authority/
private 
company 
at least once
 a week
Removed 
by local 
authority/ 
private 
company 
less often
Communal 
refuse dump
Own 
refuse dump
No 
rubbish 
disposal
Other
Core 92 1 1 4 1 0.3
Periphery 81 2 3 11 3 0.5
Photograph by Martin Bolton 
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8.2 Health
The 2015 GCRO Quality of Life survey asked 
questions regarding residents’ health for the first 
time. Residents were asked if they or a member of their 
household had been diagnosed with one or more of 
a number of conditions. The reliability of responses 
was dependent on the interviewee knowing about the 
health status of other members of the household and 
whether people had been checked and diagnosed with 
certain conditions. Table 45 shows the health status 
of residents. The majority of residents reported that 
their health did not prevent them from working and/or 
participating in social activities (Table 46). Overall, 58 
per cent of respondents in both areas said no members 
of their households had been diagnosed with any of the 
named conditions. 
Table 45: Self or member of household diagnosed with any of these conditions  
in past year, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Hyper- 
tension
Heart 
disease 
or stroke
Diabetes TB Cancer Diarrhoea Emphysema/ bronchitis Asthma
HIV/
AIDS
Influenza/
pneumonia
Core 14 4 12 2 3 2 2 6 4 12
Periphery 18 4 10 3 2 1 1 5 5 11
Table 46: Health status, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Health status prevents doing daily work Health status prevents participation in social activities
Always
Some 
of the 
time
Hardly 
ever Never Always
Some of 
the time
Hardly 
ever Never
Core 6 23 21 50 5 22 21 52
Periphery 6 22 22 50 5 21 23 51
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The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey found little 
difference in the biggest health problems reported by 
periphery and core respondents in their communities 
(Table 47). Notably, regardless of where they lived, 
residents named drug abuse and alcohol as among 
the three biggest problems. The latter was seen as 
a similar-sized problem to HIV/AIDS. Between 
2013 and 2015, there was a shift in concern, 
with HIV/AIDS falling in importance and drug 
abuse increasing. 
Table 47: Biggest health problems in community, Gauteng, 2013, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2013; GCRO QoL, 2015
Drug abuse HIV/AIDS Alcohol abuse
2013
Core 19 27 9
Periphery 18 30 12
2015
Core 24 11 11
Periphery 25 12 11
People in peripheral areas were more likely to use 
public health-care facilities and less likely to use 
private health care (Table 48). Although more than 
seven out of ten users were satisfied with the health-
care services provided by the public health facility they 
usually used, one in five were dissatisfied regardless of 
where they lived (Table 49). Furthermore, when those 
who did not use public health-care facilities were asked 
why they did not, the main reason cited was the quality 
of care provided (Table 50). Access to private health-
care facilities is influenced by access to medical aid. 
People without medical aid have to rely on public health 
services unless they are able to pay private health-
service providers from their own pockets. Over three-
quarters (78 per cent) of residents in peripheral areas, 
and 65 per cent in core areas, had no medical insurance 
(Table 51).
Table 48: Where respondent usually goes for medical care, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Public health-
care 
facilities
Both public 
and private 
facilities
Private 
health-care 
facilities
Traditional 
healer
Spiritual 
healer
Not 
applicable, 
don’t usually 
need health
 care
Core 56 10 25 1 1 7
Periphery 69 7 16 1 1 6
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Table 49: Satisfaction with public health care facilities, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
Core 23 50 10 12 5
Periphery 18 52 10 14 6
Table 50: Main reason for not using public health care facilities, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Quality of 
care
The 
queues are 
usually 
too long
The staff 
are too 
unfriendly 
or 
unhelpful
The clinic 
often does 
not have 
the 
medicine 
I need
I have been 
before 
and they 
could not 
help me
Cost
I have 
medical 
 aid
Other
Core 38 11 6 4 3 2 31 5
Periphery 35 10 5 5 3 3 31 8
Table 51: Access to medical aid, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
No 
medical 
insurance
Medical aid 
– All health 
care in private 
facilities
Medical aid – 
Private primary 
health care/ 
government 
hospitalisation
Hospital plan Other Don’t know
Core 65 22 6 3 1 3
Periphery 78 14 4 2 0 2
8.3 Changing access to services
When it comes to access to services, according to 
Census data, the lives of residents in Gauteng have 
changed significantly since 1996. The province, 
metros and municipalities, as well as parastatals, 
have evidently attempted to ensure residents in 
all parts of the province have access to services. 
With respect to some aspects of service delivery, 
the lives of people in peripheral areas have changed 
the most. Disparity in access to services still exists, 
however, between households in peripheral areas and 
those in the core.
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Table 52: Household access to water, Gauteng, 1996, 2001, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
1996
Piped 
water 
in 
dwelling
Piped water 
on site/in
yard
Public tap
Water- 
carrier/
tanker
Borehole/
rain- 
water 
tank/
well
Dam/
river/
stream/
spring
Other
Core 72 17 9 0.5 0.5 0 0.4
Periphery 50 19 22 3 5 0.3 1
2001
Piped 
water inside 
dwelling
Piped water 
in yard
Piped water 
on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
less than 
200 m from 
dwelling
Piped 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
greater than 
200 m from 
dwelling 
Borehole/
rain-
water 
tank/ 
well
Dam/
river/
stream/
spring
Water 
vendor
Core 52 36 5 6 0.2 0 0.1
Periphery 34 41 10 10 1 1 3
2011
Piped 
(tap) 
water inside 
dwelling/
institution
Piped (tap) 
water inside 
yard
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
less than 
200 m from 
dwelling/
institution
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
200 m– 500 
m from 
dwelling/
institution
Piped (tap) 
water on 
community 
stand: 
distance 
500 m– 
1 000 m 
(1 km) 
from 
dwelling/ 
institution
Piped 
(tap) 
water on 
community
stand: 
distance 
greater than 
1 000 m 
(1 km) from 
dwelling/
No 
access to 
piped (tap) 
water
Core 67 25 5 1 1 0.2 1
Periphery 51 33 9 3 1 0.4 3
NOTE : There is no explanation for the drop in the proportion of residents in the core and the periphery who had piped water inside their  
dwelling in 2001. However, it is likely to reflect increased water delivery to residents in RDP housing, where water is delivered to a tap in the  
yard and not into the house.
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Unfortunately, the categorisation of access to water 
in the 1996, 2001 and 2011 Censuses is not exactly 
comparable. Nevertherless, the available categories 
demonstrate that access to water has improved for 
many households in the province (Table 52). Yet, 
perhaps because of population growth and the type of 
services being provided to new government housing, 
the proportion of households with access to piped 
water inside their dwelling barely increased in the 
periphery between 1996 and 2011 (it rose from 50 per 
cent to 51 per cent), and the proportion decreased in 
the core from 72 per cent to 67 per cent (Table 52). 
However, the proportion of households with access to 
water on site, in the yard of a property, increased in 
both core and peripheral areas between 1996 and 2011 
(Table 52). There was a decrease in the proportion 
of households in the province that were reliant on 
public taps for water. In the periphery this number fell 
from over one in five households in 1996, to just over 
one in ten (13 per cent) in 2011 (Table 52). However, 
in 2011, people in over 4 per cent of households in 
the periphery, and 2 per cent in the core, still had to 
walk more than 200 m to get water. This amounted to 
over 57 900 households in the core, and 52 300 in the 
periphery, and in almost 6 200 and 4 600 households, 
respectively, people had to walk more than one 
kilometre to get water.
Access to energy has improved significantly since 
1996. The energy used by households for lighting has 
been used here as a marker for change, since residents 
are least likely to use formally-provided energy for 
this purpose. In the periphery, the use of electricity 
for lighting rose from 68 per cent of households to 80 
per cent, and in the core from 84 per cent to 91 per 
cent, between 1996 and 2011 (Table 53). The continued 
use of flammable paraffin and candles is of concern, 
however. There has been no significant increase in the 
use of gas or alternative forms of energy such as solar 
power (Table 53). 
Table 53: Household energy used for lighting, Gauteng, 1996, 2001, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
Electricity Gas Paraffin Candles Solar Other/None
1996
Core 84 0.1 2 14 n/a 0.0
Periphery 68 0.3 4 28 n/a 0.0
2001
Core 86 0.3 2 12 0.1 0.1
Periphery 70 0.2 4 26 0.2 0.2
2011
Core 91 0.2 2 7 0.2 0.2
Periphery 80 0.2 4 15 0.2 0.3
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Access to clean, hygienic and private sanitation 
is a basic human need. Although there have been 
improvements in access to sanitation facilities 
since 1996, many people in the province still rely 
on chemical toilets and pit latrines, some of which 
are not ventilated (Table 54). Between 1996 and 
2011, the use of flush toilets grew, and reliance on pit 
latrines fell throughout the province, particularly 
in peripheral areas (Table 54). This may reflect 
the growth in formal RDP housing. Whilst the 
proportion of households in the core that depended 
on the bucket system for sanitation remained the 
same in 1996 and 2011, it halved in the periphery 
(Table 54). However, population growth has meant 
that there has been an increase in the number, if 
not the proportion, of households in the province 
relying on the bucket system. This is more notable 
in the core. In 1996, almost 26 000 households 
in the core depended on buckets rising to almost 
43 000 households in 2011. In peripheral areas 
the number of households using buckets rose from 
just over 22 000 to almost 26 500 over the same 
period (Census, 2011). 
Table 54: Household access to sanitation, Gauteng, 1996, 2001, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
1996
Flush or 
chemical 
toilet
Pit 
latrine
Bucket 
latrine Other
Core 88 8 2 2
Periphery 65 27 4 4
2001
Flush 
toilet 
(connected 
to 
sewerage 
system)
Flush 
toilet (with 
septic 
tank)
Chemical 
toilet
Pit latrine 
with 
ventilation 
(VIP)
Pit latrine 
without 
ventilation
Bucket 
latrine None
Core 86 2 1 1 7 1 3
Periphery 62 4 2 3 21 3 5
2011
Flush 
toilet 
(connected 
to 
sewerage 
system)
Flush 
toilet (with 
septic 
tank)
Chemical 
toilet
Pit latrine 
with 
ventilation 
(VIP)
Pit latrine 
without 
ventilation
Bucket 
latrine None Other
Core 89 1 1 1 5 2 1 1
Periphery 72 4 2 5 12 2 2 1
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Regular refuse removal improves sanitation and 
prevents pollution of land and water resources.  
Weekly removal of refuse by local authorities 
increased substantially in the decade after 2001, 
particularly in core areas. In 1996, only two thirds 
of households in peripheral areas (66 per cent) 
had weekly collections, but by 2011 this number 
had risen to eight out of ten (Table 55). By 2011, 
over 90 per cent of households in the core had 
weekly collections. Of concern are the 17 per cent 
of households in the periphery (and 6 per cent in 
the core) which had no regular removal of rubbish 
in 2011. However, this is a significant decrease 
from 30 per cent of households (and 9 per cent in 
the core) in 1996.
Table 55: Household refuse removal, Gauteng, 1996, 2001, 2011 (%)
SOURC E :  Census, 1996, 2001, 2011 (Quantec)
Removed 
by local 
authority at 
least weekly
Removed by 
local 
authority less 
often
Communal 
refuse dump
Own refuse 
dump
No rubbish 
disposal
1996
Core 87 4 2 5 2
Periphery 66 4 6 19 5
2001
Core 88 2 2 6 2
Periphery 68 3 4 20 5
2011
Core 92 1 1 4 1
Periphery 81 2 3 11 3
Access to services not only reflects the type of housing 
people live in, but also reflects the success of the 
state in providing services. In the context of a rapidly 
increasing population, this can be a difficult task. The 
data suggests that in respect of water supply, much is 
lacking and the state is failing to keep up with demand 
(McDonald and Ruiters, 2005). Households are still 
disadvantaged, with a lower proportion of households 
in the core having a tap inside the house in 2011 than 
in 1996, and only just over half of households in the 
periphery (Table 52). Similarly, improvements in 
sanitation are not significant. Although the situation 
has improved in peripheral areas, only just over three 
quarters of households have a flush toilet (Table 
54). However, significant improvements have been 
made in refuse removal and access to electricity, 
in both core and peripheral areas, even though 
one in five households in the periphery still does 
not use electricity for lighting. The unevenness of 
improvement in service delivery between the core 
and periphery indicates that the state is attempting 
to tackle uneven development in the sphere of 
infrastructure and services. But, importantly, even 
though the proportion of households with better 
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housing and access to services has increased for most 
types of service delivery since 1996, because of the 
growth in the population of the province, the number of 
households and individuals lacking access to housing 
and services has increased.
8.4 Satisfaction with services
Receiving services is one thing, being satisfied with the 
service one gets, is quite another. Even when dwellings 
are formal brick and mortar structures, they may not 
be appropriate for the needs of a household. Water 
and electricity supplies are sometimes intermittent. 
Toilet facilities may not be of the flush type, or may 
be shared. Sewers may be prone to overflowing and 
breakage. Pit and other latrines may not be maintained 
or emptied regularly. And the cost of services may 
be considered too high, and the administration of 
billing, inefficient.
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey asked 
respondents how satisfied they were with the services 
received. Overall, there were relatively high levels of 
satisfaction (Table 56). At the same time, however, 
a relatively significant proportion of residents 
were dissatisfied with the services they received, 
particularly those living in peripheral areas (Table 56). 
Some 27 per cent of residents in the core, and 31 per 
cent in the periphery, were dissatisfied with the cost of 
services provided by municipalities and metros (Table 
53). And 31 per cent of residents in peripheral areas, 
and 28 per cent in core areas, were dissatisfied with 
billing processes (Table 56).
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Table 56: Satisfaction with services, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
Dwelling
Core 28 51 6 10 6
Periphery 20 48 6 15 10
Water
Core 26 61 6 5 3
Periphery 19 59 6 9 7
Sanitation
Core 24 55 8 8 6
Periphery 18 50 8 13 11
Waste removal
Core 24 58 7 6 4
Periphery 18 56 7 10 9
Energy sources
Core 21 53 11 10 6
Periphery 16 52 11 12 9
Cost of municipal services
Core 13 37 23 18 9
Periphery 9 35 26 20 11
Billing of municipal services
Core 13 36 24 18 10
Periphery 9 34 26 20 11
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Considering that, in 2011, 28 per cent of respondents 
in peripheral areas, and 15 per cent in the core, lived in 
informal housing, and a third of households in core and 
peripheral areas lived in 1 or 2 rooms, it is perhaps not 
surprising that 25 per cent of residents in peripheral 
areas, and 16 per cent in the core, were dissatisfied 
or very dissatisfied with their dwelling (Census, 
2011 and Table 56). 
Dissatisfaction with levels of services provided 
through parastatals, municipalities and metros was 
slightly lower. Levels of expectation with regard to 
water provision may generally be low, since although 
only 67 per cent of households in core areas, and 
52 per cent in the periphery, had piped water in the 
dwelling (Census, 2011), only 8 per cent of residents 
in core areas, and 16 per cent in the periphery, were 
dissatisfied with the water services they received 
(Table 56). Satisfaction levels may also reflect 
increasing water delivery in the intervening years. 
Residents were less satisfied with sanitation services 
(Table 56). Although 90 per cent of households in core 
areas, and 76 per cent in the periphery, had access to 
a flush toilet in 2011 (Census, 2011), in 2015, 14 per 
cent of residents in core areas, and 24 per cent in the 
periphery, were dissatisfied with sanitation services 
(Table 56). This may be because many households have 
to share their toilet facilities with others. Residents 
were slightly less likely to be dissatisfied with waste 
removal services (19 per cent in the periphery, and 
10 per cent in the core) (Table 56). Energy is provided 
by the parastatal Eskom, sometimes through a 
municipality or metro, and at other times, directly. 
Satisfaction with energy supply may have been affected 
by the rolling blackouts that occured at times of high 
energy use. So, although 91 per cent of households 
in the core, and 80 per cent in the periphery, had 
access to electricity in 2011 (Census, 2011), 16 per 
cent of respondents in the core, and 21 per cent in the 
periphery, were dissatisfied with their energy source or 
supply (Table 56).
“Satisfaction with energy supply may have 
been affected by the rolling blackouts that 
occured at times of high energy use.”
Photograph by Simphiwe Phumo
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9. Satisfaction with government, participation in
politics and attitudes to democracy
9.1 Satisfaction with government
One indicator of peripherality is lack of access to 
government. Yet, GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey 
data shows that in Gauteng, residents of the periphery 
do not seem to be disadvantaged in this regard. Over 
a third of residents in both core and peripheral areas 
had contacted a government department in the 
previous three months (39 per cent in the periphery, 
and 35 per cent in the core) (Table 57). Residents 
in the periphery were less likely to say they never 
interacted with government. 
Of those who had contacted government 
departments in the previous three months, the 
majority, regardless of where they lived, felt they had 
been assisted within a reasonable amount of time, 
their needs had been met, and they had been treated 
with respect and dignity (Table 58). Notwithstanding 
these responses, less than a third thought government 
officials abided by the Batho Pele principles of ‘putting 
people first’. There are many allegations of corruption 
at all levels of government, including in the South 
African Police Services (SAPS) and metropolitan 
traffic police, and nearly one in five respondents (17 per 
cent) in the core, and more than one in ten respondents 
in the periphery (12 per cent), said they had been asked 
to pay a bribe. 
Table 57: Interaction with government departments, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Never 
interact with 
government 
officials
Contacted 
government 
department 
in past 3 
months
Assisted 
within a 
reasonable 
amount of 
time
Needs were 
met
Was treated 
with respect 
and dignity 
Think 
government 
officials abide 
by Batho Pele 
principles
1996
Core 23 35 64 79 76 27
Periphery 20 39 65 82 78 30
Although residents may be unsure of the 
responsibilities of the different levels of government, 
the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey asked residents 
which level of government had most improved their 
quality of life (Table 58). Notably, 42 per cent of 
residents in the periphery, and 44 per cent in the 
core, said none of the different levels had. Otherwise, 
responses were fairly similar, with residents in 
the periphery having slightly more confidence in 
the efficacy of national government than those in 
the core (Table 58).
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Table 58: Which level of government has most improved quality of life, 
Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
National 
government
Provincial 
government
Local 
municipality None of them
Core 28 9 19 44
Periphery 32 8 18 42
Notwithstanding relatively high levels of 
satisfaction with their interactions with government 
departments, residents, particularly those living 
in peripheral areas, were generally less satisfied 
with the various tiers of government (Table 59). 
This may be because of the poorer levels of service 
delivery and higher levels of unemployment 
in peripheral areas.
Table 59: Satisfaction with various levels of government, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
National
Core 9 29 21 23 17
Periphery 8 32 17 27 16
Provincial
Core 7 32 24 22 15
Periphery 6 33 21 26 15
Local
Core 7 29 22 24 18
Periphery 5 26 18 29 21
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9.2 Participation in politics
In the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, residents 
were asked about activities related to the development 
of their community, their participation in politics, and 
their opinions about the state of democracy in South 
Africa. Almost half of residents in core areas, and 40 
per cent in peripheral areas, had not taken part in any 
meetings or activities related to their community in 
the previous year (Table 60). Of the many residents, 
particularly in peripheral areas, who had participated 
in meetings, the most commonly attended meetings 
were ward, street committee or residents association, 
and school governing body meetings (Table 60). 
Around one in ten people had participated in 
community development forum meetings, but mayoral 
imbizos (attended by 3 per cent of residents in the 
core, and 4 per cent in the periphery) and Integrated 
Development Plan meetings (attended by 2 per cent 
of residents in both areas), were apparently of very 
limited interest to residents.
Table 60: Participation in activities or meetings in past year, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
None Ward meeting
Street 
committee
or residents 
association
Community 
development
forum
Community 
policing 
forum
School 
governing
body
Core 48 26 26 9 8 18
Periphery 40 36 33 11 8 18
According to the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, as 
many as 80 per cent of Gauteng residents (regardless 
of where they lived) were registered voters, and of 
these, 78 per cent in the core, and 80 per cent in the 
periphery, said they planned to vote in the next local 
election (2016). Yet, only 58 per cent of registered 
voters in the province did vote in the local elections 
held in August 2016 (News24, 7 August 2016). Of those 
who said they would not be voting, the most common 
reasons appear to be a lack of confidence in politics 
and the power of their vote to changes in their life 
(Table 61). Where people lived did not seem to make 
much difference, although people in the periphery 
were more likely to lack an identity document, 
which suggests that access to the Department of 
Home Affairs may be lacking for people living in 
peripheral areas (Table 61).
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Table 61: Reasons why not planning to vote in 2016 local government elections, 
Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Don’t like 
politics, 
broken 
promises, 
waste of 
time
Does 
not think 
his/her 
vote will 
make any 
difference
Don’t care
Don’t 
know who 
to vote for
Local 
elections 
don’t 
matter
No 
Identity
document
Not 
allowed 
to vote, 
for 
example 
not RSA 
citizen
Other
Core 27 21 12 7 4 6 21 3
Periphery 26 22 9 7 3 11 20 2
Photograph by Helen Riding
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Although some registered voters showed a lack of 
confidence in the effectiveness of their vote, there was 
a degree of confidence in the election process itself. 
However, as many as one in five (20 per cent) residents 
in the core, and 18 per cent in the periphery, did not 
think that the 2016 local election would be free and 
fair (GCRO QoL, 2015). Just over half were confident 
that it would be (52 per cent in the core, and 53 per 
cent in the periphery). These attitudes are of concern 
since over six out of ten residents in both areas said 
they thought the country was going in the wrong 
direction (Table 62).
The attitudes and opinions of residents relating to 
politics and democracy were relatively similar in core 
and peripheral areas (Tables 62 and 63). People had 
some confidence in their ability to influence matters 
that affected them, but around a third thought they 
could not (Table 62). Sadly, 27 per cent of residents in 
the core, and 30 per cent in the periphery, said nobody 
cared about people like them.
Table 62: Attitudes to politics, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Politics is a waste of time
Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Core 14 24 14 34 14
Periphery 12 24 14 37 13
People like you cannot influence developments in your community
Core 8 22 18 37 15
Periphery 7 25 18 38 12
The country is going in the wrong direction
Core 24 37 16 18 6
Periphery 22 40 16 18 5
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Although the majority of residents in the GCRO 
QoL 2015 survey thought the country was going 
in the wrong direction, they had relatively strong 
confidence in democracy in South Africa (Table 62 
and 63). However, their responses do show cause for 
concern. Over a quarter of residents in both areas did 
not think that the judiciary is free from government 
influence, and almost a third questioned the freedom 
of the press. Strong concerns about corruption were 
expressed, with over eight out of ten residents, in both 
areas, saying that corruption is the main threat to 
democracy in South Africa.
Table 63: Attitudes to democracy, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Judiciary is free from government influence
Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Core 11 31 30 21 7
Periphery 9 33 31 21 5
Corruption is the main threat to our democracy
Core 43 40 10 6 2
Periphery 39 44 10 6 1
Press is free to say or write what it likes
Core 15 35 20 23 8
Periphery 13 37 20 23 6
10. Living in core and peripheral areas in Gauteng
If peripheral areas are imagined as rural, people 
living there could be thought of as living bucolic lives, 
untroubled by the stresses of living in high-density 
urban areas, with noise, traffic and crime. Rural life is 
also sometimes imagined as being more ‘communal’ 
than city life, with people knowing and trusting their 
neighbours. But, if peripheral areas are not always 
the rural spaces of imagination, are they then sites 
of high-density living, social marginalisation, and 
social (in)-cohesion?
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Access to amenities and services varies between 
neighbourhoods. With the exception of nursery 
schools, residents in core areas were much more 
likely to have useful services within walking distance 
of their homes (Tables 65 and 66). This applied to 
amenities useful in everyday life such as supermarkets 
and banks, as well as those for finding jobs and running 
businesses. With the exception of hair salons, people 
living in core areas were also significantly more likely 
to have access to liquor stores, bars and clubs, and 
clothing stores (Table 66).
10.1 Community
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey asked 
residents about the community and neighbourhoods 
they lived in. There were no significant differences 
between core and peripheral areas in the reasons 
residents gave for living where they did (Table 64). 
Residents were most influenced by affordability, 
length of residence in the suburb, convenience, 
and family nearby (Table 64). When asked where 
they would prefer to live in Gauteng, there were 
some differences.  
Perhaps predictably, residents in the periphery  
(30 per cent) were more likely than those in the core 
(25 per cent) to say they would prefer to live in ‘a quiet 
rural area or small town’. Approximately a quarter 
in both areas said they would like to live in ‘a trendy 
inner-city apartment’. Notions of a brick house in the 
suburbs, with a garden, still hold strong. This was the 
preference of 48 per cent of residents in the core, and 
45 per cent in the periphery.
Table 64: Most important reason why you live in your suburb, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Affordability 
of property
Always lived 
here
Easy to get 
to work
Family lives 
nearby
Quality of 
property
Core 26 19 13 11 6
Periphery 27 21 12 13 4
NOTE :  Percentages do not add up to 100 per cent as only the five most-frequently given answers are shown.
Table 65: Amenities in walking distance of home (750 m), Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Transport Super- market Bakery Bank
Nursery 
school
Internet 
café
Business 
services
Hardware 
supplier
Core 66 71 44 46 45 47 32 40
Periphery 63 57 28 31 42 33 20 30
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Table 66: Other amenities in walking distance of home (750 m), Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Clothing Hair salon Liquor store Bars and clubs
Core 39 64 54 45
Periphery 25 62 47 39
The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey found that 
residents in the core (32 per cent) were slightly more 
likely than those in the periphery (29 per cent) to say 
that their community or suburb had improved in the 
previous year, but they were also more likely to say 
that things had deteriorated (17 per cent in the core, 
and 14 per cent in the periphery). More than half in 
both areas said there had been no change. Residents 
were most concerned about crime, with 36 per cent in 
the core, and 38 per cent in the periphery, naming it as 
the biggest problem in their community. This could be 
related to the second most-named problem, drugs  
(17 per cent in the core, and 15 per cent in 
the periphery). Unemployment was the 
third most-named problem, cited by 14 per 
cent of residents in the core, and 16 per cent 
in the periphery. 
10.2 Crime and community safety
Regardless of where they lived, residents of 
the province were concerned about crime and 
many did not feel safe in their neighbourhoods. 
Entrepreneurs named it as the main constraint on 
business (GCRO, QoL, 2015). In the GCRO Quality 
of Life 2015 survey, 39 per cent of residents in the 
core said crime had worsened in their area in the 
past year, and almost half of residents who lived 
in peripheral areas said the same (Table 67). Only 
around one in five residents in both areas said 
that levels of crime in their area had decreased. 
Being a victim of crime may affect perceptions of 
crime. One in five residents in both areas said they 
had been a victim of crime in the previous year 
(GCRO QoL, 2015). 
Table 67: Perceptions of crime, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
In the past year has crime in this area
Improved Stayed the same Got worse
Core 22 39 39
Periphery 19 35 46
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Perceptions and experiences of crime affect how safe 
people feel at home and in their neighbourhoods. 
The majority of residents in Gauteng felt safe in 
their homes and when they walked in their area 
during the day (Table 68). In both core (58 per cent) 
and peripheral areas (68 per cent), the majority of 
people felt unsafe walking in their area after dark. 
This fear affects people’s quality of life since many 
leave for work in the morning in the dark, and return 
in the dark, especially during the winter months. 
Streetlights increase safety in the dark. As many 
as 22 per cent of residents in peripheral areas and 
20 per cent in core areas were dissatisfied with the 
provision of street lights in their areas. A further 
10 per cent of residents in core areas, and 22 per 
cent in peripheral areas, said they had no street 
lights (GCRO QoL, 2015).
Table 68: Perceptions of safety, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Very safe Fairly safe Neither Bit unsafe Very unsafe
How safe feel walking in area during the day
Core 31 42 9 12 6
Periphery 29 43 8 13 6
How safe feel walking in area after dark
Core 8 22 12 23 35
Periphery 5 17 9 25 43
How safe feel at home
Core 40 36 9 10 6
Periphery 34 38 9 11 7
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Less than half of all residents in the GCRO QoL 
2015 survey were satisfied with the safety and 
security provided by government (Table 69). Over a 
third in the core (37 per cent), and 43 per cent in the 
periphery, were dissatisfied (Table 69). People in the 
periphery were much less satisfied with the services 
provided by metro and traffic police (Table 69). And, 
if something unfortunate was to happen, residents in 
all areas, but particularly those in peripheral areas, 
showed little satisfaction with emergency services 
(Table 69). Overall, people in the periphery appeared 
to be more nervous about safety, and less satisfied 
with the security provided by government, which 
raises questions about where resources are, and 
should be, focused.
Table 69: Satisfaction with safety and security services  
provided by government, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Very satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied
Safety and security
Core 9 32 22 23 14
Periphery 6 31 21 27 16
Metro/traffic police
Core 12 38 21 18 11
Periphery 7 32 20 25 17
Emergency services (e.g. fire and ambulance)
Core 12 36 20 19 14
Periphery 7 29 17 27 20
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10.3 Household goods
Ownership and investment in household goods reflects 
the income of a household, their aspirations and can 
also reflect their investment in an area. Ownership of 
household goods (or lack of them), also reflects poverty 
and inequality as they are a form of asset. A household 
goods index was created using Census 2011 data, 
which added together the proportions of households, 
per ward, without access to a radio, television, stove 
or fridge (Figure 40). Wards in peripheral areas were 
more likely to score highest on this index – i.e. have 
higher proportions of households without these goods. 
Notably, wards in mining areas had high proportions 
of households without stoves or fridges (Figures 
41 and 42, Table 70). Peripheral areas were also 
home to wards with high proportions of households 
without radios, televisions and cars, affecting their 
connectivity (Table 70 and Figures 65, 69 and 70). 
This may be because many parts of peripheral areas 
and wards are home to migrant workers (particularly 
as many are located in mining areas) who may be 
investing in these items in their other homes (Peberdy, 
2013a). Overall, households in peripheral areas are less 
likely to have basic household goods. This may not only 
reflect lower levels of investment in their communities 
and homes, but also low incomes, vulnerability of 
people living in informal dwellings to crime, and 
generally lower standards of living for households 
in peripheral areas.
Photograph by Mikey Rosato
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Figure 40: Household goods index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Household goods index
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Table 70: Ownership of household goods, Gauteng, 2011 (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Radio Television Stove Fridge Washing machine Car Cell phone
Core 72 84 88 77 45 42 95
Periphery 65 75 78 65 35 30 92
Photograph by Lesedi Mogale
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Figure 41: Households with no fridge per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Households with no fridge per ward (%)
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Figure 42: Households with no stove per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
Households with no stove per ward (%)
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13.1 - 29 51.1 - 94 Gauteng wards
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10.4 Social cohesion
Levels of social cohesion may be difficult to establish 
when there are high levels of mistrust among residents. 
Sadly, more than three quarters of respondents in 
the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey (76 per cent 
in the core, and 79 per cent in the periphery), when 
asked if people in their community could be trusted, 
said ‘you need to be very careful’. Only 14 per cent in 
both areas felt most people could be trusted. There 
were some differences in the opinions of residents in 
core and peripheral areas around race, gender and 
migration as well as attitudes to, and acceptability 
of violence towards, other residents who they 
perceived as different. 
Around 60 per cent of respondents agreed with 
the statement that ‘blacks and whites will never really 
trust each other’, suggesting there is some way to go 
as regards social cohesion and race (Table 71). Also 
troubling were the 28 per cent of residents in the core, 
and 32 per cent in the periphery, who agreed that 
‘Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative 
action’. Only about a third in both areas thought 
coloured people were playing an important role in 
building the country.
Table 71: Race and social cohesion, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015 
Strongly 
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Blacks and whites will never really trust each other
Core 27 31 17 17 8
Periphery 25 36 16 17 6
Indians do not deserve to benefit from affirmative action
Core 6 22 24 35 13
Periphery 6 26 26 33 10
Coloured people are playing an important role in helping to build the new South Africa
Core 9 24 27 28 12
Periphery 8 22 28 32 10
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In a country where hostile attitudes towards lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex people (LGBTI) 
are regularly expressed, and ‘corrective’ rape takes 
place, what were residents’ attitudes towards gay 
and lesbian people? The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 
survey found that only 56 per cent of residents in the 
core, and 57 per cent in the periphery, thought gay 
and lesbian people should have the same rights as 
other South Africans (Table 72). And 30 per cent of 
people in the core, and 28 per cent in the periphery, 
disagreed. Even more troubling, 15 per cent of 
residents in the core, and 13 per cent in peripheral 
areas, said it was ‘acceptable to be violent towards 
gays and lesbians’ (Table 72). Attitudes towards 
gay and lesbian people are even more disturbing 
when considered in the light of the acceptability of 
other forms of social violence. Domestic violence, 
particularly against women, is a significant problem 
in South Africa. Two per cent of residents, regardless 
of where they lived, thought it could be acceptable 
for a man to hit his partner. One per cent of the 
adult population of the province is the equivalent of 
around 100 000 adults.
Table 72: Attitudes towards gays and lesbians, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Strongly agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Gays and lesbians deserve equal rights
Core 19 37 14 18 12
Periphery 17 40 15 18 10
It is acceptable to be violent towards gays and lesbians
Core 4 11 14 42 30
Periphery 3 10 14 46 27
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The outbreak of xenophobic violence of 2008 that 
claimed the lives of at least 62 people (of whom it is 
thought around 30 were South Africans) started in 
Alexandra, which, although located in the core of the 
province, consistently appears in the maps in this 
report as socio-economically marginal or peripheral. 
In 2008 the violence spread to Jeppe, near the 
Johannesburg CBD, and Ramaphosa in Ekurhuleni, 
both peripheral areas located within the core of the 
province. Xenophobic attacks had occurred across 
the province prior to May 2008, and continued 
subsequently. In January and April 2015, there were 
other widespread but less murderous outbreaks  
of violence in areas of Soweto, and again,  
in Jeppe. Attacks continue to be perpetrated across the 
province, often in townships and informal settlements 
where people live precarious lives. South Africans 
interviewed in the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey 
expressed strong hostility to foreigners, and 25 per 
cent of South Africans, regardless of where they lived, 
agreed with the statement that Gauteng was ‘for 
South Africans only and that all foreigners should 
be sent back to their home countries’. Only three per 
cent, however, said it was ‘OK’ to physically attack 
foreigners to make them leave. Not all are hostile as 
57 per cent said that legal foreigners were acceptable, 
and a further 18 per cent thought that all foreigners 
should be allowed to stay. However, some people do 
not just regard foreigners as surplus in Gauteng as 
some would also like to limit the movement of other 
South Africans into the province. As many as 43 
per cent of respondents in both core and peripheral 
areas agreed with the statement ‘there are too 
many people coming to Gauteng, we should bring 
back influx control’.
Thus, it seems that where people live does 
not make a significant difference to their attitudes 
towards each other. However, the attitudes of some 
people towards those they perceive as different 
to themselves, and the acceptance of violence, 
particularly towards gay and lesbian people, are of 
great concern. 
10.5 Quality of life
There has been little research focused on the 
quality of life in core and peripheral areas. The 
literature suggests that, depending on the indicators 
used, quality of life may be perceived to be higher 
in some peripheral areas, particularly rural and 
semi-rural areas, than in core areas (Ilbery, 
1984; Oppong et al., 1988). In Gauteng, there was 
little difference between people living in core or 
peripheral areas between levels of satisfaction with 
a whole range of areas of life (Table 73), although 
residents in the core were slightly more likely to be 
satisfied (Table 73). 
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Table 73: Life satisfaction, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Very 
satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied
Very 
dissatisfied
Life as a whole
Core 22 48 15 11 5
Periphery 18 48 16 13 5
Amount of time you have to do things you want to do
Core 12 52 14 16 5
Periphery 9 53 13 18 6
Leisure time
Core 19 54 14 10 3
Periphery 14 55 16 12 3
Friends
Core 21 57 14 7 2
Periphery 17 58 16 7 2
Family 
Core 35 49 6 7 2
Periphery 30 54 6 8 2
Marriage or relationship No relationship
Core 28 38 7 2 2 23
Periphery 25 38 7 3 2 25
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Quality of life can be enhanced by exploring hobbies, 
watching or participating in sport, visiting parks and 
botanical gardens and going to art galleries, museums 
and heritage sites. Libraries are both recreational and 
study spaces, and for some households, including some 
learners, these are their only access to books. The 
GCRO Quality of Life 2013 survey asked respondents 
about their use of various facilities. In all cases, 
people living in peripheral areas were less likely to 
make use of recreational facilities (Table 74). This 
may be because they are not readily available in these 
areas. In the GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey, over 
a third (35 per cent) of residents in the periphery, and 
almost a quarter (23 per cent) in the core, said there 
were no libraries near them. Library users living in 
the core were more satisfied with their local library 
(49 per cent) than those in the periphery (36 per cent). 
Similarly, residents in the core (51 per cent) were much 
more satisfied with local parks and public spaces than 
those in the periphery (35 per cent). In the periphery, 
more than half (54 per cent) were dissatisfied with 
their local parks and public spaces. Lack of access 
to libraries and parks affects the quality of people’s 
lives detrimentally. 
Table 74. Recreational facilities used, Gauteng, 2013 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Libraries Sports facilities
Botanic 
gardens/
parks/ open
 green spaces
World 
heritage sites
Museums and 
art galleries
Core 18 19 24 7 9
Periphery 14 15 18 4 6
NOTE :  This question was not asked in the GCRO QoL 2015 survey.
“Quality of life can be enhanced by exploring 
hobbies, watching or participating in sport, 
visiting parks and botanical gardens and going 
to art galleries, museums and heritage sites.”
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11. Transport and connectivity
Understandings of uneven development emphasise 
the flows of people and commodities from peripheral 
areas to core areas (Smith, 1986, 1997; Pileček and 
Jančák, 2011; Van Hamme and Pion, 2012). As a core 
area of South Africa, Gauteng certainly receives 
flows of people and goods. But what happens within 
the province? What are the flows of people, goods 
and commodities within it? It is difficult to assess 
intra-provincial flows of goods. The GCRO Quality 
of Life 2013 survey provides some information 
on the flows of people through the province for a 
variety of purposes. Unfortunately, these questions 
were not asked in the same level of detail in 2015 as 
in 2013. However, there is little reason to suppose 
that the origins and destinations of the journeys 
of the majority of residents changed dramatically 
between the two surveys. 
Identification of core and peripheral areas is often 
related to transport. The relationship is complex and 
at times apparently contradictory. Some scholars 
identify peripheral areas as those that are distant 
from, and lack ready transport connections to, the 
core. Others emphasise the flows of labour, goods 
and capital, which require transport, from the 
periphery to the core. Isolation and immobility can 
act as markers of peripherality while transport 
networks, distances and directions of movement 
indicate the relationships between core and 
peripheral areas and places. Identifiers of peripheral 
areas also include poor infrastructure (including 
transport) and lower density road networks. Access 
to transport and means of transport can also be 
markers of peripherality.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 43: Gauteng quality of transport: Overall quality of transport
SOURC E : Venter, Mobility in the Gauteng City-Region, 2014
Residential areas Industrial Protected areas/ Natural systems Waterbodies
Commercial small holdings Gauteng Boudary
Existing road network
Freeway and Primary Tertiary Metrorail Stations
Secondary Rail network
Overall quality of transport index
-2.662 - -2.022 -1.117 - -0.622 -1.117 - -0.622 0.33- 0.770
-2.021 - -1.118 -0621 - -0.353 -0.061- 0.336
Clusters
1. Inacessable 
townships
2. Poor access, poor 
mobility townships
3: Medium access, 
mobility advantaged
3: Medium access, 
mobility advantaged
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Figure 43 identifies the road and rail transport 
networks of Gauteng. It shows the lower-density and 
poorer-quality road networks in peripheral areas 
of the province. The major road and rail networks 
reflect understandings of the relationships between 
core and peripheral areas. The road and rail networks 
demonstrate the role of Gauteng as the core of the 
economy of the country as they focus on enabling the 
flow of resources into the province, and manufactured 
and other goods out. Within Gauteng, the rail networks 
are focused on getting resources from resource-
producing areas into the core, getting labour and other 
supplies into the core, and distributing manufactured 
goods produced in the core around the province 
and further afield. 
The GCRO Quality of Life 2013 survey asked 
extensive questions about transport, including the 
origins and destinations of respondents’ journeys. 
People move in large numbers around the province 
daily (Figure 44). Figures 45 to 47, showing all 
trips into and within the three metros, highlight 
the attraction of the core. Those who live in the 
periphery mostly travel to the core for work. Many 
residents travel long distances to work, particularly 
those commuting from peripheral areas to the 
core (Figures 48 to 58). However, there are also 
residents in the periphery who travel to work nodes 
in peripheral areas, and, in the case of Emfuleni, 
to core areas located in the municipality (Figures 
52 to 58). Residents of the core who live in metros 
may travel outside the boundaries of the metro in 
which they live to go to work, but usually to another 
core area, with few commuting to peripheral areas 
(Figures 49 to 51).
People from peripheral areas mainly look to the 
core for job opportunities, although the mining areas 
of Merafong and Randfontein attract interest (Figure 
59). People are less likely to travel long distances for 
leisure and entertainment, and most head to venues in 
the core. Some travel relatively long distances for these 
purposes and some people from the core venture to 
peripheral areas (Figure 60). Shopping opportunities 
appear to be more likely to be located in core areas 
(Figures 61 to 64). However, people in peripheral 
areas seem as likely to shop locally as go to core 
areas (Figure 61). 
Although the mapping of all trips shows a strong 
orientation to the core, the picture is a little more 
complex. Figures 52 to 58, showing commutes, and 
Figure 61, showing journeys for shopping, reveal the 
presence of smaller-scale core places. So, although 
towns like Westonaria, Bronkhorstspruit and Babelegi 
are located in peripheral areas, and are relatively 
small conurbations, they may be core for the people 
living in and around them in terms of work, recreation 
and consumption.
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Figure 44: All trips undertaken (commutes, looking for work, leisure), 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin of trip Taking children to school To go to work
Other purpose To go to a place of leisure or entertainment To look for work
Shopping To go to a place where I study Gauteng municipalities
Reason for, and origin of trip
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Figure 45: All trips into and within the City of Johannesburg, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Johannesburg Into Johannesburg Core
Within Johannesburg Ekurhuleni Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 46: All trips into and within the City of Tshwane, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Tshwane Into City of Tshwane Core
Within City of Tshwane City of Tshwane Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 47: All trips into and within Ekurhuleni, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Ekurhuleni Into Ekurhuleni Core
Within Ekurhuleni Ekurhuleni Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 48: All commuting trips except the City of Johannesburg, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin (where they live)
C O M M U T I N G F R O M :
Tshwane Lesedi Mogale City City of Johannesburg
Ekurhuleni Merafong Randfontein Gauteng municipalities
Emfuleni Midvaal Westonaria
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Figure 49: Commuter trips within and from the City of Johannesburg, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Johannesburg Go outside Johannesburg Core
Go within Johannesburg Johannesburg Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 50: Commuter trips within and from Ekurhuleni, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Ekurhuleni Go outside Ekurhuleni Core
Go within Ekurhuleni Ekurhuleni Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 51: Commuter trips within and from the City of Tshwane, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within City of Tshwane Go outside City of Tshwane Core
Go within City of Tshwane City of Tshwane Gauteng municipalities
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
merafong
randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
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Figure 52: Commuter trips within and from Emfuleni, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Emfuleni Go outside Emfuleni Core
Go within Emfuleni Emfuleni Gauteng municipalities
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
merafong
randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
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Figure 53: Commuter trips within and from Lesedi, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Lesedi Go outside Lesedi Core
Go within Lesedi Lesedi Gauteng municipalities
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westonaria
johannesburg
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emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
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Figure 54: Commuter trips within and from Merafong, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Merafong Go outside Merafong Core
Go within Merafong Merafong Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 55: Commuter trips within and from Midvaal, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Midvaal Go outside Midvaal Core
Go within Midvaal Midvaal Gauteng municipalities
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
merafong
randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
lesedi
midvaal kilometres
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Figure 56: Commuter trips within and from Mogale City, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Mogale City Go outside Mogale City Core
Go within Mogale City Mogale City Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 57: Commuter trips within and from Randfontein, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Randfontein Go outside Randfontein Core
Go within Randfontein Randfontein Gauteng municipalities
ekurhuleni
westonaria
johannesburg
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randfontein
emfuleni
tshwane
mogale city
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midvaal kilometres
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Figure 58: Commuter trips within and from Westonaria, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Westonaria Go outside Westonaria Core
Go within Westonaria Westonaria Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 59: Trips to look for work from all municipalities, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin (where they live)
 O R I G I N AT I N G I N :
City of Johannesburg Emfuleni Midvaal Westonaria
City of Tshwane Lesedi Mogale City Core
Ekurhuleni Merafong City Randfontein Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 60: Trips for leisure and entertainment from all municipalities, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin (where they live)
 O R I G I N AT I N G I N :
City of Johannesburg Emfuleni Midvaal Westonaria
City of Tshwane Lesedi Mogale City Core
Ekurhuleni Merafong City Randfontein Gauteng municipalities
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Figure 61: Trips for shopping, all municipalities except Johannesburg,2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin (where they live)
 O R I G I N AT I N G I N :
City of Tshwane Lesedi Mogale City City of Johannesburg
Ekurhuleni Merafong City Randfontein Gauteng municipalities
Emfuleni Midvaal Westonaria
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Figure 62: Trips for shopping, City of Johannesburg, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Johannesburg Johannesburg Gauteng municipalities
Outside and within Johannesburg Core
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Figure 63: Trips for shopping, City of Tshwane residents, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within City of Tshwane City of Tshwane Gauteng municipalities
Outside and within City of Tshwane Core
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Figure 64: Trips for shopping, Ekhuruleni residents, 2013
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2013
Origin within Ekurhuleni Ekurhuleni Gauteng municipalities
Outside and within Ekurhuleni Core
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11.1 Access to transport
In terms of access to and use of transport, the majority 
of households in the province rely on public transport 
to get around, or they walk. In 2011, less than a third 
of households (30 per cent) in peripheral areas owned 
a car, compared to 42 per cent in the core (Census, 
2011). The periphery was home to most of the wards 
with the lowest car ownership (Figure 65). This 
means that most residents rely on public transport, 
or car owners not in their own household, to travel 
around the province. 
Photograph by Skhumbuzo Mtshali
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Figure 65: Households with no car per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
7 - 28 53 - 74 Core
28.1 - 53 74 - 96 Gauteng wards
Households with no car per ward (%)
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The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 survey found that over 
half of residents in the core (59 per cent), and 67 per 
cent in the periphery, used public transport for their 
most frequent trips (Table 75). Taxis were the most 
common form of transport used. Trains and buses 
came a distant second and third, as public transport 
carriers. Notably, the proportion of residents using 
the new bus rapid-transport systems of ReaVaya 
(Johannesburg), and A re yeng (Pretoria), was slightly 
larger than those using older bus carriers (Table 
75). Overall, around a third of residents thought that 
public transport services had improved for them and 
their households in the previous year (GCRO QoL, 
2015). Cars were used by 44 per cent of residents (as 
drivers, passengers or as part of a lift club) in the core, 
and less than a third (31 per cent) in the periphery, 
for their longest and most frequent trips (Table 75). 
In December 2013, highly-contested open road tolls 
(e-Tolls) were introduced in Gauteng. They had an 
impact on residents in the province, with 16 per cent 
in the core, and 11 per cent in the periphery, saying the 
introduction of tolls had caused them to change their 
route. A slightly lower proportion said tolls had caused 
them to change their mode of transport (12 per cent in 
the core, and 9 per cent in the periphery). The slightly 
lower proportion of residents in the periphery who had 
changed their routes and mode of transport possibly 
reflects lower levels of car use.
Table 75: Types of transport used for most frequent and longest trips, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Walk Taxi Train Gautrain
ReaVaya 
or A re 
yeng bus
Other bus Car as driver
Car as 
passenger
or lift club
Core 64 46 7 1 3 2 32 12
Periphery 74 57 5 0.4 2 2 21 10
NOTE : Multiple response question.
Access to nearby transport services was relatively 
similar, with two thirds in the core, and 63 per cent 
in the periphery, reporting that they had transport 
services within walking distance of their homes 
(GCRO QoL, 2015). The majority of residents were 
satisfied with the mode of transport they used, but 
people in the periphery were less likely to be so 
(Table 76). Some residents were dissatisfied with 
the condition of roads, particularly those in the 
periphery (Table 76). This suggests that transport 
infrastructure in peripheral areas is not being 
maintained and/or upgraded.
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Table 76: Satisfaction with mode of transport and roads, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E :  GCRO QoL, 2015
Very 
satisfied Satisfied Neither Dissatisfied
Very 
dissatisfied
Satisfaction with mode of transport used for longest and most frequent trips
Core 21 59 9 9 2
Periphery 14 61 9 12 4
Satisfaction with roads
Core 21 41 10 14 14
Periphery 12 34 9 20 26
The GCRO Quality of Life 2013 survey data on 
transport shows that core areas of the province 
attract commuters and those looking for work 
from the periphery and core. However, there is also 
evidence, particularly when it comes to shopping, 
but also in the arena of work, of the existence of 
smaller cores or nodes in peripheral areas of the 
province. For some residents, whether they are 
excluded from the core, they exclude themselves, 
or they are disengaged from the core, these nodes 
constitute their world. However, the overwhelming 
impression reflects the relationship between core 
and periphery described in the literature on uneven 
development, with peripheral areas providing low-cost 
labour for the core.
11.2 Connectivity
Peripheral areas are marked by their lack of 
connectivity and the difficulties residents have in 
accessing services, information, employment and 
core areas. Connectivity extends beyond transport. 
Using data from Census 2011, this study developed an 
index of connectivity which includes the percentage 
of households per ward without a car, and with 
no access to a computer, the internet, radio and 
television (Figure 66). Having access to a computer, 
the internet, radio and televison enhances access 
to work and leisure opportunities and information. 
Owning a car may not be essential, but having 
access to a good, affordable public transport system 
is. Access to cell and landline phones was not 
included in the index, given that by 2011, 95 per cent 
of households in the province had access to a cell 
phone (Census, 2011). 
Households and residents in peripheral 
areas are proportionately more likely to have low 
and lower levels of connectivity than residents of 
core areas (Figure 66). However, there are areas 
within the core of the province where residents 
have low levels of connectivity. On the whole, 
these are associated with former apartheid black 
townships and informal settlements where people 
have low incomes. 
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Figure 66: Connectivity index
SOURC E : Census, 2011
0 - 132 220.1 - 258 134.1 - 185 Core
132.1 - 174 258.1 - 286 354.1 - 408 Gauteng wards
174.1 - 220 286.1 - 314 408.1 - 497
Connectivity index
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Access to a car may be important for residents who 
have to travel long distances to work, or do shift work, 
particularly where public transport is irregular 
and/or not available at night. Public transport 
networks in the province are incomplete, and many 
residents rely on mini-bus taxis which, although 
they are provided through the private sector, are 
regulated by the state. According to Census 2011 
data, less than a third of households (30 per cent) 
in peripheral areas owned a car, compared to 42 
per cent in core areas. The GCRO Quality of Life 
2015 survey found no difference in either area in 
the proportion of households owning a car. It is in 
peripheral areas, where the highest proportions of 
residents who have to travel the longest distances, 
where public transport networks may be weak, are 
where the highest proportions of people without a car, 
per ward, are found.
Municipalities increasingly encourage residents 
to receive bills electronically, whether by cell phone 
or email, and to pay municipal accounts by means of 
electronic bank transfers. The proliferation of cell 
phones as well as cell phone and internet banking 
makes this possible for some residents. However, 
these systems transfer the costs of receiving and 
paying bills from local authorities to the customer, 
and the proportional cost of receiving and paying 
bills for low-income residents is high. Nevertheless, 
electronic systems increase direct access to billing 
and municipal information for many households as 
most residents do not have access to postal services. 
Census 2011 found that only a third of households in 
the core, and 22 per cent in the periphery, received 
mail through a mail box and only 15 per cent in the core 
and 14 per cent in the periphery had mail delivered to 
their doorstep. 
Access to a computer and the internet whether 
at home, school or work, is increasingly important as 
residents need to (and are often required to) access 
information, do banking and pay bills using electronic 
services. Households in peripheral areas are least 
likely to have access to a computer, and are more 
likely to be at a distance from municipal offices and 
postal services so that accessing physical pay points 
may be difficult. However, there is a low penetration 
of computer ownership in the province generally, as 
significant numbers of households in the core have no 
access to computers at home (Figure 67). Census 2011 
found that just over a third (36 per cent) of households 
in core areas have a computer at home, compared 
to just over one in five (22 per cent) households in 
peripheral areas. The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 
survey found that the proportion of households with a 
computer at home had changed little in the intervening 
years, with 39 per cent of residents in the core, and 
25 per cent in the periphery, having access to a 
computer at home. 
“Municipalities increasingly encourage residents 
to receive bills electronically, whether by cell 
phone or email, and to pay municipal accounts 
by means of electronic bank transfers.”
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Figure 67: Households with no computer at home per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
12 - 34 52.1 - 67 Core
34.1 - 52 67.1 - 95 Gauteng wards
Households with no computer at home per ward (%)
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Figure 68: Households with no access to the internet per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
12 - 34 52.1 - 67 Core
34.1 - 52 67.1 - 95 Gauteng wards
Households with no access to the internet per ward (%)
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Figure 68 shows the proportion of households per 
ward in 2011 with no access to the internet whether 
on a phone, at home, at work, or elsewhere. It clearly 
shows the lack of internet penetration in peripheral 
areas and that there are significant proportions of the 
core, largely in township areas at the edges, where 
households have no internet access. Although Census 
2011 found that a higher proportion of households had 
access to the internet than had computers at home, 
almost two thirds of households in peripheral areas (63 
per cent), and half in core areas (49 per cent), had no 
access to the internet. The GCRO Quality of Life 2015 
survey found higher proportions of households did not 
have an internet connection at home (66 per cent in the 
core, and 78 per cent in the periphery). The majority of 
respondents, regardless of where they lived, accessed 
the internet using a cell phone, which is a costly 
way to be connected. 
Table 77: Source of access to the internet, Gauteng, 2015 (%)
SOURC E : GCRO QoL, 2015
Any-
where on 
my cell 
phone/
tablet
Home Work
Any-
where on 
my
laptop
Wi-Fi 
hotspot/
free or 
public 
Wi-Fi
Internet 
Café
Library 
or 
commu-
nity 
centre
Taxi 
Wi-Fi Other
Core 75 43 32 25 17 16 5 2 9
Periphery 78 32 21 15 10 12 3 2 6
NOTE : This table only shows the proportions of those households who access the internet. Multiple response question so percentages  
do not add up to 100 per cent.
The use of cell phones to access the internet reflected 
the penetration of cell phones in Gauteng, where 95 
per cent of households in the core, and 92 per cent 
in the periphery, had access to a cell phone in 2011. 
Landlines appear increasingly obsolete, with just over 
one in five households in the core (22 per cent), and one 
in ten (11 per cent) in the periphery having a landline 
telephone in the house (Census, 2011). The growth in 
access to telephone networks is astounding, as in 1996, 
only 50 per cent of residents in the core, and 29 per 
cent in the periphery had access to a landline or cell 
phone (Census, 1996).
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Figure 69: Households with no TV per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
2 - 13 26.1 - 45 Core
13.1 - 26 45.1 - 84 Gauteng wards
Households with no TV per ward (%)
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Figure 70: Households with no radio per ward (%)
SOURC E : Census, 2011
6 - 22 31.1 - 41 Core
22.1 - 31 41.1 - 64 Gauteng wards
Households with no radio per ward (%)
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12. Conclusion
[T]he clear distinction which once existed 
between the urban and the rural is gradually 
fading into a set of porous spaces of uneven 
geographical development, under the 
hegemonic command of capital and the state. 
(Harvey, 2008: 36)
This report set out to explore uneven development 
in the province of Gauteng and the Gauteng City-
Region. Using economic criteria alongside population 
density and types of land use to initially identify core 
and peripheral areas in the province, it focused on 
the lives of residents in the core and peripheral areas 
so identified, and, where possible, the changes they 
have experienced in the twenty years of democratic 
government following the demise of apartheid in 
1994. The discussion references the spatial legacy 
of apartheid social and economic engineering, 
which is seen in the persistence of peripheral areas 
within the economic core of the province. These 
areas are mostly former black townships and 
settlements created by the apartheid state. This 
legacy emphasises the role of the state, history, and 
The proportion of households in wards in peripheral 
areas without a television and/or radio was higher 
than in most wards in the core (Figures 67 and 
68). Some households may lack both but that data 
is not available. Overall, Census 2011 found that 
72 per cent of households in the core had a radio, 
and 84 per cent a television. Of households in 
the periphery, 65 per cent had a radio, and 75 per 
cent a television.
Ownership of radios and televisions, 
access to the internet, and participation by 
residents in public forums, all need to be 
taken into consideration by the various levels 
of government when deciding how best to 
communicate with residents.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
195
PART A
time, in understanding core–periphery relationships 
as they shift as changing political, economic and 
social processes inscribe themselves on space. As 
Henri Lefebvre argues,
Space is not a scientific object removed from 
ideology and politics; it has always been political 
and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality 
and indifference with regard to its contents and 
thus seems to be “purely” formal, the epitome of 
rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has 
been occupied and used, and has already been the 
focus of past processes whose traces are not always 
evident on the landscape. Space has been shaped 
and moulded from historical and natural elements, 
but this has been a political process. Space is 
political and ideological. It is a product literally 
filled with ideologies. (Henri Lefebvre, 1976: 31, 
cited in Soja, 1980: 210)
As this report focused on demographic and social 
issues relating to core and peripheral areas, it 
did not directly address the processes and flows 
of capital, which shape uneven development in 
Gauteng. However, the available data presented on 
the generation of GVA from primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors indicate Gauteng’s place as a core 
area in South Africa, and highlight where core areas 
lie within the province (GPG, 2012). Similarly, the 
employment profiles, which show higher rates of 
employment in the primary sector in peripheral areas, 
suggest a core–periphery relationship. Through the 
data on employment, unemployment, incomes and 
transport, it is possible to see how, although Gauteng 
is itself a core area, the movement of migrants to the 
province has created a labour force in its peripheral 
areas, on the doorstep of capital, that is ripe for 
exploitation and the payment of low incomes. The 
spatial impact of migration-associated urbanisation is 
reinforced by the legacy of apartheid spatial patterns 
and new government-led housing development, 
which locates workers in the periphery. The data on 
travel routes for going to work, and looking for work, 
emphasise this conclusion as the routes travelled 
by respondents in the GCRO Quality of Life 2013 
survey are focused on the core areas and metros of 
Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and Tshwane, and to 
a lesser extent, Emfuleni. With labour flowing to 
core areas of Gauteng and the GCR, it is possible 
for the province to grow and reinforce its place as 
one of the core areas, not only of South Africa, but 
also of the African continent. At the same time, 
it is reinforcing the concept of the Gauteng City-
Region, which has been embraced by the Gauteng 
provincial government. 
The demographic picture is somewhat confused 
and this highlights, in some ways, the role of race 
in shaping South Africa’s demographic landscape. 
Although the demographic index created in this report 
shows that areas that are demographically marginal 
are more likely to lie outside the boundaries of the 
core, there are those that lie within it. And wards 
in core areas are home to the largest proportions of 
people over 65 years. Similarly, the picture of the 
location of migrant populations is somewhat blurred. 
With almost half of the population of the province 
being migrants, it would be remarkable if they indeed 
fitted neatly within peripheral boundaries. Migrants 
find entry into an area and space to live where there 
is rental accommodation and residential mobility. 
For many cross-border migrants, expectations of 
xenophobia may affect the choice of where to live. 
Nevertheless, migrants are more likely to live in 
peripheral areas. 
People who live in peripheral areas were, on the 
whole, found to have less favourable living conditions 
and less access to services than people living in the 
core of the province. Although people in peripheral 
areas were more likely to own their own homes, these 
were more likely to be RDP houses. The proportions 
“People who live in peripheral areas were, on 
the whole, found to have less favourable living 
conditions and less access to services than 
people living in the core of the province.”
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of households living in informal dwellings, with 
inadequate access to water, electricity, sanitation 
and refuse removal, were disproportionately 
higher in peripheral areas than in core areas. 
These disparities did not seem to have significantly 
different physical, mental or emotional health 
impacts, however. 
Although residents of peripheral areas were 
more likely to be dissatisfied with services and, like 
residents in core areas, had relatively high levels of 
dissatisfaction with government, residents of the 
periphery showed more confidence in government  
and democracy than those in the core. They were  
also more likely to take part in meetings and 
organisations in their communities which could  
affect their services. 
Peripheral areas, whether rural or township, 
are sometimes considered to be places of community, 
where people know and speak to their neighbours. 
People in rural areas are imagined to live relatively 
stress-free lives, compared to those in the city. 
However, this report suggests that, despite their 
participation in civil society, residents in peripheral 
areas are no more likely to have confidence or trust in 
the people who live in their communities. Attitudes 
related to social cohesion were largely similar in core 
and peripheral areas. Respondents in both  
areas showed similarly disturbing attitudes to  
LGBTI people and foreigners in their communities. 
People in peripheral areas were more likely to 
be fearful of crime and walking at night in their 
neighbourhoods, even though, in the GCRO Quality  
of Life 2013 survey, respondents in the periphery  
were slightly less likely to have been victims of 
crime than those in the core. Tellingly, residents 
in the periphery were dissatisfied with policing 
and the provision of other emergency services 
in their communities, suggesting that these 
areas of the province may not be policed with the 
same vigour as core areas, where residents were 
more satisfied.
Significant changes have taken place in core  
and peripheral areas in the past twenty years. 
Importantly, there has been a significant increase 
in population, with over 50 per cent of the increase 
between 2001 and 2011 being the result of in-migration 
from other provinces and other countries (StatsSA, 
2013). This has created a large, relatively cheap and 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
197
PART A
unskilled labour force in peripheral areas, as well as 
within the boundaries of the core. In part, this reflects 
the role of Gauteng in the national economy. The 
growing population presents particular challenges 
for change and masks some of the progress made by 
the state in the provision of housing and services. 
Although progress has been made in the fields of 
education, housing and access to water, energy and 
sanitation, as regards reductions in the proportions of 
households without these services since 1994, larger 
numbers of households were without formal housing 
and other services in 2011 than in 1996. Significantly, 
much of the progress made has been in peripheral 
areas rather than in the core. This suggests that the 
state is endeavouring to reduce inequalities in the 
lives of people living in core and peripheral areas of 
the province, in the areas of education, housing and 
service delivery. 
Authors who address the role of the 
state in dealing with uneven development 
suggest that it rarely addresses the processes 
which underpin spatial inequalities and the 
development of core and peripheral areas (Soja, 
1980; Smith, 1986, 1997;Etherington and Jones, 
2009), and as Gonzalez suggests, in the context 
of city-regions:
The main risk in the particular interpretation 
of the city-region agenda … is its displacement 
of issues of uneven development and regional 
disparities by concentrating only on places that 
are doing well. This has at least three problematic 
consequences. First, the emphasis will be mainly 
on the urban core of the city-regions at the 
expense of secondary cities, smaller towns and 
remoter rural areas. Second, it will downplay the 
importance of the national scale as a frame where 
regional disparities are still (re)produced. Third, 
a reified view of scales is being used in this debate, 
one which assigns different functions to different 
scales. (Gonzalez, 2006: 317 cited in Etherington 
and Jones, 2009: 251)
In the case of Gauteng and the GCR, and in the 
context of socio-economic inequalities, in particular, 
the conclusions Gonzales comes to are not always 
valid. Significant efforts have been made to reduce 
inequalities between core and peripheral areas, 
particularly in the areas of housing and service 
provision. However, it should be noted that these are 
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more visible in the peripheral areas within the cities 
of Johannesburg and Pretoria (rather than within 
the larger Tshwane area). Much of the RDP housing 
that has been built to relocate people from informal 
housing, has been built in peripheral areas that are at 
significant distances from the core, which is where 
employment opportunities are. And, the proposed 
mega human settlements are likely to reinforce 
these disparities. Thus, in the case of new housing 
developments it seems core-periphery relationships 
are being reinforced.
The Gauteng Spatial Development Framework 
(GPG, 2011) and its economic development proposals 
(GPG, 2012) planned to reduce spatial inequalities. 
However, a closer reading of these documents 
suggests that these spatial development frameworks 
and economic policies echo Gonzalez in that they 
seem to focus on the urban core and, in particular, 
on developing high-skilled economic development 
opportunities, which, it is thought, will reinforce 
Gauteng’s place as a global city-region. There seems 
to have been little reflection on the impact of these 
policies on peripheral spaces, and on the people living 
in them. These plans are likely to exclude those who 
lack the education and qualifications to participate in 
a high-skill economy (including many who live in the 
core). The provincial government has also introduced 
economic policies intended to ‘modernise’ and 
‘re-industrialise’ township economies. The aim is to 
develop manufacturing to reduce spatial employment 
and income inequality. The Gauteng Spatial 
Development Framework (GPG, 2011) emphasises 
transport, but as a way to move goods and commodities 
faster into and out of the province, and to move labour 
more efficiently in from peripheral areas to potential 
places of work. The economic development framework 
also emphasises the need to develop the agricultural 
sector, but largely to stimulate agri-processing in 
the core (GPG, 2012). These policies clearly form 
part of an economic trajectory that embraces capital 
and foreign direct investment but is unlikely to 
challenge the history and processes that created 
uneven development and contributed to the formation 
of the core and peripheral areas of the province 
and city-region. 
This report provides a picture of what is 
happening in core and peripheral areas in Gauteng  
and the GCR. It identifies a number of areas that are 
ripe for further research. First, although it has  
referred to the legacy of apartheid that can still be 
seen in the peripheral areas identified here, it does not 
address how race and gender are played out within 
core and peripheral areas of the province. This is an 
important issue, given the different racial profiles 
of the core and periphery of the province. Second, it 
has not fully addressed the issue of intra-provincial 
flows of commodities, goods, services and capital 
between core and peripheral areas of the province, 
which would help in understanding the processes 
that underpin uneven development, and enable the 
development of strategies to mitigate it. Third, the 
report underscores a need to consider the role of 
the GCR as a core area of both the nation and the 
continent, and the implications of that role for the 
development of peripheral and core areas within 
the city-region and province. Finally, the report has 
created a binary analysis of core and peripheral areas 
in Gauteng and the GCR. Although attempts have 
been made to create a slightly more nuanced analysis 
through the use of ward-level data, there is a need 
to understand the processes underpinning uneven 
development, in order to develop a finer approach 
that moves away from a binary construction of 
inequality and deals with the way people live in the 
city-region. This report provides a basis from which 
to achieve that.
“The provincial government has also introduced 
economic policies intended to ‘modernise’ and 
‘re-industrialise’ township economies. The 
aim is to develop manufacturing to reduce 
spatial employment and income inequality.”
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Part B
Gauteng – on the edge
P H I L I P H A R R I S O N A N D YA S M E E N D I N AT H
1. Context
1.1 Introduction
This second part of the report addresses the 
straightforward empirical question: What is 
happening along the spatial edges of the Gauteng 
City-Region (GCR)? The previous part made the 
point that spatial edges do not necessarily coincide 
with economic and social peripheries. It is quite 
possible, as Sally Peberdy explains, to have places 
of wealth and economic prosperity on the spatial 
margins, and places of poverty and economic decline 
in the spatial centre.8 This part of the report makes a 
similar observation, although from a different angle. 
It shows that there are variant dynamics of growth 
and decline along the edges of the GCR, with relative 
spatial marginality both attracting and deterring 
new development. 
An immediate challenge is to explain what is 
meant by the ‘spatial edge of the GCR’. The GCR is, 
of course, a subjective construct, with its boundaries 
continually open to contested definition, both 
technically and politically (Mabin, 2013; Mubiwa  
and Annegarn, 2013; Gotz et al., 2014).  
The current consensus may be that most, if not all, 
of the province of Gauteng falls within the GCR. If, 
however, we look beyond the boundaries of Gauteng, 
the definitional uncertainties increase. It may seem 
evident, for example, that Sasolburg in the Free State 
should be considered part of the GCR, but should 
we also include the Rustenburg Platinum Belt, the 
Sun City entertainment complex, the gold-mining 
districts around Klerksdorp-Potchefstroom, and 
the mining-industrial complex around Witbank, 
Middelburg and Evander?
We won’t linger too long on this question as 
there is no objective resolution, although we may 
meaningfully use criteria such as the extent of 
commuting flows to at least provide a plausible, 
interim, technical answer. As case-studies for this 
part, we have chosen a number of places that would 
generally be accepted as being part of the GCR. They 
fall roughly on the edge of Gauteng Province rather 
than on the boundaries of an expanded conception 
of the GCR. They fall also within a belt of spatial 
8. This does not mean, however, that spatial distance has no meaning in terms of economic and social prosperity. Time-cost does matter, but 
the significance of time-cost is mediated by a range of factors including the dynamics and structure of the economy, the quality of the local 
workforce, the spatial distribution of social capital, and knowledge accessibility (for example, Banister and Berechman, 2001; Iyer et al., 2005; 
Andersson and Karlsson, 2007; Vickerman et al., 2009).
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peripherality rather than a specifically-defined  
outer line, an approach that is consistent with 
references to a ‘perimetropolitan zone’9  
(for example, Hart, 1991). 
In terms of structure, this part of the research 
report is divided into three sections. The first 
section is ‘context’ and includes this introduction, 
followed by an account of the relevant literature 
and a historical overview of the development of the 
spatial peripheries of the GCR. The second section 
is the substantive core of the study, which comprises 
six narratives – our case studies – organised 
into four themes:
• Extractive economies on the edge (Carletonville and 
Nigel-Heidelberg); 
• State-implanted industry on the edge (The 
Vaal, including Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark 
and Sasolburg);
• Revisiting the decentralised growth points 
(Babelegi and Bronkhorstspruit);
• Recreational hubs on the edge (Hartbeespoort).
The third section draws conclusions from the 
narrative, indicating, for example, the driving forces of 
change along the spatial periphery, and the themes that 
require further investigation.
Our method of investigation was fairly 
simple. We began by familiarising ourselves with 
the spatial edges of the GCR through: a desktop 
review of existing written material, a broad analysis 
of maps and aerial photographs, a scan of public 
and private datasets, an initial review of municipal 
plans and policies, and site visits. We then identified 
six locales along the edge to illustrate six different 
developmental processes:
• Carletonville-Khutsong was selected to illustrate 
a local economy, long dominated by gold mining, that 
has struggled to diversify, and that has not, as yet, 
ensured its sustainability beyond mining. 
• Nigel and Heidelberg are two medium-sized towns 
on the Far East Rand, a little over 10 km apart, 
although in different municipalities. Together they 
illustrate modest success in diversifying beyond 
mining, especially into manufacturing.
• Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg, 
together with townships such as Boipatong, 
Sharpeville and Sebokeng, and smaller towns 
including Meyerton and Walkerville, form the Vaal 
Triangle, which is a major illustrative case of the 
spatial impacts of state-led industrialisation. 
• The Babelegi industrial estate forms part of 
a cluster of settlements (including Temba and 
Hammanskraal) in the far north of the Tshwane 
metropolitan city, in what has been referred to as a 
zone of displaced urbanisation. It is a key example 
of an apartheid-era industrial development point 
that was established within a homeland (in this case, 
Bophuthatswana).
• Bronkhorstspruit-Ekangala is a key example 
of a long-established agricultural service centre 
that experienced investment under apartheid’s 
regional industrial-development programme, and 
is now enjoying a mini-boom as a result of major 
developments in the energy sector, and some 
renewal in manufacturing.
• Hartbeespoort provides a vivid illustration of a 
recreational and tourist hub that emerged around a 
state-constructed dam, and that has been through 
a variable pattern of development, including a 
recent property boom.
Our main method of case-based analysis was the 
construction of spatially-located narratives, which 
were put together using a variety of information 
sources including media articles, census data, 
research reports, local plans, corporate websites, 
and a few selected interviews. Through narrative, 
we try to explain how and why particular places have 
progressed, regressed or stagnated. Although we 
cannot generalise from individual cases, we do provide 
insight and suggest lessons that could at least be 
interpreted for other places.
9. In the case-studies narratives, we deal broadly, but not comprehensively, with the processes shaping ‘perimetropolitan’ Gauteng. We must 
acknowledge, for example, that agriculture still plays a shaping role in these areas. It may, as a sector, only contribute 0.5 per cent of Gauteng’s 
Gross Value Added (GVA) but it remains the largest land consumer within the perimetropolitan belt and it underpins the development of 
agro-processing, which is one of drivers of perimetropolitan growth. The urban areas around Gauteng provide a steady demand for agricultural 
produce, and so agricultural actively is often more intense around the metropolitan area than in more outlying places. The selected case-studies 
do not necessarily pick up on the continued significance of agriculture, with the possible exception of Heidelberg, where agriculture is the third 
largest contributor to GVA after manufacturing (mainly agro-industry) and government services (Abrahams, 2007).
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Figure 71: Location of case-study areas
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1.2 Literatures
We can draw on various literatures in thinking 
about processes on the edges of large urban 
agglomerations, but these must, however, be 
used with caution and translated carefully in the 
context of our study.
Rethinking agglomeration
A first set of literature is about the advantages of 
the agglomeration of human activity. In its early 
incarnations, this literature suggested that high-
order economic development would accumulate in 
the spatial core, leaving lower-order activities on the 
edge. In the spatial sciences, this theory goes back to 
the late nineteenth century, with the work of J.H. Von 
Thunen on patterns of agricultural activity on rural 
land, and also to Burgess, a prominent figure in the 
Chicago School of Urban Sociology in the 1920s, who 
described urban expansion in terms of concentric 
rings of development. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
these ideas were developed with greater precision 
by regional scientists such as Walter Isard and 
William Alonso, who developed the famous Bid-Rent 
Model, based on the idea of ‘distance decay’ (Isard, 
1956; Copus, 2001).
From the 1950s, these ideas were reinforced 
by development economists such as Myrdal, 
Hirschmann and Friedmann, who argued that the 
advantages of agglomeration – including labour 
pooling, proximity to suppliers and purchasers, and 
rapid transfer of information – activate a process of 
‘cumulative causation’, which progressively reinforces 
the dominant position of the core. In 1991, Paul 
Krugman, recipient of a Nobel Prize in Economics, 
introduced his core–periphery model which argued 
that economic regions that already have high levels 
of productions will be the most profitable, attracting 
even more production. In simple terms, success 
breeds success, creating increasing differentiation 
between the cores and peripheries at all spatial scales 
(Krugman, 1991).
The difficulty with the straightforward 
application of agglomeration is that it didn’t always 
accord with practice. There are, of course, many large, 
fast-growing cores, but also stagnant and declining 
cores. Equally, there are places on the periphery with a 
strong growth dynamic. This suggests that there may 
be various processes at work, not only the operation 
of agglomeration economies. Krugman himself was 
to acknowledge that, in addition to the benefits of 
agglomeration, there are also downsides  
to concentration, such as congestion, high land  
costs, and environmental damage. Whether or not  
an industry concentrates or disperses will depend  
on the relative weight of the benefits and negatives in 
a particular context (Krugman, 1995; Krugman and 
"It is the complexity and contingency of the multiple 
processes at work in regional development that 
directs us again to an exploration of what is actually 
happening in specific places."
Photograph by Skhumbuzo Mtshali
213
PART B
Venables, 1996). Fujita and Thisse (2013: 10)  
make a similar point in their discussion of the 
contextually-specific interplay between the benefits  
of ‘nearness’ and ‘farness’:
Specifically, the location of human activity can 
be viewed as the interplay between the need for 
proximity and a crowding out effect: agents 
benefit from proximity to one another or to 
some place, but face tougher competition in 
the use of scarce resources such as land and a 
green environment.
While most economic geographers still acknowledge 
the benefits of agglomeration, concentration and 
density, they now offer more complex perspectives. 
Sturgeon (2003: 199), for example, accepts that 
the advantages of agglomeration do not always 
materialise within a single activity hub but may be 
realised within a ‘modular production network’. This 
networked notion of agglomeration is recommended 
in the concept of ‘polycentric development’ which is 
now highly influential in urban policy (Copus, 2001; 
Davoudi, 2003).
Then, there is the concept of a ‘value chain’ which 
suggests that the linkages which create economic 
advantage are to be found in the interactions and 
processes that progressively add value as a commodity 
is conceived, assembled and distributed. The chain 
as a whole is vertically integrated through intra-
firm management, inter-firm contracting and trade 
networks, but the components of the chain may be 
spatially separated (Gereffi et al., 2005). The spatial 
application of product life cycle (PLC) theory10 
suggests that different places – including those on 
the spatial periphery – may play a role in supporting 
enterprise at different stages of the firm’s or industry’s 
life cycle. The argument is that the life cycle begins 
mainly in the metropolitan core where the clustering 
of skills, venture capital, knowledge spill-overs and 
institutional capacity supports innovation. However, 
as industries grow and mature – and as the nature 
of competition shifts from product competition 
to cost competition – firms frequently migrate to 
more peripheral locations where land and labour 
costs are lower (Duranton and Puga, 2001; Capasso 
et al., 2011).11
It is the complexity and contingency of the 
multiple processes at work in regional development 
that directs us again to an exploration of what 
is actually happening in specific places. This 
requires us to adjust traditional conceptions of 
agglomeration and core–periphery, and take a more 
complex, and contextually informed, view of what is 
driving change. 
The ‘edge city’
We cannot avoid referring to the ‘edge city’, although 
its relevance to the study of the spatial margins of 
the GCR is questionable. Originating in the classic 
North American text, Edge City: Life on the New 
Frontier (Garreau, 1991), the idea of the edge city 
has been taken up in a sprawling literature. The edge 
city refers to mass-scale private-led developments 
outside of the historical downtowns. The edge cities 
are tied back to the old core through a network of 
“jetways, freeways and rooftop satellite dishes” 
(Garreau, 1991: 4). At the time of writing, Garreau had 
10. Levitt (1965) introduced PLC theory by arguing that industries have a life cycle, beginning with an explorative entrepreneurial phase when 
new products are introduced, and ending with the final depletion of technological and market opportunities (unless, of course, new innovation 
allows for re-creation). 
11.  There is a recognition that there is no generic life cycle, since different industries and firms reveal many variants. High-order finance and 
business services, for example, often remain concentrated in the historic core through their entire life cycles as they require highly specialised 
regulatory systems and low-risk environments. Information and communications technology (ICT) firms, on the other hand, may seek new 
clusters, often beyond the historic core, where new forms of specialised infrastructure can be provided from scratch (Copus, 2001; Norton 
and Rees, 2007).
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identified around two hundred new edge cities across 
the United States, each of them larger than downtown 
Portland, Oregon. 
Scholars offered other terms, apart from edge 
city, including ‘post-suburbia’ (Bontje, 2004), 
‘exurbia’ (Nelson, 1992), ‘exopolis’ (Soja, 1996), 
‘outer cities’ (Newman and Kenworthy, 1989), 
‘superburbia’ (Adell, 1999) and ‘perimeter cities’ 
(Fishman, 1987). Different variants of the edge 
city were identified and were labelled variously as 
‘technopoles’ (Castells and Hall, 1995), ‘aerotropolis’ 
(Kasarda and Lindsay, 2011), ‘funurbia’ (or 
entertainment cities) (Bontje, 2004), ‘finance cities’ 
(Bontje and Burdock, 2005), and ‘ICT clusters’ (Van 
Winden et al., 2004).
Edge cities have also now been identified across 
many parts of the world, including in the United 
Kingdom (for example, Phelps, 1998), in Western 
Europe (Bontje and Burdock, 2005), in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union (Rudolph and Brade, 2005; 
Dövényi and Kovács, 2006; Zeković et al., 2007), and in 
East Asia where edge city developments have happened 
at an extraordinarily large scale (Douglass and Huang, 
2012 Lin, 2001; Yu and Ng, 2007; Wang et al., 2009; 
Yaping and Min, 2009).12
We can hardly ignore the weight of this literature, 
although there are emergent critiques. Beauregard 
(1995 and 1997) argues, for example, that the case 
for the edge city as the leading form of new urban 
development was overstated. He points out that edge 
cities are layered on historical urban processes, with 
developments continuing in the historical core and 
in the older suburbs, and that the focus on edge cities 
may even be ill-advisedly “peripheralizing the centre” 
(1997: 708). Lang and LeFurgy (2003: 427) believe that 
the edge city literature has focused too much attention 
on well-defined mega developments, and too little on 
the sprawling developments “that never reach the 
scale, density, or cohesiveness of edge cities”. They 
refer rather to “edgeless cities” (Lang and LeFurgy, 
2003: 427). There are also commentators who suggest 
that edge city literature has thrived on hype – Joel 
Garreau was, after all, a journalist by profession – and 
that it may be more useful to consider ‘intermediate’ 
or ‘mundane’ cases on the urban edge rather than 
only the more spectacular developments (Lang, 2003; 
Wolf and Gertler, 2004; Phelps, 2004; Holloway 
and Hones, 2007). 
What the edge city literature does do very 
effectively is challenge any legacy conception that 
development intensity and land value invariably 
declines with spatial distance from the core. For 
Garreau (1991: 25), “the Americans’ idea of what 
makes up a city no longer matches reality ... the 
old-fashioned downtown is the relic of the past”. 
In this sense, it may be a valuable antidote to the 
classical distance–decay models, although the 
pendulum may now have swung too far in the 
opposite direction.
For our study, edge city literature may be most 
helpful in offering the possibility that the spatial edge 
may be a new economic centrality. However, the sort 
of edge cities written about by Garreau and others are 
not a feature of the edges of the GCR. They do exist 
in the GCR but are rather a feature of places closer 
in to the core. The emergence of the Sandton CBD in 
the 1970s and 1980s may, for example, be termed an 
edge city development. Large-scale private-driven 
developments in Midrand, Fourways, Sunninghill, 
Centurion, and Menlyn in Pretoria East, may also 
be regarded as edge city developments.13 The large 
settlements that do exist on the edges of the GCR 
12. Yu and Ng (2007) usefully described the large-scale developments on the urban edge as a form of “diffusion-coalescence”. 
13. Michel and Scott (2012: 104) suggest that Umhlanga Ridge north of Durban has “the characteristics of a possible Edge City”.
“the Americans’ idea of what makes up a city no longer 
matches reality ... the old-fashioned downtown is the 
relic of the past”
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have quite different origins, having originated mainly 
through mining or as the product of state planning 
or policy. They may be better understood as forms of 
planned satellite cities. 
Satellite city literature14
In the decades following World War II, many countries 
responded to perceived congestion and urban decay 
by developing satellite settlements beyond the 
edges of existing urban agglomerations. In most 
cases, there was an attempt to create self-contained 
settlements with a balance of work and residence, but 
in some countries such as Sweden, there was a more 
pragmatic approach, which included strengthening 
transport linkages between satellites and the core 
cities. By the 1990s, the idea of satellite cities had 
lost favour in many countries, although there is 
now a new wave of satellite-type developments in 
regions such as East Asia and the Middle East, with 
considerable interest also in parts of Africa (Harrison 
and Todes, 2016).
The outcomes and experiences of satellite cities 
are discussed in the literature, which pays attention, 
for example, to the extent to which self-containment 
was actually achieved, and whether sustainable 
economies were established. The literature shows 
how difficult it is to achieve sustainable economies 
within new planned settlements. Where economic 
success was initially achieved, the growth impetus 
was often lost during periods of economic downturn 
(Ward, 1993). Many of these settlements are also 
extremely vulnerable to wider processes of economic 
restructuring (Ward, 1993; Gaborit, 2010). Generally, 
settlements with more diversified economies and 
better locations relative to transport networks and the 
core cities do better (Turok, 1990; Alexander, 2009). 
Very few settlements succeeded in matching the levels 
of population with jobs, and many planned satellite 
cities effectively became dormitory towns (Cervero, 
1995). Overall, the objectives of planned satellite cities 
have generally proven to be highly elusive (Harrison 
and Todes, 2016).
In Gauteng, there is a long history of state- 
and private sector-led satellite town development. 
This has included settlements built around the 
mining sector (for example, Carletonville); later 
development of towns focused on heavy industry 
(for example, Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg); and 
displaced urban settlements around the apartheid-
era industrial decentralisation points (for example, 
Ga-Rankuwa, Soshanguve, Hammanskraal-
Temba and Ekangala-Ekandustria). As we shall 
see, there was some early success in building 
the economies of satellite cities in Gauteng, but 
these developments have proven vulnerable to 
changing global conditions, shifts in policy, and new 
local dynamics.
Space economy
While literatures on edge cities and satellite cities 
deal with specific forms of development on or 
beyond the urban edge, there is also an important 
14. An extensive review of this literature, with an application also to the GCR, is provided in Harrison and Todes (2016), which is to be revised 
for re-publication.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
216
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
literature which explores the space economy in an 
integrated way. This literature is not specifically 
about the edges of metropolitan cities or city-regions, 
but does provide a means of understanding the 
complex interactions between economic change and 
spatial development.
Doreen Massey’s Spatial Divisions of Labour 
(1995) is the classic work that showed how local 
spatial change was the outcome of interactions 
between macro-economic forces, state policies, the 
organisation of both capital and labour, and local social 
processes. While Massey linked local spatial changes 
to the powerful forces shaping global economies, she 
did not do this in a mechanistic way. She understood, 
for example, that these processes are not happening in 
a void but are layered on existing historical patterns, 
which play a key role in shaping contemporary 
outcomes. She also understood that the local spatial 
outcomes of larger forces are mediated by multiple 
political, social and institutional realities, although 
there are critics who argue that she didn’t go far 
enough in this direction. 
Other writers, too, have explored the nature 
of regional economies, showing how regional 
economies are affected by macro-forces, but also 
how the organisation of regional economies shapes 
actual outcomes. Storper (1997) considered ways in 
which technological change leads to the fall and rise 
of products and production processes, and how this 
transmits also into processes of regional development. 
Like Massey, Storper did not ignore the effects of local 
organisation, and, especially, the ways in which the 
strength of relationships between economic actors 
influences the capacity of regions to adapt to changes. 
An important discussion in this literature is the way 
in which regional economies become locked into 
particular development paths that lose dynamism 
when the global economy changes (for example, Martin 
and Sunley, 2006). 
From these leading contributions, a considerable 
literature developed around ‘spatial restructuring’ 
which is far too extensive to review here. The South 
African literature that draws on these ideas includes 
Gillian Hart’s now classic Disabling Globalization: 
Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2002), 
and also contributions by Chris Rogerson (Rogerson 
and Rogerson, 1999) on industrial restructuring on the 
Witwatersrand, and John Pickles (1991) and Alison 
Todes (1998) on economic and spatial processes on the 
former homeland periphery. 
The international and local literature speaks 
forcefully to a number of the case-studies in our 
study. The most obvious instance of relevance 
may be the Vaal Triangle. This area, with its steel 
and petrochemical industries, is deeply embedded 
within global markets and production circuits, and 
continually buffeted by change over which it has little 
apparent influence, although corporate strategies and 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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government policies (for example, tariff structures) 
have influenced local economic performance and 
spatial outcomes. 
Peripheries and ‘suburbanisms’
There are various literatures which explore the edges 
of large urban agglomerations in different parts of the 
world in ways that are more expansive than a focus 
only on edge or satellite cities or space economies. 
This field of study goes back at least to the 1940s 
when geographers wrote of a ‘rural–urban interface’ 
or an ‘urban fringe’, and to various attempts in the 
1950s and 1960s to identify an ‘in-between’ which 
is not suburban but which is also not evidently rural 
(see Adell, 1999, for a review). There was a growing 
recognition that these places beyond suburbia may 
hold certain advantages for development – they may 
be close enough to the urban core to benefit from 
agglomeration economies, but far away enough to avoid 
the tough competition, and high land and labour costs, 
in the centre (Adell, 1999). 
Friedmann and Miller (1965) envisaged a new 
spatial order in which urban living would penetrate 
deeply into the inter-metropolitan belt, unifying 
core and periphery in a single matrix. Hart (1991) 
followed by referring to a perimetropolitan zone 
around metropolitan cities in the USA, using a 
concept which was adapted from the French notion 
of périurbanisation, which implies both the outward 
dispersal of urban activities into rural areas, but also 
the dissemination of rural lifestyles and ideologies 
into urban space (Adell, 1999). In Australian literature, 
perimetropolitan zones extend beyond the outer 
suburbs of large cities to incorporate a diverse network 
of urban areas – mining, industrial, tourist and 
agricultural towns – that are linked to the metropolis 
but still partly embedded within a matrix of rural 
land (for example, Murphy and Burnley, 1993; Burnley 
and Murphy, 1995, 2005). Perimetropolitan zones are 
highly diverse in social and settlement structure as 
they bring together long-established rural and small 
town residents and new urban arrivals from different 
social strata (Murphy and Burnley, 1993; Burnley and 
Murphy, 1995, 2005).
There is also now a wide use of the term 
perímetro in Latin American literature. Recent work 
by Rainer Randolph and colleagues on Rio de Janeiro 
concludes, for example, that rapid expansion of 
transport infrastructure, with a shift in investment 
towards the perímetro, is significantly changing the 
nature of metropolitanisation, which can no longer 
be understood as an extrapolation of existing forms 
(Randolph and Gomes, 2007). Aguilar (2008), and 
Aguilar and Ward (2003) report on metropolitan 
change in Mexico and refer variously to ‘meta-urban 
peripheries’, ‘extended metropolitan areas’ and ‘outer 
metropolitan space’. Aguilar (2008: 134) observes 
that the development of these extended metropolitan 
regions “tends to follow a pattern of low density, with 
polycentric islands, expanded fringes, and linear 
developments of higher densities”. Aguilar and Ward 
(2003) show how complex and polynucleated the 
perimetropolitan belts are becoming, pointing also 
to the consequences of fragmented administrative 
jurisdiction in these areas, for instance, with regard 
to environmental risk and social exclusion. Firman 
(2009) similarly tells the story of rapid metropolitan 
expansion in the Jakarta-Bandung region of Indonesia, 
showing how uncontrolled land development and new 
town development in the perimetropolitan zone has 
led to huge spatial complexity, severe environmental 
problems, and increased spatial segregation by 
income and lifestyle.
“There are various literatures which explore the edges 
of large urban agglomerations in different parts of the 
world in ways that are more expansive than a focus 
only on edge or satellite cities or space economies.”
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The spatial edges of African cities have received some 
attention in recent literatures. The recent turn has 
gone beyond the established literature on rural–urban 
transitions and interfaces reviewed by Mbiba and 
Huchzermeyer (2002). Doan and Oduro (2012) write, 
for example, of the expansion of Accra in Ghana, 
showing the spatial complexities of this development, 
with a mix of concentric expansion, growth of old 
villages, radial expansion along transport axes, and 
new development nodes. Simon et al. (2004) consider 
the city of Kumasi in Ghana, exploring the processes 
through which traditional villages were incorporated 
into the metropolitan system, while Jenkins (2003, 
2013) uses the case of Maputo in Mozambique to reveal 
the complex intersections between the formal and the 
informal in the shaping of home space, including on the 
spatial peripheries of the city. 
There is an eclectic mix of work on the 
spatial edges of some South African cities. In early 
work Hart and Partridge (1966) defined an ‘outer 
residential zone’ for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging (PWV) region, the progenitor to the 
GCR, while Geyer (1989, 1996) and Geyer et al. (2012) 
have described decentralisation trends from the 
metropolitan core to the ‘metropolitan fringes’. Much 
of the literature on the perimetropolitan zones in 
South African cities has emerged, however, from a 
critique of the apartheid industrial decentralisation 
programme, and of the South African phenomenon 
of ‘displaced urbanisation’ 15 (for example, Dewar 
et al., 1986; Wellings and Black, 1986; Murray, 
1987; Meth, 1998).16
The Global Suburbanisms programme housed 
at York University17 has added significantly to 
the literature on processes occurring beyond the 
traditional boundaries of cities.18 The writings bring 
together various different contexts. Addie and Keil 
(2015), for example, drawing on work from Canada, 
argue that we should explore suburbanisms through 
the real existing forms and, especially, through  
the lived experience of these forms, rather than 
through normative and ideological debates.  
Wu (2016) explores emerging Chinese cities beyond  
the historical urban core, which are driven by a 
collusion between developers and local authorities, 
eager to raise finance from land transactions.  
Wu shows how these new cities on the edge take 
diverse forms that are not easily represented 
through the lens of existing Western urban 
scholarship. Gilbert and De Jong (2015) explore 
the edges of Mexico City, where most of the growth 
has happened since 2000. They show how the 
increasingly dominant informal processes are 
not a vestige of formal development, but are the 
product of a complex entanglement of governance 
practices, land privatisation and regularisation, 
and urban infrastructure and services deficits. The 
significance of governance to local outcomes is taken 
up in a number of other contributions, which have 
shown that governance arrangement are often more 
fragmented, complex and poorly developed in the 
core, with severe implications for the management 
of environmental, social and economic processes 
(for example, Peck, 2011; Ekers et al., 2012; Hamel 
and Keil, 2015).
Southern African scholarship has contributed 
importantly to the global suburbanism literature. 
Mabin et al. (2013) argue that much of the new 
development in Africa’s cities is, in fact, happening 
on the spatial edges of the urban agglomerations, 
although the form taken by this development is 
diverse, including the emerging spaces of upper-, 
middle-, and low-income, formality and informality. 
Todes (2014) explores the growth of the northern 
edge of the Durban metropolitan region, showing how 
outcomes are a product of the complex intersection 
between multiple actors, including the municipality, 
landowners and developers. Buire (2014) extends these 
15.  This displacement was a result of the ways in which the apartheid government moved communities into homelands but within extended 
commuting range of metropolitan centres. 
16. Beyond this, for the GCR there are various studies of specific localities across time including, for example, Rogerson (1974) on Babelegi; 
Rogerson (1990), and Kesting and Westcott (2009), on the development of Sun City; Crankshaw (1996) on the township of Bekkersdal outside 
the mining town of Westonaria; Rogerson (2007) on tourist development in the Magaliesberg; Booysens and Visser (2010) on the growth of the 
small town of Parys and Van Eeden (1992; 2010a)on the decline of the mining town of Carletonville. 
17. For a link to the programme see http://suburbs.apps01.yorku.ca/dissemination/publications/ 
18. Note that the term ‘suburbanism’ does not refer mainly to traditional ‘suburbs’ but rather to new processes of suburbanism that may extend 
far beyond the boundaries of traditional cities.
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arguments by showing how different combinations 
of private and public actors in the development 
of Africa’s suburbanisms are producing varied 
spatial forms, governance arrangements, and 
lived experiences. 
Summary
The literatures are diverse, and make variant 
contributions. The recent critiques of classical 
agglomeration theories, for example, draw us towards 
a complex understanding of how the benefits of 
‘nearness’ and ‘farness’ interact within different 
industries and places to produce the changing 
spatial patterns that we observe. Edge city literature 
may not be directly relevant to the context we are 
exploring, but it does rather forcefully challenge the 
view that the edges are necessarily peripheral in 
economic terms. The satellite city literature focuses 
more on state-initiated developments beyond the 
core city, and shows how uncertain and elusive 
intentions to achieve these forms of development 
often are. Literature on space economies and spatial 
restructuring reveals the ways in which powerful 
shaping forces are transmitted into localities, but 
also how governance and local organisation and 
relationships many influence these outcomes. 
Finally, the growing literature on peripheries and 
suburbanisms reveals an extraordinary diversity of 
economic, spatial, social and governance processes 
along the edges of large metropolitan agglomerations, 
and directs us to a study of the details of what is 
actually happening.
With these insights, we now move to the 
specificities of what is happening in the GCR, 
beginning with the broad, contextualising 
historical overview.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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Figure 72: The GCR and its sprawling edge
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1.3 A history of the edge
Nineteenth-century origins and 
mining-produced polycentrism 
Until the discovery of an outcrop of Main Reef in 
present-day Johannesburg in 1886, the region had 
an agrarian economy and consisted of scattered 
indigenous and Boer settlements. Pretoria was 
the centre of government and was gradually 
developing into an urban centre of some significance. 
Potchefstroom was the site of the Universiteit vir 
Christelike Hoër Onderwys (University for Christian 
Higher Education), but beyond this there only was 
a scattered network of dorps (or rural hamlets) 
including Rustenburg, Krugersdorp, Magaliesburg, 
Koster, Heidelberg, Meyerton and Bronkhorstspruit, 
and traditional villages in the shrinking 
‘native reserves’.
The gold strike of 1886 led to the emergence 
of a large-scale urban agglomeration, with 
Johannesburg at its core, although the story was 
never just about Johannesburg. All along the linear 
(or semi-circular) line of the reef, urban settlements 
developed to service gold mines. Some of these 
became small cities (for example, Benoni, Boksburg, 
Germiston, and Springs). Beyond the gold fields 
were the coal fields and the small towns set up to 
service those mines. Witbank, for example, was 
established in 1890. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the outlines 
of the road and rail system that was to structure 
development for more than a century was also in 
place. This reinforced the east-west trajectory of 
development along the Witwatersrand but also opened 
opportunities for development to the south, north, east 
and west of the emergent core.
1900 to the 1940s: Mining, 
infrastructure, and state-
led industrialisation
Mining continued to drive changes in spatial form 
during this period. Cullinan developed as a small 
mining town to the east of Pretoria after the discovery 
of a diamond-bearing kimberlite pipe in 1902. In 
1924, the platinum-bearing Merensky Reef was 
discovered, with the first two platinum mines near 
Rustenburg opening in 1929. Gold remained the 
major factor in this period, however. Gold mining 
extended outwards along the Witwatersrand through 
the first half of the twentieth century, with the rapid 
development of the Far East Rand in the 1930s, and 
the opening of the first mines on the Wits West Line in 
the 1940s, with the establishment of Carletonville to 
service these mines.
Coal mining played a role in the development 
of an industrial hub on the Vaal River, south of 
Johannesburg, but there were other key factors, most 
notably the entrepreneurial skills of the Lithuanian 
immigrant, Sammy Marks, and the benefaction he 
received from the succession of Boer, British and 
Union governments. The little town of Vereeniging 
was established in 1892 at the point where the 
railway line from the Cape to the Witwatersrand 
crossed the Vaal River. In 1911, Marks established 
the Union Steel Corporation (USCO) in Vereeniging, 
building South Africa’s first steel-making plant. In 
1927, the town became the corporate headquarters 
and steel-making production site of the firm 
Stewarts & Lloyds, and in the 1930s, a number 
of downstream industries established around 
these two plants.
The state also recognised the strategic 
importance of steel-making and set up the Iron and 
Steel Corporation (Iscor) in 1928. The first Iscor plant 
was opened in Pretoria West in 1934 but with the surge 
in demand for steel for domestic and military purposes 
during World War II, a new site was established on 
the Vaal River. A specialist steel plant, mainly for war 
production, was opened in 1944, and after the war, 
construction began on a fully-integrated steel mill, 
with the town of Vanderbijlpark established by 1949 to 
service the plant.
The emergent electricity-generating industry, 
largely dependent on coal, also stimulated growth on 
the edges of the growing metropolitan city. Initially, 
electricity was privately generated (by the Victoria 
Falls Power Company) with a coal-fired power 
station near Vereeniging. In 1923, the state-owned 
Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) was founded, 
and in the 1940s Eskom bought out the Victoria Falls 
Power Company, and began work on a national grid. 
The role of the state in developing new dams for 
domestic water supply, and for irrigated agriculture, 
was also important in shaping patterns of regional 
development. The Vaal Barrage, completed in 1922, 
was critical to the expansion of steel-making around 
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Vereeniging, but it was the development of the Vaal 
Dam in the 1930s that created a new recreational 
hub in the south. The completion of Hartbeespoort 
Dam and its related irrigation schemes to the west 
of Pretoria in the 1920s, also led to recreational 
and tourist-related development in the region, and 
to the development of Brits as a new agricultural 
service centre.
By the 1930s, the outlines of a metropolitan region 
were becoming apparent (Mabin, 2013). Johannesburg 
received city status in 1927, and Pretoria in 1931, and 
there was also a linear band of towns and cities strung 
out along the Witwatersrand. As a metropolitan city 
emerged, so did a perimetropolitan belt, including, 
at the time, the small towns between Johannesburg 
and Pretoria; the mining settlements on the East 
and West Rand; and the emergent industrial town 
of Vereeniging. 
Overall, in this period, mining dominated the 
(non agriculture-related) development of areas beyond 
the incipient metropolitan core, although there was 
an expanding hub of industrial development in and 
around Vereeniging. Industry became increasingly 
important during World War II, as the government 
pursued import substituting policies, with national 
government becoming increasingly involved in the 
production of strategic commodities such as steel 
and electricity.19
19. The government, led by General Jan Smuts, was cautious about intervening too directly in the economy, and it was only after the 1948 
victory of the National Party that there was a major thrust in terms of state-led industrialisation, with significant consequences for the 
metropolitan edge.
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1950s–1970s: State-directed 
manufacturing and  
large-scale growth on the edge
Gold mining continued to expand through to the end 
of the 1970s, but within the city-region its spatial 
footprint was long-since established. The major new 
expansions were well to the south, around Welkom 
in the Orange Free State, and into what is now the 
North West. On the Far East Rand, mines were already 
ageing, and some closed in the 1960s. There was, 
however, modest success with replacement industries 
including, for example, a large rail locomotive plant 
in Nigel, established by an Australian company in the 
late 1950s, and a large tobacco manufacturing plant in 
Heidelberg, in the 1970s.
The expansion in mining continued nearly 
unabated on the western edge of the Witwatersrand, 
with the additional production of uranium from 
the early 1950s to service the expanding nuclear 
industry in the United States and Western Europe. 
Carletonville, for example, was one of the fastest 
growing towns until 1964 when a massive sinkhole 
swallowed a number of houses and damaged 
confidence in the area. The West Rand never 
industrialised in the way the East Rand did. The 
1970s brought expansion along the Platinum Belt 
to the north-west of the urban agglomeration 
as platinum-based catalytic converters were 
introduced globally into the automobile industry. 
New mines were opened and population growth 
around Rustenburg peaked at 16 per cent per 
annum in 1973/74. 
The major industrial developments on the 
metropolitan edge happened in the Vaal Triangle. 
The Iscor plant in Vanderbijlpark opened in 1952 and 
continued expanding through the 1950s and 1960s. 
The South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation 
(Sasol) was incorporated as a state-owned company 
in 1950, and developed its first synfuel (oil-from-
coal) plant, building the town of Sasolburg, and the 
township of Zamdela, to house white and African 
workers, respectively. In the early 1970s, there was 
a major expansion of the emergent petrochemicals 
complex, with the opening of the Natref 
Refinery in Sasolburg.
Also in the 1970s, Sasol located its second and 
third synfuel plants on the present day Mpumalanga 
highveld, establishing the town of Secunda, 120 
km south-east of Johannesburg. This reinforced 
the development of the eastern highveld complex 
as the second agglomeration of coal mining, energy 
generation, metal production, and petrochemicals. 
Witbank was marketed as the “Ruhr of South Africa” 
(Johannesburg City Council, 1956: 392) and in 1965 
a large stainless steel plant, Columbus Steel, was 
located in Middelburg.
By the 1960s, apartheid was in full swing, and 
Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd was implementing 
his plan to create independent homelands for 
each black ethnic group. The homelands closest to 
the city-region were to the north of Pretoria, the 
most significant of which was Bophuthatswana, 
established as the Tswana Territorial Authority 
in 1961. There were large-scale relocations of 
individuals and households living in and around 
Pretoria to newly-established townships behind the 
homeland border, including Mabopane, established 
in 1963, Ga-Rankuwa in 1965, and Soshanguve in 
1974. These settlements, extending northwards 
into the semi-rural villages of the Winterveldt, 
created a major new agglomeration of settlements 
on the urban edge. A second agglomeration emerged 
along the N1 freeway north of Pretoria, around the 
townships of Temba, Kudube and Hammanskraal. 
These were displaced urban settlements, serving 
as long-distance commuting satellites of Pretoria, 
"By the 1930s, the outlines of a metropolitan region 
were becoming apparent (Mabin, 2013). Johannesburg 
received city status in 1927, and Pretoria in 1931, and 
there was also a linear band of towns and cities strung 
out along the Witwatersrand."
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and contributing to the extreme fragmentation of 
the metropolitan region. The other homeland on the 
edges of the city-region was KwaNdebele, established 
as the South Ndebele Territorial Authority in 1977. 
The township of Ekangala was established 20 
km north of Bronkhorstspruit, for incorporation 
into the homeland. 
From around 1960, the apartheid government 
attempted to grow industrial employment along the 
borders of the homelands and, after 1968, within the 
homelands. The Rosslyn industrial estate, just beyond 
the boundaries of Pretoria, was developed to support 
the Mabopane-GaRankuwa-Soshanguve complex, 
with some decentralised industry also in nearby 
Brits where Alfa Romeo manufactured cars from 
1974 to 1985. In the 1960s, Datsun and Fiat opened 
small manufacturing plants in Rosslyn, with a South 
African company, Praetor Monteerders, starting 
vehicle production in 1968. Babelegi, established 
adjacent to Hammanskraal-Temba in 1970, was 
the first industrial development point within a 
homeland. It proved to be quite successful, eventually 
peaking in the early 1990s at an employment 
level of 17 000. 
In 1976, a year before Bophuthatswana’s pseudo-
independence, the casino magnate, Sol Kerzner, made 
a deal with the chief minister of Bophuthatswana, 
Lucas Mangope, to establish Sun City, north-west of 
Rustenburg. It opened in 1979, and became a place 
of fantasy and escapism for the white residents of 
Pretoria and the Witwatersrand during the late 
apartheid years. The Pilanesberg Game Reserve 
was established in the homeland immediately 
adjacent to Sun City.
1980s to mid 1990s:  
State retreat and a fitful decline
The gold mining industry began its long decline in 
the 1980s as the gold price levelled and production 
costs continued to increase. Mining-dominated towns 
such as Carletonville and Klerksdorp stagnated or 
declined. The platinum industry continued its roller-
coaster ride through this period. There was a dramatic 
collapse of the platinum price in the early 1980s (from 
$1 070 per gram in 1980 to $274 in 1982) and the 
industry battled to recover through the decade and into 
the early 1990s. The development around Rustenburg 
continued but vacillated.
Manufacturing centres also suffered as local 
markets faltered during the economically stagnant 
1980s, and as global competition in the 1990s left 
inefficient industries unprotected. The East Rand lost 
manufacturing employment through the 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, with the more peripheral Far East Rand 
disproportionately affected. 
From the 1980s, the state began its retreat 
from direct involvement in industry, with mixed 
outcomes. In 1979, Sasol was privatised, and the 
company went global, entering into joint venture 
partnerships in countries across the world, but it 
continued to expand production of petrochemicals, 
and downstream chemicals in Sasolburg and Secunda. 
Iscor was privatised in 1989, but it had a more troubled 
experience than Sasol as it was a highly inefficient 
producer in global terms, and struggled to survive 
without state protection. Between 1994 and 2001, 
Iscor embarked on a major restructuring process, 
which resulted in its national workforce reducing 
dramatically from 44 000 to 12 200. The Vereeniging-
Vanderbijlpark complex, including townships such  
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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as Sebokeng and Sharpeville, was badly  
affected, with employment decline and the loss  
of consumer income.
In the 1980s, South Africa’s industrial 
decentralisation programme was strengthened 
with expanded incentives and a new emphasis 
on deconcentration points – those on the edge of 
metropolitan areas rather than in remote locations. 
This favoured the peripheries of the present-day 
Gauteng region. In 1984, the Ekandustria growth 
point was established between Ekangala and 
Bronkhorstspruit, to support the KwaNdebele 
homeland. It did relatively well, attracting a 
growing number of Taiwanese investors, and 
peaked at an employment level of around 10 000 
in the early 1990s. Babelegi continued to expand, 
with employment reaching around 17 000. Rosslyn 
was doing well. By 1975, BMW had full ownership 
of the Praetor Monteerders plant and was 
developing the factory as its only production site 
outside of Europe.
Overall, there was a mixed bag of outcomes for 
the edges of the GCR during the 1970s and 1980s, 
but the growth momentum of the earlier decades 
had mainly been lost. In the early 1990s, however, 
political changes were looming, and these would 
impact sharply on geographies established under 
apartheid rule.
Mid-1990s to the present: 
The core consolidates, or new 
beginnings for the edge?
The year 1994 marked the dawn of democracy in 
South Africa. There was new hope for South Africa’s 
previously marginalised majority, but the economic 
benefits of political change were spatially variant. 
Overall, the GCR benefitted with higher levels of 
economic growth and in-migration than other parts 
of the country. Within the GCR, however, there 
was considerable variation. The core metropolitan 
cities performed best, with Simkins (2010: 11) 
writing that the “long decline of the Centre has 
been reversed”. On the spatial edges of the GCR, the 
economy was most fragile, largely as a result of the 
decline of gold mining, and the troubles in the steel-
making industry.
Gold mining continued to contract, and the 
economies on the edge of Gauteng still heavily 
dependent on this industry experienced dire times. 
The West Rand was most affected as its economy 
was far less diversified than the East Rand. The 
platinum industry, by contrast, experience rapid and 
sustained growth in this period, with Rustenburg 
emerging as one of South Africa’s secondary cities, 
and smaller centres like Brits also growing. The 
expansion was, however, not well managed, and social 
tensions grew, culminating tragically in the Marikana 
killings of 2012. Since then, global platinum prices 
have declined and the social crisis on the Platinum 
Belt has deepened.
Industrial growth points in the homelands were 
negatively affected, economically, by political changes. 
Incentives were withdrawn, and tariff protection 
reduced, and most industries in these places closed 
or relocated. However, unlike growth points in more 
remote localities, there was wind-down rather than 
collapse. The industrial complex in the Vaal remained 
troubled. Iscor was taken over by global steel giant, 
ArcelorMittal, in 2004, and for a while, there were 
promising signs of growth. The 2008 global financial 
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crisis was, however, a major blow. Markets did recover, 
but from around 2014, the steel industry, both globally 
and in South Africa, plunged into an unprecedented 
crisis. The catalyst was the sharp contraction in 
the construction industry in China, also the world’s 
largest steel producer. With shrinking local demand, 
Chinese producers turned to export markets to sell 
off surplus production. Markets in the USA, the UK 
and South Africa, among others, were flooded with 
cheap imports, making local industries increasingly 
non-viable. In South Africa, ArcelorMittal threatened 
to close its steel plant in Vanderbijlpark, but a deal was 
reached with the South African government over the 
reimposition of import tariffs. Global steel markets 
remain extremely unsettled and there is continued 
uncertainty over the future of the steel-making 
complex in the Vaal. Across the Vaal River, however, 
Sasolburg continues to do well, with increasing 
investment in petrochemical production, despite 
depressed global oil prices.
The 2011 census confirmed that growth in 
Gauteng was consolidating in the core, with the major 
exceptions of Sasolburg and the Platinum Belt (prior 
to 2012). The overall narrative seems to be one of a 
declining perimetropolitan belt, but there are signs of 
some revival in manufacturing in peripheral locations. 
Among the major new investments since 2010 are: 
Nestlé’s two new factories in Babelegi; the Consol 
Glass factory in Nigel; the fluorspar beneficiation 
plant near Bronkhorstspruit; Tata’s new bus and truck 
assembly plant in Rosslyn; Samancor’s manganese 
beneficiation plant at Meyerton, near Vereeniging; 
the Heineken brewery at Walkerville in the Midvaal 
local municipality; and the new ethylene purification 
unit in Sasolburg. Edge locations are apparently 
benefitting from a growing shortage of land, and 
rising costs, in the metropolitan core, but also from 
institutional improvements such as the incorporation 
of these places into metropolitan authorities, and 
new forms of support from national government. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
introduced a (Section 121) Tax Allowance Incentive 
in 2010, and this has been significant in a number 
of recent locational decisions,20 with a clear benefit 
also from the Mining and Minerals Beneficiation 
Programme of the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC). 
The growth has not only been in manufacturing, 
however. The property boom from the late 1990s until 
2008 led to a splurge in second-home developments 
and lifestyle estates in recreational spots such as 
the Vaal Dam and Hartbeespoort Dam. The 2008 
downturn brought the property boom to an end, 
although there has been modest recovery, and also 
area-specific growth, such as around Bronkhorstspruit 
where the construction of the Kusile Power Station has 
produced a local boom. There has also been a recent 
wave of large-scale retail development, with a new 
trend towards shopping malls outside the market-
saturated metropolitan core.21
A key question is whether these incipient 
dynamics of growth within the perimetropolitan 
belt will coalesce into developments of significant 
scale to shift the overall distribution of economic 
activity within the GCR, or whether they will 
remain minor counter-currents in the face of an 
overarching tendency towards further concentration 
in the core. A new dynamic in the ongoing process of 
perimetropolitan development is the development 
vision of the provincial premier, David Makhura. 
The premier has spoken of development corridors 
extending to the edges of the province “encompassing 
new industries, new economic nodes and new cities” 
(Makhura, 2015). 
20. The selected projects are within the priority sectors identified in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) – eighteen of the projects are 
in the chemical sector, six in the cement and ceramics sector, and three in the wood, paper and pulp sector. See https://www.thedti.gov.za/
financial_assistance/ 
21. The Vaal Mall was opened in Vanderbijlpark in 2006 and the Highveld Mall in 2007. Further developments were interrupted by the 2008 
downturn, but from 2012, a new rush of developments was seen. The Middelburg Mall opened in 2012, as did the Boitekong Mall between 
Rustenburg and Sun City. In 2013, there was a significant expansion to the Vaal Mall, as well as the opening of the Tower Mall in Klerksdorp and 
the Cradlestone Mall in the Cradle of Humankind, north-west of Johannesburg.
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2. Stories of extractive economies
2.1 The context of mining 
The Witwatersrand is unusual in terms of the 
enormous significance of extractive industry in 
the initial shaping of the economy and the spatial 
structure, and of the continued significance of mining 
in parts of the region. The peculiarity of mining is 
that it can never be a permanent activity. In broad 
terms, a mining cycle involves: prospecting and 
discovery; investment in the mining infrastructure; 
a growth period as extraction increases; a downward 
cycle; and, eventual closure. There may, however, 
be multiple sub-cycles linked to the fluctuation of 
commodity prices.
The sustainability of mining settlements is 
currently an area of considerable international 
concern. During the global commodities boom (2000–
2008), mining was a major growth sector and the focus 
of international literature was largely on the impacts 
of mining on the growth of settlements. Bryceson and 
MacKinnon (2012), for example, report on an extensive 
investigation into mining, urbanisation and welfare 
across Africa, emphasising growth (although there is 
reference to boom-bust cycles and the uncertainties of 
commodity markets). Currently, however, the concern 
is more about the effects of decline. There is a growing 
literature in China, for example, on sustainability 
threats to mining cities (for example, Li et al., 2009; 
Li et al., 2015). Martinez-Fernandez et al. (2012) 
compare shrinking mining cities in Australia, Canada, 
Japan and Mexico, while recent media reports point to 
current concerns in Australia over the future of mining 
towns in the aftermath of the recent commodities 
boom (Lorkin, 2015). 
The South African case is somewhat different 
to many contexts internationally, as mining has 
been well established for over a century, and there 
has been a slow trajectory of decline for over three 
decades, especially in the gold-mining sector. South 
Africa did not generally benefit from the recent 
commodities boom (with platinum, iron, and coal, 
as partial exceptions) and the concern with the 
declining mining sector’s effect on towns and cities 
goes back some time. Nel and Binns (2002), for 
example, wrote of the effects of the decline in gold 
mining on the small city of Welkom, and a number of 
subsequent studies take up this theme in investigating 
the effects of mining closures on communities and 
settlements, and also responses to closures through 
local economic development strategies (Binns and Nel, 
2003; Rogerson, 2011, 2012; Lochner, 2013; Lochner 
and Cloete, 2013).
The literatures grapple with the tough challenges 
as localities dependent on mining are extremely 
vulnerable to forces far beyond their control, 
including, most importantly, commodity prices and 
the strategies of mining companies, which are often 
headquartered in distant locations. There are some 
insights of value. Freudenburg and Frickel (1994) 
do not support the polarised positions in which 
mining is either an unalloyed blessing or the source 
of long-term underdevelopment of a local economy. 
They show that “outcomes appear to have reflected 
intersecting configurations of physical resource 
characteristics, the organizational form/scale of 
extractive activities, the historical period in question, 
"South Africa did not generally benefit from the recent 
commodities boom and the concern with the declining 
mining sector’s effect on towns and cities goes back 
some time."
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and the nature of relationships among competing 
resource uses and users” (Freudenburg and Frickel, 
1994: 266). Martinez-Fernandez et al. (2012) show how 
the strategies of the dominant mining corporations 
in relation to the ebbs and flows of international 
commodity markets dominate the prospects of each 
city. Feagin (1990) argues that the historical timing of 
events such as oil and mineral discoveries are critical 
to economic prospects. 
South African literature contributes to a policy 
debate on how to respond to the decline of mining. 
The literature argues for the importance of economic 
diversification, but Pelser et al. (2012) distinguish 
between ‘vertical diversification’ which happens when 
the local economy expands to provide services and 
products for mining, and ‘horizontal diversification’ 
which happens when new economic activity emerges 
that is different to, and independent of, mining. It 
is this latter form that is of greatest value to a local 
economy. Pelser et al. (2012) advise that strategies 
to diversify must be pursued well in advance of mine 
closures, preferably at the peak of a mining cycle when 
economic resources to support alternative industries 
may be plentiful. Various writers have emphasised 
the importance of supporting local entrepreneurs and 
SMMEs in mining areas, but Seidman (1993) argues 
that local entrepreneurialism may take a long time to 
bear fruit, and in some cases, large-scale investment 
supporting large-scale job creation may be needed to 
forestall economic disaster.
In the sections below, Carletonville is an 
illustrative example of a local economy that remains 
overwhelmingly dominated by mining, and has largely 
failed to diversify. The Nigel-Heidelberg district is 
used to illustrate relative success in transcending the 
boom-bust trajectory of the mining cycle. These are 
medium-sized towns, largely peripheral to the GCR, 
but they have survived beyond mining. Heidelberg’s 
success offers insight into another form of primary 
economic activity, agriculture. 
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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2.2 The Carletonville story
Introducing the area
Carletonville is on the Far West Rand, within 
the Province of Gauteng (although an earlier attempt 
by government to transfer Khutsong township in 
North West Province failed). It falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Merafong Local Municipality 
and the West Rand District Municipality. It is a gold 
and uranium-mining area, with the world’s deepest 
mines, and a GVA in 2013 of R13.7 billion (Quantec, 
2015). Carletonville is 77 km from Johannesburg 
and is accessible by a provincial road, the R501. It is 
at the far end of Gauteng’s commuter rail network, 
but the freight rail network to Carletonville has been 
decommissioned.
The historical focus of settlement is the town 
of Carletonville, although Khutsong township, 
north-west of the town, has a population almost 
three times greater. Immediately south of 
Carletonville is the mining belt, with the shafts and 
tailings dams and dumps of Western Deep Levels 
and Blyvooruitzicht, and scattered settlements 
including mine compounds, informal settlements, 
and laid-out mining villages for mine managers 
and skilled workers. South of the mining belt is 
the small town of Fochville and the neighbouring 
township of Kokosi.
The population of the area in 2011 was 197 520, 
which was 6.2 per cent less than the 210 683 in 2001, 
reflecting the effects of the declining mining economy. 
The main concentrations of people in 2011 were in 
Khutsong township (62 456), Kokosi township (26 403) 
and Carletonville (22 988) (Statistics South Africa 
(Stats SA), 2015). 
Fortunately, we do know quite a lot about 
Carletonville, not least because of the ongoing work of 
Professor Elize van Eeden of North West University 
(for example, Van Eeden 1992, 2010a, 2010b). The 
story is, however, a sobering one. It tells of an area 
which enjoyed great prosperity during the boom 
years of the gold mining industry, but which largely 
failed to diversify its economy and find a sustainable 
path into the future. The story has, however, not 
yet ended, and there are still possibilities for new 
economies to emerge.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff
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Figure 73: Locating greater Carletonville
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‘Happy prospect’ – beginnings, 
to the early 1960s
In the early twentieth century, this area was a remote 
and sparsely-populated outpost of the Witwatersrand, 
best known for heavy skirmishes during the South 
African War (1899–1902), although the extensive 
ruins of pre-colonial settlements suggest that it 
was once a hub of human activity. It was only in 
1920 that Fochville, named after an American war 
hero, was proclaimed as the first formal settlement 
in the district, serving a small agricultural sector 
(Van Eeden, 1998).
 
The bustle of gold mining was far to the east.  
It was believed at the time that the gold-bearing reef 
ended near Randfontein. However, Guy Carleton 
Jones, the Canadian who worked as chief engineer 
for Cecil Rhodes’ old company, Gold Fields, was not 
convinced. He recruited a German geophysicist 
and together they traced a line of magnetic shales 
associated with the gold-bearing rock, deep under the 
earth, which became known as the Wits West Line. 
Boreholes confirmed the passage of the Main Reef, and 
New Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd was established, 
with ambitions of opening six large mines in the 
district (Van Eeden, 1998).
The 1930s and 1940s was a frenzy of activity as 
exploration was followed by the development of 
the new mines. It was arguably the most important 
development in South Africa’s gold mining history, 
since the discovery of the Main Reef in present day 
Johannesburg, in 1886. Blyvooruitzicht (meaning 
‘happy prospect’) mine was established in 1937 as one 
of the world’s largest gold mines, followed in 1945 by 
West Driefontein, and Doornfontein in 1947, also both 
mega-mines. In the late 1940s, South Africa entered 
into agreements with the United States and Great 
Britain to supply uranium to their growing nuclear 
industries, and the production of uranium along the 
Wits West Line from 1953 added impetus to the mining 
industry (Van Eeden, 1992). 
There were challenges, however, as the mines 
were frequently flooded by large volumes of water from 
dolomitic karst aquifers. The mining companies were 
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Mining landscapes around Carletonville)
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eventually given permission by government to dewater 
the dolomitic compartments, leading to easier mining 
conditions, but also to a reduction in groundwater 
levels of up to 1 000 m, with severely detrimental 
effects on local agriculture. Government was forced 
to mediate as tensions flared between mining 
companies and farmers (Van Eeden, 1992; Winde 
and Stoch, 2010).
African workers were housed in compounds, 
and white managers and workers in scattered 
mining villages.22 In 1948, however, the town 
of Carletonville, named after Guy Carleton 
Jones, was established by Gold Fields Ltd. White 
settlement in the area consolidated quite quickly 
in Carletonville, and in 1959 the settlement was 
proclaimed as a town and granted independence 
of the mining company. By the 1950s, there was an 
influx of African work seekers, and the authorities 
identified squatting on farms as a growing problem. 
In 1959, Khutsong was proclaimed as a township 
for Africans who lived outside the mine compounds 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
By the early 1960s, the mines in the area were 
doing spectacularly well. West Driefontein, for 
example, was rated as the largest gold mine in the 
world by 1964, producing around 63 000 kg of gold 
annually (or two million fine ounces). There were 
also some signs of activity in manufacturing with 
a handful of light industries, mainly in metals and 
engineering, locating in Carletonville in support of 
the mining industry. In the early 1960s, Carletonville 
was said to be the fastest growing town in South 
Africa, with a population approaching 50 000. It was 
marketed as the ‘Jewel of the West Rand’, a new and 
modern town. There was even media speculation 
that Carletonville would grow into a large city 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
Disaster and its aftermath: 3 August 
1964 to the end of the 1960s
There was a tragedy in the making. The de-watering 
of the dolomitic compartments from the 1940s had 
created serious geological instability and, from 
the early 1950s, a growing number of sinkholes 
occurred. In 1962, a massive sinkhole opened up at 
the West Driefontein mine, swallowing the crusher 
and sorting plant, and killing 29 workers. It was, 
however, a disaster in the town, rather than the 
tragedy on the mine, which caused the panic. On 3 
August 1964, two houses and parts of others vanished 
down a sinkhole that had suddenly appeared in a 
suburb of Carletonville, taking with them a family 
of five (Winde and Stoch, 2010). The municipality 
immediately froze all new development, and 
national government even mooted the possibility 
of evacuating all of Carletonville. In the final event, 
it was only the small settlement of Bank which was 
relocated. Its residents, who were mainly of Indian 
origin, were moved to Lenasia, leaving behind a ghost 
settlement, and depriving the district of the spending 
power and entrepreneurialism of this community 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
Carletonville survived but its growth prospects 
were severely affected. The mining companies 
remained committed to the area as there were 
enormous profits still to be made in the deep level 
mines. The new Kloof mine, for example, opened 
in 1968. Other investors, however, kept away, and a 
labour shortage developed, with managers and workers 
fearing for their safety. Of the few small industries that 
had established before 1964, around one-half closed 
down, and by 1970 only 1 per cent of households in 
Carletonville were involved in manufacturing activity. 
This was at the end of a decade when manufacturing 
had boomed nationally, and when the East Rand had 
22. These included West Wits (1937), Oberholzer (1939), Bank (1940), Welverdiend (1942) and Blybank (1947).
"By the early 1960s, the mines in the area were doing 
spectacularly well. West Driefontein, for example, was 
rated as the largest gold mine in the world by 1964, 
producing around 63 000 kg of gold annually..."
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emerged as South Africa’s ‘industrial workshop’, but, 
for Carletonville, the disasters of the 1960s had taken 
an enormous toll, and may have been the primary 
reason for the town’s failure to diversify economically 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
Restored prosperity: The 1970s
In the 1970s, prosperity returned to Carletonville. 
With rising gold prices, this was a decade of mining 
success and growth in the local economy. The 
actual physical production peaked in the early 
1970s when the last of the major new mines, East 
Driefontein, opened, but the surging gold price kept 
the mines highly profitable through the decade.23 
The good fortunes in gold led the growth of the local 
economy. The Oberholzer census district, of which 
Carletonville was the largest centre, more than 
doubled its contribution to the Gross Geographic 
Product (GGP) of present-day Gauteng, from 3.1 per 
cent of the total in 1970, to 6.8 per cent in 1981. In 
proportional terms, by 1980, Oberholzer district had 
become the fourth largest contributor, of 24 districts, 
to the economy of present-day Gauteng, following 
Johannesburg (31 per cent), Pretoria (17 per cent) 
and Germiston (7.8 per cent) (Simkins, 2010). In 
1976, there was again speculation in the media that 
Carletonville might develop in the future as a new city 
(Van Eeden, 1992). 
Carletonville was clearly growing but its economy 
was mono-sectoral. In 1972, mining accounted 
for 92.7 per cent of GGP, followed at an extreme 
distance by retail at 5.1 per cent, and by the end of 
the decade mining was even more dominant because 
of its rapid growth. Unlike the East Rand, which 
was diversifying quickly, the Far West Rand was 
still extremely vulnerable economically (Simkins, 
2010). Industrial development remained marginal 
to the local economy, with labour participation in 
manufacturing increasing only slightly from 1 per cent 
to 2.6 per cent. Local actors, hopeful that industry 
might be located in the town, were disappointed 
by the National Physical Development Plan (1975), 
which designated Carletonville as part of the West 
Transvaal region, excluding it from the proposed 
industrial areas of the Witwatersrand (Van Eeden, 
1992). There was, however, limited growth in retail 
and services in the 1970s as the state replaced 
mining companies as a key service provider and 
opened a police station, hospital and school. Private 
retailers also arrived with Pick n Pay, for example, 
opening stores. 
The anxiety of the 1980s
The 1980s was a period of consolidation rather 
than continued growth in mining. The price of 
gold levelled off, and rising costs put the profit 
margins of mines under pressure. There were also 
growing concerns over the future of the mines, with 
predictions that Blyvooruitzicht mine could close 
by 1994. Indeed, by the late 1980s, Blyvooruitzicht’s 
23. The mines were doing well, notwithstanding a series of complications that included: mass flooding of shafts; a series of mine disasters 
including one at West Driefontein in 1972 when 175 workers were injured and 17 killed; and growing labour unrest. In September 1973, eleven 
mineworkers were shot dead by police.
"In the 1970s, prosperity returned to Carletonville. 
With rising gold prices, this was a decade of mining 
success and growth in the local economy. The actual 
physical production peaked in the early 1970s when 
the last of the major new mines opened..."
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production was only a fraction of what it had 
been in 1970, and workers were being retrenched 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
While mining was under some pressure, it was 
not yet in crisis. The population of Carletonville 
continued to grow through the decade at rates higher 
than that of the region comprising present-day 
Gauteng (Simkins, 2010). There was, however, a local 
understanding that this growth was vulnerable and 
the municipality and local business chambers were 
eager to promote manufacturing as an alternative to 
mining. From 1982, the West Rand Regional Planning 
Committee, including local actors and mining 
companies, worked to develop a local infrastructure 
for manufacturing, and to attract industrialists to 
the area. In 1987, a large industrial park was opened 
(Van Eeden, 1992).
A major constraint was the lack of support from 
national government for industrial development in 
the area. P.W. Botha’s ‘Good Hope Plan’, released in 
1981, did in fact recognise Carletonville as part of the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) urban 
complex, but it was a disappointment to local actors 
as it did not support industrialisation in the area. 
The government focused on promoting industrial 
development within and near to African homelands, 
and Carletonville, some distance from a homeland 
boundary, was not a favoured location. Also, by the 
time the industrial infrastructure was in place in 
the late 1980s, South Africa’s economy was in the 
doldrums and the possibilities of attracting industry 
were slim. It did not help that Andries Treurnicht’s 
Conservative Party (CP) captured political control 
of the locality in the late 1980s. In the 1987 national 
election, Arrie Paulus, the general secretary of 
the all-white Mine Workers Union (MWU), was 
elected to parliament to represent Carletonville, 
and a year later the CP took control of the municipal 
council in the context of a bitter struggle by white 
mineworkers to maintain their privileges in the face 
of a resurgent African trade union movement.24 When 
the CP-dominated local council put up ‘Whites Only’ 
signs around the town – reintroducing forms of ‘petty 
apartheid’ that had disappeared in the 1970s – African 
consumers reacted by boycotting shops in the town. 
It was a disaster for the small retail sector and the 
Carletonville Chamber of Commerce lobbied national 
government to force the town council to abandon these 
new restrictions.
Crisis in the 1990s and 2000s
With political changes from 1990, and democracy 
from 1994, the once-dominant white right 
wing was marginalised but, tragically, political 
transformation came together with deepening 
local economic crisis. In the period 1991–1996, 
population growth changed suddenly to - 0.77, 
worsening to - 2.74 for 1996–2001 (Simkins, 2010). 
This wasn’t a sudden economic collapse but it was 
the beginning of a protracted and painful decline, 
with many dimensions including economic, social 
and environmental.
24. The newly formed National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was especially active in Carletonville, the home of its founder and 
president, Elijah Barayi.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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The economic crisis was, of course, the consequence 
of the gradual decline in gold mining. The mines in 
the area consolidated under the four largest mining 
companies in South Africa: Durban Roodepoort 
Deep (DRD Gold); Gold Fields Ltd; Harmony 
Gold; and AngloGold Ashanti. These companies 
strategised to keep the mines profitable. Gold Fields, 
for example, went through an extended period of 
phased consolidation, which eventually brought its 
six mines together into a single operation known as 
the Kloof-Driefontein Complex (KDC), which still 
employs around 30 000 workers.25 Gold Fields also 
went deeper, investing heavily in KDC which, at 4.1 
km below the surface, is now the deepest mine in the 
world, and this shaft sinking may extend the life of the 
mine to 2035, depending on market conditions (Gold 
Fields, 2012). AngloGold Ashanti has kept its Savuka, 
Mponeng and Tau Tona mines in operation, while the 
Kusasalethu mine near Carletonville is still the largest 
individual mine owned by Harmony Gold. Production 
is nevertheless in decline with the Tau Tona mine, for 
example, reducing from 646 000 ounces of gold in 2002 
to 189 000 in 2012. 
The tensions after the Marikana massacre of 
2012, and the ongoing conflict between NUM and 
the Association of Mineworkers and Construction 
Union (AMCU), had repercussions for the Far West 
Rand. In 2013, Harmony Gold suspended production 
at Kusasalethu following ongoing strike action, with 
around 6 200 jobs placed at risk (Business Day, 8 
January 2013). The major problem, however, was 
at Blyvooruitzicht. This was an old and declining 
mine, but there was new hope in 1997 when it was 
purchased by DRD Gold. The company sold the mine 
on, however, and there was a series of owners until 
provisional liquidation in 2013, and retrenchment 
of the remaining 1 700 workers (Financial Mail, 
27 March 2014).
The closure of Blyvooruitzicht and the 
contraction of the other mines had a negative effect 
on Carletonville and, more especially, on Khutsong 
and Kokosi, where unemployment levels soared. 
The population of the district continues to decline, 
although many job seekers remain in the area even 
after their job contracts expire in the hope that new 
employment will materialise (Anonymous 1 and 
2, Personal communication, 2013). The deepening 
troubles in the mining sector are unfortunately not 
mitigated to any significant extent by the growth 
of any other sector, with the possible exception of 
wholesale and retail. There were belated attempts 
by mining companies to support the diversification 
of the local economy. Gold Fields, for example, 
developed a hydroponic farm producing cut flowers 
for a global market, with hothouses fed by the warm 
humid air of mine ventilation shafts. The project 
employed around 300 people, and although an 
interesting innovation, it was trivial in relation to 
the challenge of developing replacement industries 
for mining (Engineering News, 22 August 2002; 
Creamer, 2008).
Historically, all retail activity in the region, 
including for Fochville and Khutsong, has been located 
in the town of Carletonville, despite the fact that 
Khutsong accommodates the greatest population. 
The size of wholesale and retail trade in Carletonville 
gradually trended upwards until the national economic 
downturn of 2008/09, increasing its proportional 
contribution to the economy. The situation since 
2009 is less clear. Local competition has grown 
recently, with the development of three neighbourhood 
suburban retail centres in Fochville, which have drawn 
the larger chain stores away from the Carletonville 
CBD, and also from a thriving SMME retail market 
in the township, run predominantly by Asian and 
other immigrant traders (Anonymous 1, Personal 
communication, 2013).26
The overall declining economy has exacerbated 
social stress and political conflict in the district. A 
decision by government in 2005 to transfer Khutsong 
from Gauteng Province to North West Province 
provoked a local rebellion, with often violent protests 
continuing until 2008, when the government 
finally backed down (Kirshner, 2014). Although 
the demarcation issue was resolved, Khutsong has 
remained as a place of extreme social stress, with 
25. The operation consists of the previous East Driefontein, West Driefontein, Kloof, Venterspost, Libanon and Leeudoorn mines. In 2012, this 
complex was producing 35 000 kg of gold a year (Gold Fields, 2012). 
26. Following retrenchments from the mines, a number of former mine workers have become involved in retail trade rather than returning to 
rural areas, but the scale of this activity is not clear.
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high levels of violent crime, including recruitment of 
school children into gangs and the frequent abduction 
of young girls. In November 2013, the local community 
reacted to gang violence with a vigilante group of 
around 600 people attacking gang members across 
the township. Five gang members were ‘necklaced’ to 
death (City Press, 5 November 2013; Mail & Guardian, 
8 November 2013).
Economic problems are compounded by an 
environmental crisis of considerable proportions 
– the consequences of more than seventy years of 
gold and uranium mining. Van Eeden (2010b: 200) 
describes the Carletonville district as “probably the 
most dangerous environment in the country”. The 
environmental crisis is multifaceted. Dolomitic 
ground collapse risks remain severe, with around 90 
per cent of the residents of Khutsong, for example, 
highly vulnerable. In addition, there is heavy metal 
and radioactive contamination of the streams, 
wetlands and soils. Acid mine drainage decants from 
numerous streams a potent mix of radioactive waste 
and other hazardous material, with percolation 
from tailings dams adding to the concoction (Van 
Eeden, 2010).27
In 2000, Merafong (‘place of mining’) local 
municipality was established, which includes 
the towns of Fochville and Carletonville, and the 
townships of Khutsong and Kokosi. The local 
situation was already bleak by then, and the new 
local authority had an unenviable task. In Jean and 
John Comaroff’s edited book, Law and Disorder in 
the Postcolony, Carletonville is one of the illustrative 
localities chosen to depict the violence and disorder 
characterising many post-colonial contexts. In 
her contribution to the book, Rosalind Morris 
writes of sexual violence in Khutsong township 
(Morris, 2006). 
27. Van Eeden (2010) reports on studies that show, for example, that water bodies in the area have uranium concentrations of around 16 mg/l, 
many times higher than the level of 0.284 mg/l considered by regulatory bodies to be the maximum level for human safety.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (A declining mining economy)
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Future prospects
Will Carletonville stagger on for another two decades 
or so and then shut down as the last mines close? 
Will it then become a ghost town or at least a small 
remnant of what it once was? These are real prospects, 
but there is an alternative scenario that may offer 
some hope. It is possible that improved market 
conditions and advancing mining technologies will 
give the mining industry a new lease of life, providing 
a last opportunity to diversify the local economy by 
developing replacement industries. There are still 
vast gold and uranium reserves present at deep levels 
between Carletonville and Potchefstroom, and with 
new technologies and favourable market conditions, 
mining companies may still invest in the extraction 
of this resource. If this investment happens, the 
Gauteng Provincial Government may be able to 
realise its dream of a Western Development Corridor, 
founded on industries such as agro-processing and 
renewable energy production (Makhura, 2015), 
that extends all the way to Carletonville. However, 
the dolomitic risks in the Carletonville area 
remain – in 2015 a large sinkhole appeared in the 
town underneath a Rand Water pipe, although this 
time, fortunately, there were no casualties (City of 
Merafong, 2015).
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Living in hope: informal settlements around the mines)
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Conclusion
Carletonville provides a hard lesson. We do not know 
if the snowballing economic growth in the 1950s 
and early 1960s could ever have supported a more 
diversified economy, as happened on the East Rand, 
for example. Carletonville was more isolated than the 
East Rand, had infrastructure problems (for example, 
water shortages and a lack of industrial sites), and 
had a labour force that was almost entirely migrant 
and related only to mining. But, the 1964 sinkhole put 
paid to any real prospect of industrial development, 
and so Carletonville missed out on South Africa’s 
manufacturing boom in the mid-to-late 1960s. When 
the mining industry began contracting sharply from 
the 1990s, the local economy was unprepared and 
vulnerable. Fortunately, it hasn’t been a case of sudden 
death, and economic activities, including retail, have 
survived, but the process has been painful for the many 
individuals and households geographically bound in 
some way to Carletonville. 
Did local economic actors try hard enough? It is 
difficult to say. Did the mining companies play their 
role in supporting wider economic development? 
Probably not, but they did participate from time-
to-time in local initiatives. The reality is that 
Carletonville’s economy was not prepared for the long 
decay of the mining cycle, and its failure to diversify 
was key. Fortunately, there is nothing inevitable 
about the future, and a reprieve for Carletonville 
remains a possibility.
2.3 The story of Nigel-Heidelberg
Introducing the area
Nigel is a medium-sized town on the Far East Rand 
within the jurisdiction of the Ekurhuleni metropolitan 
council, 53 km from the O.R. Tambo International 
Airport. About 10 km south-west of Nigel is the town 
of Heidelberg, which falls within the Lesedi local 
municipality. Although institutionally divided, these 
towns share similarities in history, and, at times, 
they were competitors. Nigel is located at the edge 
of a large urban agglomeration, whereas Heidelberg 
is a stand-alone town, although its location on the 
N3 highway from Johannesburg to Durban is a 
balancing factor. Both these towns have associated 
townships with large populations. Duduza, north of 
Nigel, is linked to a mega township complex which 
includes Tsakane and KwaThema (although, in 
this narrative, we deal only with Duduza. The other 
townships, though spatially-connected to Duduza, 
are oriented more towards the small Ekurhuleni 
city of Springs). Ratanda township is located outside 
Heidelberg. Historically, these towns serviced gold 
mining and agriculture, but there is also a modestly-
sized manufacturing (agro-processing) industry. In 
2013, the GVA of the area was approximately R10.8 
billion, somewhat smaller than that of Carletonville 
(Quantec, 2015).
In 2011, the population of the area was 183 280, 
19.6 per cent higher than the 2001 population of 153 
154. This was a very modest increase, reflecting 
the subdued growth of the area during that time. 
The major concentrations of people in 2011 were in 
Duduza (73 297), Nigel (38 219), Ratanda (36 098) and 
Heidelberg (35 566).
"When the mining industry began contracting sharply 
from the 1990s, the local economy was unprepared 
and vulnerable. Fortunately, it hasn’t been a case of 
sudden death, and economic activities, including retail, 
have survived, but the process has been painful for 
the many individuals and households geographically 
bound in some way to Carletonville."
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Figure 74: Locating the Nigel-Duduza-Heidelberg-Ratanda complex
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Quirky origins
Heidelberg is an old settlement in South African 
terms. It existed long before Johannesburg, having 
been established as a trading post in 1862. For 
the short and turbulent period between 1880 and 
1883, Heidelberg was the capital of the Transvaal, 
but when the government returned to Pretoria, 
Heidelberg became a mainly agricultural service 
centre once again. 
Gold was discovered in the hills around 
Heidelberg in 1885, a year before the discovery 
of the Main Reef in Johannesburg. Periodically, 
gold mining companies were floated with mining 
ventures around Heidelberg, but they all failed. 
The Heidelberg Roodepoort mine, for example, 
started in 1896, with forty stamps and an 
investment of £150 000, but was liquidated after a 
year (Curle, 1905).
Nigel had a somewhat quirky beginning, two-
and-a-half decades after Heidelberg was founded. 
In 1888, payable gold was discovered on the farm 
Varkensfontein, 10 km north of Heidelberg, and 
President Kruger declared a public diggings. The 
farm owner, popularly known as Oom Lang Piet, 
was reading Sir Walter Scott’s The Fortunes of Nigel 
(1822)28 at the time that a prospector appeared on his 
farm. He rejected the overtures of the prospector and 
eventually established his own company, Nigel Gold 
Mining Ltd, which developed the moderately-sized 
Nigel mine. The big companies soon arrived, however, 
and the Sub-Nigel mine was registered in 1895 by 
Consolidated Gold Fields. The Sub-Nigel mine took 
time to mature, and was disadvantaged after the 
South African War as it fell outside the designated 
area for Chinese indentured labour, but by the 1930s, 
Sub-Nigel had become one of the great giants of 
Witwatersrand mining.29
For more than two decades, the settlement 
around the Sub-Nigel and Nigel mines was little 
more than a scraggly mining camp. In 1923, a 
dorpsraad (village council) was set up, which 
provided some order, and in 1930 it was elevated to 
a town council. 
Boomtown in the 1930s
The Great Depression threatened the future of Nigel, 
but when South Africa abandoned the Gold Standard 
in December 1932 and devalued its currency, the 
price of gold soared. In Nigel, the driving force in 
this revival in the 1930s was the Sub-Nigel mine, 
28. The Fortunes of Nigel is a historical novel about a young Scottish nobleman who is the victim of a complex intrigue but who ultimately 
succeeds in outwitting his tormentors. 
29. In the period 1909–1971, Sub-Nigel produced 15 million ounces of gold.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Heidelburg on the edge)
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which quickly rose to stardom, but a number of 
other mines were developed in the decade including 
Spaarwater, Vlakfontein and Vogelstruisbult. 
The period 1934 to 1939 was boom time for Nigel, 
with no fewer than five new town extensions being 
proclaimed, and large-scale speculation in fixed 
property taking place. The development of the town 
was also helped by the opening of the railway line 
from Springs through Nigel to Heidelberg, in 1935 
(Macnab, 1987). 
Despite the new rail connection, Nigel still 
remained somewhat peripheral to major urban hubs 
on the Witwatersrand, which had both drawbacks 
and benefits. Macnab (1987: 50) writes that the white 
community in Nigel, “being somewhat isolated from 
the city life in Johannesburg with its bright lights ... 
created its own self-sufficient community, organized 
its own life”. 
Early industrialisation in 
the 1940s and 1950s
In the 1940s, there was a slowdown of production 
in mining because of the need to refocus labour 
and resources on the war effort. This exacerbated 
tensions in the mining industry. In 1942, an African 
mineworkers union was established, and action 
to protect the rights of workers escalated until 
a full-blown strike was called in August 1946. 
Nigel was the site of some of the worst violence 
during the strike. On 13 August, police fired at 
the striking workers on the mine, killing five 
and injuring ninety-one (South African History 
Online, 2011a). 
In the 1940s and 1950s, however, there was an 
early beginning to manufacturing in the district. 
A Mr Cook of TJC Holdings gained the Coca-Cola 
franchise in South Africa for Nigel and Heidelberg, 
and opened the Nigel Bottling Company. In 1949, 
production of Coca Cola began in Nigel under 
license. There were positive developments in 
Heidelberg too, related mainly to agro-processing. 
In 1954, Eskort, a manufacturer of processed pork 
products, opened a factory in Heidelberg to gain easy 
access to the large market on the Witwatersrand 
(Eskort, N/D).30
By the late 1950s, the older mines in the 
district were winding down. The Nigel Gold Mining 
Company, for example, ceased production in 1957, 
placing a question mark over the future of the 
town. However, in the same year, a large Australian 
company, Commonwealth Engineering (Comeng), 
invested in Nigel, establishing a subsidiary, Union 
Carriage & Wagon Company (Pty) Ltd (UWC), and 
production began in 1959. Over the next decades, 
almost all the locomotive coaches for the South 
African Railways – around 14 000 – were produced 
by UWC, and for a period, the plant in Nigel was 
among the largest of its kind in the world (Dunn, 
2006). Other forms of metal fabrication developed 
in Nigel from the late 1950s. Babcock Africa Ltd, a 
subsidiary of a leading British multinational company 
involved with construction and engineering, also 
established in Nigel. Rogerson and Rogerson (1997) 
indicate that by the end of the 1950s, the structure 
of Nigel’s manufacturing economy was established. 
The primary contributions by Nigel to the wider 
30. Previously, its only factory was in Estcourt, in Natal (Eskort N/D).
Photograph by Brian Boshoff 
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economy, even to the present day, are machinery 
and fabricated metals, transport equipment, and 
glass products. 
Nigel’s success in attracting this investment 
proved critical to its ability to, at least partially, 
transcend the mining cycle. We may speculate that 
Nigel’s ability to pull in major foreign investment 
at this time had something to do with the strong 
political connections of the then spatially marginal 
small town. The member of parliament for Nigel 
at the time was B.J. Vorster, who had risen rapidly 
through the political hierarchy since his election to 
parliament in 1953.31
Treading water in the 1960s and 1970s
There was a marked slowdown in mining on the Far 
East Rand in the 1960s as the older mines reached the 
end of their economic life in the context of a stable, but 
low, gold price. At its peak, there were 24 operating 
mines and 90 shafts on the Far East Rand, but by the 
end of the 1960s the only significant remaining mines 
were Vlakfontein and Spaarwater. Sub-Nigel declined 
gradually through the 1960s, and finally shut down in 
1971 (Macnab, 1987).
The industries established in preceding decades, 
and especially UWC, helped moderate the effects of 
the decline in mining. However, the Far East Rand 
did not benefit significantly from further growth 
in manufacturing in the 1960s, despite the boom 
in manufacturing nationally in this decade, and 
the emergence of the East Rand, more generally, 
as South Africa’s ‘industrial workshop’. Nigel 
maintained its industrial base but was peripheral 
to the expansion in manufacturing on the East 
Rand, which happened mainly in localities closer to 
Johannesburg such as Germiston, Kempton Park and 
Boksburg. Nevertheless, there was some expansion 
in small-scale metal-related industries, and in 
military equipment.
With the modestly-scaled manufacturing sector 
in Nigel, there was a need to accommodate African 
workers outside the mining compounds. There was a 
small township called Charterston, but the apartheid 
planners considered it to be dangerously close to white 
residential areas, and between 1964 and 1975, there 
were relocations to the newly-proclaimed African 
township of Duduza.
Heidelberg had remained a small but fairly stable 
town, serving a reasonably prosperous agricultural 
district. In the 1970s, it benefitted from the expansion 
of the South African Defence Force, when the South 
African Army Gymnasium and South African Signal 
Corps were located there.32 There was also some 
benefit from the proclamation of the Suikerbosrand 
Nature Reserve in 1975, which included a (then whites 
only) public resort. 
However, in the 1970s, Heidelberg benefitted 
from the intensification of agriculture, and further 
development in agro-processing. In this decade, the 
beef producer, Karan, located near Heidelberg, began 
its rapid expansion to become South Africa’s largest 
integrated beef producing company, and the largest 
beef feedlot in the southern hemisphere (Kuhn, 
2012).33 The second largest feedlot in South Africa, 
PK Farming and Mancho Ranch, also developed 
in the same district. The major development in 
agro-processing came in 1978 when the Rembrandt 
Group, later Rothmans International, opened a large 
tobacco processing factory in Heidelberg.34 In 1999, 
British American Tobacco took control of Rothmans 
International, and the factory became part of the 
stable of its subsidiary, British American Tobacco 
(South Africa) (BAT-SA).
31. He was appointed a deputy minister in 1958, minister of Justice in 1961, and became prime minister in 1966 after Hendrik 
Verwoerd’s assassination. 
32. The SA Signal Corps moved to Pretoria in the mid-1980s. 
33. The Karan estate now accommodates 120 000 cattle, with a feed-mill processing 1 400 tons of beef per day. Karan opened an abattoir in the 
town of Balfour in neighbouring Mpumalanga, and has established its distribution and marketing centre at City Deep in Johannesburg. See the 
Karan Beef website: http://www.karanbeef.co.za/AboutUs 
34. Although this was an agro-processing plant, the tobacco was not produced locally but procured from suppliers across the low-lying northern 
parts of South Africa.
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Deepening troubles in the 
1980s and early 1990s
In the 1980s, the local economy staggered onwards, 
battered by the gathering political storm in the 
country as a whole, and by political conflicts locally. 
Kok (1998) reports that the real annual GGP growth 
of the Far East Rand for the decade 1981–1991 was 
-4.0 per cent, stabilising to zero per cent in the 
period 1991 to 1993. The only significantly worse 
performer was Westonaria on the Far West Rand, 
with an annual change of -10.8 per cent for 1981 to 
1991, and -2.7 per cent for 1991–1993. The economic 
troubles were reflected also in declining rates of 
population growth as the area was no longer attractive 
to migrants. Growth rates in the period 1980–1985 
were still a respectable 2.25 per cent, per annum, 
higher than the regional average, but for the period 
1985–1991, they slumped to only 1.21 per cent, lower 
than the regional average (Simkins, 2010). This 
poor performance resulted from the continued 
long-term decline of mining, but also, increasingly, 
the mediocre performance of manufacturing.35 It is 
difficult to disentangle national from local factors 
in the crisis that faced Nigel’s economy at the 
time, however. 
Rogerson and Rogerson (1997) observe that 
while there was a small net gain in manufacturing 
employment on the Witwatersrand as a whole in the 
period 1980–1994 (despite a significant relative loss), 
this growth was consolidating in the core, with a real 
loss of employment in peripheral locations. Barchiesi 
and Kenny (2002) write of a steady decline in 
manufacturing industry on the East Rand in the 1980s, 
a decade in which South Africa’s economy, as a whole, 
was depressed, and of the even more severe decline on 
the Far East Rand, where Nigel is located. Even on the 
Far East Rand though, there was variation. Springs 
performed relatively well, Brakpan did badly, and Nigel 
performed somewhere in-between, while still suffering 
a steady loss of employment. 
UWC, the largest manufacturing employer 
at the beginning of the decade, almost folded, with 
employment dropping in the 1980s from 900 to 100. 
The crisis followed the near collapse in demand for 
rolling stock in South Africa in the 1980s, and it was 
only a contract to supply carriages for the Taiwan 
Railway Administration that helped the company 
survive. UWC experienced a series of ups and downs. 
There was some expansion again in the early 1990s, 
but the failure of an international contract, and a near 
collapse in rail travel in South Africa, saw employment 
in the firm dropping again from 600 in 1997, to only 250 
in 1999. The second largest company in Nigel, Babcock 
Powerlines, also experienced tough times, retrenching 
one-half of its 700 workers in 1983 (Seekings, 1990; 
Barchiesi and Kenny 2002). 
By the 1990s, there was widespread concern about 
the ‘de-industrialisation’ of the East Rand (Bloch, 
1993; CDE, 1997; Rogerson and Rogerson, 1997, 1999a, 
1999b; Barchiesi and Kenny, 2002).36 In 1997, for 
example, the Centre for Development and Enterprise 
(CDE) published the report of its study of the East 
Rand, arguing that the future of this metropolis was of 
national concern, and that it “needed a plan quickly”. 
Rogerson (2005) observes that during the 1980s and 
early- to mid-1990s, the East Rand, and especially 
the Far East Rand, seemed to be little more than an 
expanding rustbelt.
35. On the East Rand, the areas closer to Johannesburg (Benoni, Boksburg, Germiston, Kempton Park) contributed 48 per cent of the 
Witwatersrand’s employment, compared with only 8 per cent combined for the Far East Rand (Brakpan, Springs and Nigel) (Rogerson and 
Rogerson, 1997).  
36. Reasons given by these authors for the crisis include: the end of the apartheid era policies of economic protectionism; reduced investment in 
state-owned enterprises including Sasol and Eskom; transnationalisation of industries with loosening linkages to other local firms; and intense 
labour conflicts.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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This concern also related to extreme levels of violence 
and political conflict on the East Rand, including in 
Duduza and Nigel, until 1994. Local political conflict 
was severe, with increasingly violent school, consumer, 
bus and rent boycotts. The conflict was initially 
between the state and local activists organised by the 
Duduza Civic Association, and between unionised 
workers and bosses, but in the early 1990s there was 
also bitter internecine conflict between supporters of 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP). 
Restored hope (and a local mining 
fiasco) from the mid-1990s
The East Rand was arguably still in crisis, but some 
sort of turning point was reached in the mid-1990s 
even as writers were presenting bleak assessments. 
Rogerson (2005) suggests a positive turnaround 
from around 1996. Simkins (2010) observes that 
there was renewed net in-migration into Nigel in the 
1990s, although at a modest scale. The population 
of the town was growing slightly slower than the 
province as a whole, but growth was not significantly 
worse.37 It was not doing as well as the parts of the 
East Rand closest to Johannesburg, but was doing 
better than even more peripheral places such as 
Heidelberg, and significantly better than the Far West 
Rand, where economic growth remained negative 
(Simkins, 2010). 
In 1995, democratic local government was 
established in Nigel. The ANC won all the seats in 
Duduza, and the National Party won all the seats in 
the white areas (displacing the previously dominant 
Conservative Party). Overall, the ANC received 
two-thirds of the votes. Nigel later became part of the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, which was 
an amalgam of 22 apartheid-era municipalities. The 
question at the time was whether this amalgamation 
would be to the advantage of relatively marginal 
and small parts of the metropolitan area, such as 
Nigel. Heidelberg, however, remained outside the 
metropolitan municipality, forming the urban core of 
the Lesedi Local Municipality.
The creation of a metropolitan council created 
the potential for more integrated long-term economic 
strategising. In the early 2000s, the metropolitan 
council did, in fact, respond with a local economic 
development framework, but this was criticised 
for lacking an economic analysis, and for focusing 
only on redistributive aspects, without a sense of 
how the economy should grow (Rogerson, 2005). 
From around 2008, the metropolitan municipality 
does  seem to have been able to play a positive role 
in attracting investment, including to places such 
as Nigel. In contrast to the earlier framework, 
Ekurhuleni 2055, the long-range strategy launched 
in 2013, included a ‘re-industrialisation plan’ 
built around 13 pillars of intervention, including 
improved support for and responsiveness to 
manufacturing enterprises, a greater focus 
on green-economy prospects, and upgraded 
infrastructure networks. 
There was promise in the mining sector in the 
early 2000s, with the re-opening of mines that had 
closed in the 1960s and 1970s, but the decade ended 
with a fiasco that shamed the mining industry. The 
37. In the period 1991–1996, Gauteng’s population grew at 3.61 per cent, per annum, increasing slightly to 3.72 for 1996–2001. The figures for 
Nigel were 3.32 per cent and 2.02 per cent (Simkins, 2010).
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Grootvlei mine was already in serious trouble in the 
late 1990s because of the ingress of acidic water into 
its shafts (Engineering News, 3 September 1999). In 
1997, Grootvlei was purchased by Harmony Gold (Pty) 
Ltd, but later the mine was sold on to a succession of 
smaller companies. In 2009, Aurora Empowerment 
Systems (Pty) Ltd bid nearly R500 million for the 
ailing mine, promising to invest a further R600 
million, but within a year, Aurora had stripped the 
mine of its assets, and production was at a standstill. 
The company failed to pump consistently, and the 
shafts flooded with untreated and highly toxic acid 
mine drainage (AMD), decanted into the Blesbokspruit 
River. The pumping stopped altogether in 2011, and 
the entire East Rand water catchment was placed 
at risk, with AMD threatening plant, animal and 
human health. There was also a rapidly emerging 
social crisis. Creditors and workers on the mine were 
not paid, leaving an increasingly destitute and angry 
community. Liquidators were appointed, but they were 
also implicated in the gathering crisis and eventually 
removed from their positions by the Master of the 
High Court, with both the company and the liquidators 
being sued for around R2 billion in damages (Business 
Report, 30 May 2011; Mail & Guardian, 3 June 
2011; Mail & Guardian, 16 May 2014; Times Live, 
15 April 2015). 
However, even as the fiasco unfolded at Grootvlei, 
new opportunities emerged in mining that suggested 
the downward trajectory could be reversed and mining 
might experience a partial revival. At the centre of this 
story is the mining entrepreneur, Neal Froneman, who 
had a vision of consolidating mining assets and rights 
on the Far East Rand in a way that would re-establish 
the profitability of mines. In 2006, he brought the old 
Modder East mine back into production using new 
access methods and technologies, and then began 
a much bigger project of consolidation, bringing 
together, within a single bundle of rights, the deposits 
of the previous Modderfontein Mines and old Nigel 
Gold Mining Company. He also moved into unmined 
areas. In addition, in 2012, Froneman acquired 
some of the assets and rights of the beleaguered 
Grootvlei mine. Froneman’s company, Goliath Gold, 
has created one of the largest brownfield exploration 
properties in the world, with a potential for at 
least three to four mines the size of Modder East 
(FinWeek, 18 April 2012; BDLive, 6 August 2012; www.
goliathgold.com).
There is also new promise in manufacturing, 
and especially, in the established industries linked to 
locomotive production and beverage bottling. UWC 
had mixed fortunes. In the mid-1990s, construction 
giant, Murray and Roberts acquired the company 
and modernised its production plant. In 2008, UWC 
was successful in bidding for a contract to assemble 
coaches for the Gautrain.38 In 2013, UWC was sold 
as part of a black empowerment deal backed by the 
IDC, but within a year the company was retrenching 
labour as Transnet contracts for new locomotives 
went to companies in China and North America. The 
unions were infuriated and the union federation, 
38. See http://www.gautrain.co.za/newsroom/2008/07/ready-to-roll-in-nigel/
Photograph by GCRO
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Cosatu, led protest marches in Nigel (Engineering 
News, 8 February 2013; Railways Africa, 21 October 
2014). However, Nigel may yet benefit from the 
largest-ever contract in South Africa’s history. In 
2014, a BEE holding company, Gibela, was awarded 
a massive, ten-year, R51 billion contract to supply 
the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) 
with 600 trains to replace old Metrorail rolling 
stock. Gibela has indicated that it aims for 70 per 
cent local content and will target around 100 South 
African firms as component and service providers. 
Dunnottar, land previously owned by the South 
African Defence Force, 10 km north of Nigel towards 
Springs, has been identified as a production hub 
for locomotive construction (Engineering News, 
19 May 2014; Engineering News, 20 July 2014). 
Controversies have emerged over this contract, 
however, with fears that, for example, the consortium, 
which includes a large French company, may not 
be able to meet its commitments to local content 
(News24, 10 May 2015).
There have also been significant developments 
in the beverages and bottling industries. In 2006, 
Coca-Cola South Africa purchased TJC Holdings 
from the Cook family.39 A year later Coca-Cola South 
Africa entered into a black economic empowerment 
(BEE) deal with Cyril Ramaphosa’s Shanduka Group, 
and the Nigel plant became the first majority black-
owned and managed bottler in South Africa. The 
major advance in the sector came in 2011, however, 
with the opening of the new R1.9 billion Consol 
Glass plant in Nigel, which will add a further 220 
000 tons of glass production per year (Bigale, 2011). 
There was also the construction of Asambe Steel 
Corporation’s new, IDC-financed, R1 billion steel 
mill, which recycles scrap metal. The upturn in 
manufacturing in and around Nigel is layering on the 
existing industrial base and infrastructure, which 
was already in place by the late 1950s. The question 
remains, however, why manufacturing is seeing 
growth now after decades of stagnation, or even 
decline. The overall economic context is, after all, 
not auspicious.
There are indications of an increasing shortage 
of available, reasonably priced and well located 
industrial land in the metropolitan core, which 
could account, in part, for a return to industrial 
growth in some edge locations, including Nigel. A 
2008/9 study on industrial land commissioned by 
the City of Johannesburg indicated, for example, 
that demand for industrial land in Johannesburg 
would exceed supply by 2018, and that the 
growing shortage is driving up industrial land 
costs and rentals.40
The role of the metropolitan local authority 
appears to have been a critical factor. At first the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council, established in 
2000, was preoccupied with the immense task of 
integrating multiple previous local authorities in a 
spatially-fragmented urban context. As mentioned 
previously, Ekurhuleni’s economic strategies were 
initially nebulous and unrealistic. However, by the 
39. The company was renamed Scarlet Ibis Investment 3, with the Nigel plant being called Central Bottlers. 
40. Rentals in the prime locations of Sandton, Randburg and Strydom Park were as much as R80/m2 in 2008.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
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end of its first decade, Ekurhuleni was aggressively 
pursuing an Industrial Revitalisation Strategy. 
Although the main focus of attention was building 
an Aerotropolis around O.R. Tambo International 
Airport in Kempton Park, Ekurhuleni also worked 
hard to support industrial development at the opposite 
end of the metropolitan city, including in Nigel (City 
of Ekurhuleni, 2010). Municipal insiders report 
that the metropolitan authority played a key role in 
attracting the Consol Glass investment to Nigel, and in 
facilitating other investments (Engineering News, 25 
November 2011). 
Heidelberg has never had the advantage of a 
large metropolitan authority pulling investments 
towards its locality, but it remained economically 
stable, with growth in some sectors. In 2006, BAT-SA, 
the largest single employer in the Lesedi Local 
Municipality, consolidated its production capacity 
in Heidelberg when it closed its factory in Paarl, in 
the Western Cape.41 The tobacco industry is under 
pressure, however, from the anti-tobacco lobby, 
stringent new state controls on smoking, and illicit 
imports of cigarettes (Mail & Guardian, 20 December 
2013). Production in South Africa has declined, 
although increased prices have sustained profits. In 
2008, the Heidelberg factory was modernised, but 
greater automation reduced the labour force from its 
peak of around 1 300 to 800 (Business Excellence, 21 
November 2011). More recently, BAT-SA has indicated 
that it will be expanding production facilities, and 
this may result in the restoration of some of the lost 
jobs.42 The tobacco plant remains the single largest 
agro-processing industry in town, but there have 
been other developments. In 2008, for example, 
Coca-Cola (South Africa) established a new Valpré 
Spring Water plant just east of Heidelberg, taking 
advantage of the powerful, non-polluted aquifers in 
the district.43
Heidelberg’s location on the route between 
Johannesburg and Durban has supported its 
role as an emergent logistics hub. Jameson Park, 
midway between Heidelberg and Nigel, is the 
endpoint of a multi-product pipeline from Durban 
to Gauteng that carries transport diesel, petrol and 
jet aviation fuel, providing an estimated 500 jobs 
(Lesedi Local Municipality, 2008). Also of potential 
importance to the town is the development of the 
Gateway Logistics Hub on the border between 
the Lesedi and Sedibeng municipalities, which 
will warehouse bulk freight from Richards Bay 
and Durban ports for more efficient distribution 
in Gauteng and the other northern provinces. It is 
estimated that the hub will extend over 500 ha and 
create 13 000 direct and indirect jobs (Lesedi Local 
Municipality, 2012).
Nigel has historically served as a retail core for 
the Far East Rand but there are emerging competitive 
threats. The 2011 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Spatial 
Development Framework identified early signs 
of retail decay in the Nigel CBD, and emphasised 
the need to sustain Nigel’s role as a retail centre, 
specifically to retain existing high street national 
chain stores within the Nigel CBD (City of Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality, 2011). The key challenge, 
41. BAT-SA buys more than 90 per cent of South Africa’s annual tobacco crop, and has an 85 per cent share of South Africa’s legal cigarette 
industry, with popular brands such as Dunhill, Kent, Peter Stuyvesant and Rothmans. (Mail & Guardian, 20 December 2013). 
42. See www.batsa.co.za. 
43. See www.cocacola.co.za/brands/valpre.html.
"Nigel has historically served as a retail core for the 
Far East Rand but there are emerging competitive 
threats. The 2011 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Spatial 
Development Framework identified early signs of 
retail decay in the Nigel CBD, and emphasised the need 
to sustain Nigel’s role as a retail centre..."
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however, is to the CBD’s traditional role in meeting the 
retail needs of the African market, as malls develop 
in the townships. The new 30 000 m2 Tsakane Mall, 
south of Brakpan, is one of the largest township malls 
in South Africa. 
Nigel is also facing new retail competition from 
Heidelberg, which has the advantage of a location on 
the primary route between Johannesburg and Durban. 
The most significant recent development was the 
opening of the 35 000 m2, regional-scaled, Heidelberg 
Mall in 2014.  Located at a major interchange on the 
N3, this mall is an innovative joint venture between 
the Lesedi Local Municipality and private developers 
(Heidelberg GP, 2014).44
A further – although modestly sized – area 
of growth for Heidelberg is in retirement housing 
and services, with indications suggesting that 
Heidelberg is attracting retirees in the middle-class 
market segment (Lesedi Local Municipality, 2012). 
Heidelberg’s relative proximity to, but also distance 
from, the metropolitan core may account for the 
relatively high proportion of older people living in 
the town. A website for local businesses boasts that 
Heidelberg is the ‘small town with ‘big city’ benefits’ 
(Heidelberg GP, 2014).
There is a new twist in Heidelberg’s future 
development path. There are reports that a large 
opencast coal mine will be opened in the Heidelberg 
district, immediately adjacent to the Karan beef 
feedlot, to provide fuel to the Grootvlei power 
station located south of Heidelberg in Mpumalanga. 
Controversy has already erupted over the damage this 
development may cause to agriculture in the district. 
Ironically, the town that avoided dependence on 
mining may yet become a centre for mining (Mail & 
Guardian, 8 May 2015). 
 
 
Conclusion
The stories of Nigel and Heidelberg are ones of 
modest success. These towns never developed 
as major economic hubs, and remain small in 
relation to the overall GCR economy. Nevertheless, 
these are respectably-sized towns with diverse 
economies, and with recent indications of 
renewed growth.
The industrialisation – mainly foreign 
investment – that happened in the 1940s and 1950s 
before the major mines in the area closed, was critical 
to Nigel’s economic durability. Nigel’s story offers 
some hope to economies dependent on mining, in 
apparent contrast to Carletonville’s story, although 
more research is required to understand the reasons 
for this relative success. It is apparent that in some 
periods – for example, during the 1950s, and in the 
current period from around 2010 – Nigel’s somewhat 
peripheral location conferred benefits that exceed 
disadvantages. The lower land and labour costs, for 
example, have more than compensated for its relative 
distance from the metropolitan core. Also, while 
Nigel is spatially peripheral within the GCR, it has not 
always been peripheral to networks of power in politics 
and business. In recent times, active marketing 
by the metropolitan authority, and support from 
state agencies such as DTI and IDC have supported 
growth in the town.
For Heidelberg, the key factor has been market 
accessibility. The town endured long after the 
early failed attempts at gold mining, and gradually 
expanded, and this was primarily because of its 
location on the major route between Johannesburg 
and Durban, which supported agriculture and agro-
processing. More recently, it has supported the growth 
of the retail and logistics industries. Heidelberg has 
not had the advantage of being in a metropolitan 
authority, but the local council has been proactive, 
for example, in the partnership that produced the 
Heidelberg Mall.
44. This new development is in addition to the four existing shopping centres in Heidelberg, a medium-sized town.
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3. State-implanted industry on the edge 
(the Vaal Triangle) 
3.1 State-implanted manufacturing 
The Vaal Triangle is a striking example of a large 
urban complex on the spatial periphery of a city-region, 
created mainly through deliberate state action to 
promote manufacturing activity. Internationally, there 
are many examples of this form of development in 
countries that were previously state socialist, or still 
retain elements of state socialism, such as the People’s 
Republic of China. The Vaal Triangle is, however, 
the product of the activities of an economically 
interventionist state, within a predominantly market-
based, or mixed, economy.
South Africa is not the only instance of state 
ownership of industry outside of state socialism. 
Ahuja and Majumdar (1998: 115) report that in India, 
“state-owned firms are active in every sector of the 
economy, from petrochemicals and manufacturing to 
mining, trading, and services … [O]f the top twenty-five 
largest corporations in India, twenty are state-owned”. 
This was also the case in Latin American countries, 
historically, where state-owned enterprises were 
dominant in the mining and petroleum industries at 
times, and were significant in manufacturing as well 
(Vernon, 1981). In the Middle East and North Africa, 
the state remains a direct participant in industrial and 
mining sectors (OECD, 2013). In Western Europe, too, 
there were periods in which direct state ownership 
of enterprise expanded. In France, for example, the 
state took ownership of strategic firms in energy, 
finance and transportation (famously, Renault) in 
the 1940s, and further expansion of state ownership 
took place under President Mitterrand in the 1980s 
(Cohen, 2010). Even in the economically liberal United 
Kingdom, the state has historically played a direct 
ownership role in some forms of manufacturing. 
For example, for around two decades from the early 
1970s, the majority of voting shares in British Leyland 
(the Rover Group), Jaguar, and Rolls Royce, were 
held by the state, with state ownership in aerospace, 
shipbuilding and steel-making, as well (Floud and 
McCloskey, 1994).
Very little has been written about the spatial 
location and decision-making of state-owned 
enterprise in manufacturing outside state socialism, 
despite the apparent significance of state ownership 
in this sector, historically. In British scholarship, 
there is some reference to the spatial impacts of 
the decision to nationalise British Leyland (see, for 
example, Hall, 2014), and Markusen and Park (1993) 
write of the state as an “industrial locator” in South 
Korea, arguing that the state responds to different 
priorities than civilian firms do, with strategic 
concerns playing a key role. Lall and Chakravorty 
(2005) report on a multi-sited study in India, and 
"Very little has been written about the spatial location 
and decision-making of state-owned enterprise in 
manufacturing outside state socialism, despite the 
apparent significance of state ownership in this  
sector, historically."
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argue that private-sector investments tend to favour 
existing economic industrial concentrations, while 
state-owned companies often direct investment away 
from these concentrations, influenced by political 
concerns for spreading development. In general, 
however, the spatial dimension of state ownership 
in manufacturing is largely unexplored, and so a 
South African case may add significantly to the 
sparse literature.
In South Africa, state-owned manufacturing 
emerged around 1924 during the tenure of the 
so-called Pact Government. The state has had a 
direct-ownership role in transport (for example, 
South African Railways), telecommunications 
(South African Post Office) and energy (Electricity 
Supply Commission – Eskom), and it has also had a 
strategic stake in manufacturing through its direct 
ownership of the major manufacturing corporations, 
Iscor and Sasol, as well as through its major financial 
instrument supporting these companies, the IDC. 
Iscor invested, initially, in Pretoria, reinforcing an 
existing economic hub, but its subsequent investments 
were on greenfield sites in Vanderbijlpark (in the Vaal 
Triangle), Newcastle (in north-west KwaZulu-Natal), 
and Saldanha Bay (in the Western Cape). Sasol created 
the new towns, Sasolburg (in the Vaal Triangle) and 
Secunda (on the Mpumalanga highveld). Thus, through 
its direct ownership of manufacturing, the South 
African state played a role in spatial redistribution of 
industry in South Africa. 
The major concentration of state-owned industry 
in South Africa was in the Vaal Triangle, which 
straddles the Gauteng-Free State boundary, and 
includes Iscor and Sasol plants, and large clusters of 
downstream industries. 
3.2 The story of the Vaal Triangle
Introducing the area
The Vaal Triangle is centred around three large 
towns – Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg – 
which hold an agglomeration of metal-producing and 
petrochemical industries. Adjacent to these towns 
are the historically African townships of Sebokeng, 
Evaton, Sharpeville, Zamdela, Bophelong, and 
Boipatong, as well as smaller, previously- 
white, urban centres such as Meyerton and  
Henley-on-Klip. The Vaal Triangle is a cross-border 
region. The part in Gauteng, north of the Vaal  
River, falls within the jurisdiction of the Sedibeng  
District Municipality, and mainly within the 
Emfuleni Local Municipality, but includes parts 
of the Midvaal Local Municipality. Sasolburg and 
Zamdela township fall within the Metsimaholo Local 
Municipality under the jurisdiction of the Free State 
provincial government. The core town, Vereeniging, 
is 74 km from Johannesburg. The region is connected 
well to Johannesburg with national and provincial 
roads, a commuter rail network, and a national 
freight rail network. 
In 2011, the population of the region was 879 
884, a modest increase of 13.8 per cent on the 2001 
figure of 773 368. The major centres of population 
in 2011 were Sebokeng (218 530), Evaton (132 
848), Vereeniging (99 781), Vanderbijlpark (95 
841), Zamdela (82 339), Sasolburg (39 696) and 
Sharpeville (37 999). The manufacturing-dominated 
economy had a GVA of R36.8 billion in 2013, making 
the Vaal the largest concentration of economic 
value-added activity on the edges of the GCR 
(Quantec, 2015). The economy remains dominated 
by manufacturing.
253
PART B
Figure 75: Locating the Vaal
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Industrialisation and the patrimonial 
state: up until the 1930s 
The early development of the Vaal was the 
consequence of an extraordinary combination of 
individual entrepreneurialism and state patronage. 
The individual entrepreneur was Sammy Marks, a 
Lithuanian-born Jew, who came to the Cape Colony 
in 1869, via Sheffield in the UK. He moved to the 
Transvaal in 1881, where he established a strong 
and enduring friendship with President Paul Kruger.
Through this friendship, he became one of the 
leading figures in business and political circles in the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and was able to 
acquire a host of business rights. Marks also curried 
favour with the British, and was able to make an easy 
transition from supporting Kruger, to supporting Lord 
Kitchener after the South African War, and then to 
supporting General Louis Botha after 1906 when his 
Het Volk Party came to power in the Transvaal. In 
1910, Marks became a senator in the Union parliament, 
a position he held until his death in 1920 (Trapido, 
1984; Mendelsohn, 1991).
Marks used the patrimonial relations he 
established with a succession of governments to 
advance his business interests, and to develop 
the Vaal region as an early hub of industry in the 
Transvaal. When coal was discovered along the 
Transvaal-Orange Free State border in 1878, he 
acted quickly, acquiring the 22 farms that were to 
make up his Vereeniging Estates, and established 
the Zuid-Afrikaansche en Oranje Vrijstaatsche 
Mineralen en Mijnbouwvereeniging, to develop 
Photographs by Brian Boshoff (Approaching the Vaal)
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the first collieries in the region. Marks persuaded 
Kruger to support the railway line from the Cape to 
the Transvaal, which passed through his Vereeniging 
Estates. Marks also convinced the Transvaal 
government to call the point at which the railway 
crossed the Vaal River, Vereeniging, meaning ‘union’ 
or ‘association’, as it linked the Transvaal with the 
Orange Free State (Trapido, 1984; Mendelsohn, 
1991; Munnik, 2012).
The bridge crossing was opened in 1892, the 
year that Marks founded the village of Vereeniging 
to serve the collieries and railway sidings. In 1902, 
Marks used his connections with the Boers and the 
British to ensure that the peace talks which ended the 
South African War took place on his land. The Peace 
of Vereeniging, signed in May 1902, brought global 
name recognition to his fledgling town. With railway 
access to the rapidly-developing Witwatersrand, 
Marks was well placed economically, and he branched 
out from mining into agriculture and manufacturing, 
using his political contacts whenever he needed to. 
Marks formed the partnership, Lewis & Marks, with 
a distant cousin, and developed the first industries 
in the Transvaal, with government concessions, 
including a distillery, canning factory and glass 
factory. He had, however, a vision to turn Vereeniging 
into the ‘Sheffield of South Africa’ as a producer of 
steel and steel products. Marks knew that he needed 
water and power, and to provide these, he began by 
building the Leslie Barrage on the Vaal River, and 
persuaded Rand Mines, which needed power for its 
operations, to build the Vereeniging power station. 
At the time, this was the largest power station in 
southern Africa, and a pioneer in energy production 
(Mendelsohn, 1991).
Everything was in place for the development 
of a steel-producing hub – there was coal, rail, 
water and energy. In 1911, Marks landed a lucrative 
contract to supply the steel requirements of the Union 
Government and the South African Railways for a 
period of sixteen years. He established the Union Steel 
Corporation (USCO) and opened South Africa’s first 
steel-making plant in Vereeniging in 1913. Through 
his entrepreneurial genius, and with the patronage of 
political elites, Marks developed an industrial cluster 
on his properties along the Vaal River. Soon other 
industries arrived. In 1927, Vereeniging became the 
corporate headquarters and steel-making production 
site of the firm Stewarts & Lloyds. This firm, an 
amalgamation of the South African subsidiaries of 
the British firms, Lloyd & Lloyd, and A & J Stewart 
& Menzies, was headquartered in Vereeniging, 
alongside its production site (Chaskalson, 1986; 
Mendelsohn, 1991).
In the 1930s, an integrated metal-producing 
hub developed on the Vaal with USCO and Stewarts 
& Lloyds at the centre. Upstream of steel production, 
African Metals Corporation (Amcor) produced 
iron from the material provided by the collieries, 
and downstream firms such as African Cables and 
McKinnon Chain produced metal products. There 
were, however, threats on the horizon. In 1928, 
Iscor had been founded as a state-owned entity, 
and the first Iscor works were set up in Pretoria 
West in 1934. This was a major competitive threat 
to Vereeniging’s firms, and possibly to its very 
existence, as Iscor had the benefit of state subsidy 
and protection, and of economies of scale (Hallowes 
and Munnik, 2006).
Industrialisation brought migrants into the 
area, mainly from Basutoland (now Lesotho). Without 
adequate provision of housing, many newcomers found 
their way to Top Location, a dilapidated mixed-race 
neighbourhood near the centre of the town. This was 
to become ‘Vereeniging’s Sophiatown’ – shabby but 
vibrant. Top Location was a place of relative freedom, 
but police raids on illicit beer brewers (mainly Basutho 
women) and on shebeens (taverns) lead to growing 
tensions. In 1937, a police raid provoked an angry 
response, and a large group, mainly of women, stoned 
the police. Six police officers were killed in what 
became known as the Vereeniging riots. It was an event 
that created considerable anxiety across South Africa, 
and was seen as a portent of future racial conflict 
(Bonner, 1990).
For many white residents, Top Location was 
uncomfortably close to their own residential areas, 
while local industrialists believed that Top Location 
occupied land well suited to industry. Led by John 
Sharpe of Stewarts & Lloyds, who was also the mayor 
of Vereeniging, the municipality proposed to relocate 
the African occupants of Top Location to a new 
township to be called Sharpeville, several kilometres 
outside of town, where tight controls could be imposed 
(Chaskalson, 1986).
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Direct state investment in 
manufacturing: 1940s and 1950s
By the late 1930s, the sustainability of Vereeniging’s 
development was questionable, but the town was saved 
by World War II. Early in 1939, as war clouds gathered, 
General Jan Smuts approached industrialists to 
establish factories in the Vaal that could be used 
for armament production. Soon after war was 
declared in September 1939, the major industries 
in Vereeniging converted to war production: Union 
Steel produced aerial bombs; Stewarts & Lloyds 
made shells, and Amcor (later known as Samancor) 
opened a metalloys plant critical for weapons 
production. With most white men away at the front, 
the workforce consisted mainly of white women and 
Africans (Leigh, 1968).
The war massively underscored the need for steel 
production. Steel was clearly needed for weaponry 
but local steel-making was also necessary to support 
other forms of manufacturing as South Africa was 
effectively cut off by the war from international 
supplies. In 1941, the eminent industrialist, and long-
time advisor to General Smuts, Dr Hendrik van der 
Bijl, recommended a second Iscor steel plant. Witbank 
in the Eastern Transvaal was a possible location 
because of its large coal supplies, but Louis Marks 
(the son of Sammy Marks) persuaded Van der Bijl to 
select a site on the banks of the Vaal River, west of 
Vereeniging, which was owned, of course, by the Marks 
family. Construction began almost immediately and a 
specialist steel mill for armoured plate production for 
ship repairs was completed on this site in 1943 (Leigh, 
1968; Freund, 2015). 
In 1947, work began on a fully-fledged integrated steel 
plant, and the town of Vanderbijlpark, proclaimed 
in 1949, was built by Iscor’s property arm, Vesco, to 
accommodate the white workers in the new plant 
(Leigh, 1968).45 Vanderbijlpark was built according 
to garden city principles, and the townships of 
Bophelong and Boipatong were established for African 
workers using a paternalistic and reduced version 
of these principles (Hallowes and Munnik, 2006; 
Freund, 2015).46
The creation of the Iscor plant had begun under 
the patronage of General Smuts and Hendrik van der 
Bijl, but construction was completed by the National 
Party government, which had come to power in 1948. 
In 1947, Iscor had run into financial trouble as Smuts 
was only willing to fund one-third of the construction 
using the state fiscus. The National Party, however, 
demonstrated no such reluctance in creating state-
owned industry, and used the state to fully fund the 
project. The Vanderbijlpark steelworks opened in 1952, 
with a production capacity of 320 000 tons of steel per 
annum. It immediately showed profits, and continued 
expansion through the 1950s, supporting the rapid 
growth of the town of Vanderbijlpark (Leigh, 1968; 
Hallowes and Munnik, 2006).
The creation of Vanderbijlpark was, however, 
an immediate threat to Vereeniging and its 
45. The town planner was the well-known Roy Kantorowitch, who also designed the Cape Town Foreshore. 
46. Hallowes and Munnik (2006: 84) write that “Van der Bijl's metropolitan imagination indulged an ethnic fancy: the blocks of houses in 
Bophelong's residential areas were laid out “in the traditional 'kraal' formation”.
Photograph by World Bank Photo Collection
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privately-owned industries. The Vereeniging town 
council lobbied national government and helped 
broker a deal in which Iscor was given a controlling 
interest in USCO, in return for assigning the 
production of certain steels to the Vereeniging 
plant. This ensured the survival of USCO, and the 
continued growth of Vereeniging, but created a new 
monopoly on the production of steel in South Africa. 
After the war there was a further surge in industrial 
expansion in Vereeniging, with an influx of managers, 
engineers, technicians and artisans, which led to 
suburban expansion around the town (Leigh, 1968; 
Chaskalson, 1986).
In 1945, the long patronage of the Marks family 
came to an end when the Anglo American Corporation 
of South Africa bought out the firm Lewis & Marks, 
including its subsidiary, Vereeniging Estates. In 
the 1950s, Vereeniging benefitted from a highly 
strategic, growth-oriented, town council. Early 
in the decade, Duncanville was established as an 
industrial estate and it quickly emerged as one of the 
most favoured locations for industry nationwide.47 
Vereeniging was able to provide industrialists 
with a compelling package – an abundant supply of 
water from the Vaal Dam; power supplies from four 
local power stations; a location along South Africa’s 
major railway line, with rail sidings on all large 
industrial stands. The town council also assisted 
with growth by turning a blind eye to violations of 
influx control, and largely ignored pollution controls 
(Chaskalson, 1986). 
The next major development came with direct 
state investment in an oil-from-coal plant. The 
mining company Anglovaal had been exploring the 
possibility of synfuel production since the 1930s, 
but once the National Party came to power in 1948, 
it was clear that the state would not allow a private 
company to take the lead in this strategic venture. 
In late 1950, Sasol was incorporated as a state-
owned company, and the Sasol I plant was developed 
directly across the Vaal River from Vereeniging. It 
used a combination of German (Fischer-Tropsch) 
and American (Kellogg) technologies, and in 1955, 
produced its first petroleum fuel. The scheme nearly 
failed in this first decade, however, as costs were 
extremely high, there was a global oil glut, and the 
technology imported from the United States proved 
faulty (Sparks, 2012).
The town of Sasolburg was built in the early 
1950s to house Sasol’s white workers. It was 
planned by Swiss immigrant, Max Kirchhoefer, 
who was inspired by designs for British new towns. 
African workers were housed in Zamdela township, 
notoriously downwind from the chemical plants 
(Sparks, 2012). 
With the completion of Sasolburg, the three large 
industrial towns formed the Vaal Triangle. Apart 
from Iscor and Sasol, the state-owned electricity 
producer, Eskom, also invested heavily in the area, 
building the Taaibos and Highveld power stations 
and reinforcing this industrial and mining cluster. 
The 1950s were the halcyon days for the Vaal. In 
1959, for example, the mayor of Vereeniging called 
the growing agglomeration the “premier industrial 
centre of the Union” (cited by Chaskalson, 1986: 2). 
At the time, the Vaal Triangle seemed set to continue 
to develop as the leading industrial hub in South 
Africa outside the major cities of Johannesburg, 
Durban and Cape Town.
47. Chaskalson (1986) records that the price for an industrial plot in Duncanville industrial estate in Vereeniging was $700 per acre compared 
with $100 per acre for a similar plot in Springs on the East Rand.
"The town of Sasolburg was built in the early 1950s to 
house Sasol’s white workers. It was planned by Swiss 
immigrant, Max Kirchhoefer, who was inspired by 
designs for British new towns. African workers were 
housed in Zamdela township..."
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Political crisis and economic 
boom in the 1960s
The year 1960 began badly. On 21 January, a large 
section of the Coalbrook mine near Sasolburg 
caved in, killing 435 mineworkers. This was South 
Africa’s worst ever mining disaster and the mine 
was abandoned within the year. Then, on March 
21, 69 protesters were massacred outside the 
Sharpeville police station. The event reverberated 
nationally and internationally, with unrest 
spreading across the country. Prime Minister H.F. 
Verwoerd declared a State of Emergency, and banned 
the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC) (South African History 
Online, 2011b).
There was profound shock locally that the 
small ‘model township’ outside Vereeniging was 
the site of such a global furore. Sharpeville was, 
after all, tightly controlled, and there was no 
apparent history of political activity. The white 
administrators in the Vaal had missed the growing 
tensions in the township. For households moving 
from the relative freedom of Top Location, the 
tight controls of Sharpeville rankled, and when the 
PAC was founded as a militant breakaway from the 
ANC in 1959, it easily found support in Sharpeville 
(Chaskalson, 1986).
The Sharpeville massacre is recognised as one of 
the path-changing moments in South African history, 
but the local consequences are less well understood. 
Did the Sharpeville massacre scare off investors, and 
is that one of the reasons that, in the 1960s, the Vaal 
lost its premier position to the East Rand?  
The East Rand rode the wave of South Africa’s 
industrial boom in the 1960s, but while the Vaal 
Triangle continued to grow, it failed to diversify its 
industrial base to protect against a future downturn in 
the founding industries.
South Africa’s demand for steel increased 
consistently in the 1960s, supported by a booming 
national economy. To meet the growth in demand, 
Iscor’s third plant was built in Newcastle in Natal, 
in 1969, and there was also a second development 
phase at the Vanderbijlpark works between 1964 and 
1969.48 Some downstream industries, such as the 
wire-netting plant established adjacent to Iscor by 
the Kaplan family, also developed at Vanderbijlpark. 
As the steel-making industry expanded, so the urban 
complex diversified, although it still lacked the 
diversity of opportunity in the metropolitan core. In 
1966, for example, the University of Christian Higher 
Education at Potchefstroom set up a satellite campus 
in Vanderbijlpark.49
In the 1960s, Sasol solved its technological 
problems, and made new improvements to the 
technology, so that by the early 1970s it was selling 
licenses for oil-from-coal technological processes 
to international buyers. In his doctoral thesis, 
Stephen Sparks shows how the Sasol project fed 
into the “techno-nationalism” of apartheid South 
Africa. It was a source of white national pride, but 
also became central to the government’s attempts at 
self-sufficiency, once trade sanctions started to bite, 
eventually supplying 28 per cent of South Africa’s fuel 
needs (Sparks, 2012).
 
48. See www.www.arcelormittalsa.com. 
49. www.nwu.ac.za/content/history-potchefstroom-campus-potchefstroom-campus-nwu.
Photographs by Brian Boshoff
259
PART B
The South African government’s support of the 
development of an integrated petrochemical 
complex at Sasolburg was also linked to the 
economic empowerment of white Afrikaners. Sasol 
branched out into the development of by-products 
of the synfuel process, including the production of 
synthetic rubbers and fertilisers. Other companies 
established at Sasolburg were doing the same. In 
1964, for example, the IDC financed Karbochem, a 
subsidiary of Fedvolk, to develop a synthetic rubber 
plant in Sasolburg. Between 1968 and 1973, Natref 
constructed its large inland oil refinery at Sasolburg, 
funded by the IDC as a joint venture with Sasol and 
the Compagnie Française de Pétroles (Total), but also 
with the involvement of Afrikaner empowerment 
companies, Rembrandt, Volkskas and SA Mutual 
(Ndzamela, 2015). 
As the Vaal complex continued to grow, various 
attempts were made to ensure spatial co-ordination 
at a regional scale. In a major shift in policy, the 
government established Sebokeng in 1965, as a 
regional township in which all African residence was 
to be consolidated. The task of moving all the residents 
of Bophelong, Boipatong, Sharpeville and Everton to 
Sebokeng, proved to be extremely difficult, and in 1979, 
it was finally agreed to upgrade Sharpeville rather 
than relocate its residents.
The other rapidly emergent challenge was 
the growing levels of industrial pollution in the 
Vaal Triangle. Environmental controls were 
weak, nearly non-existent, until the Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention Act, 1965. From 1967, Sasol 
did introduce measures to curb the worst excesses, 
but in the early 1970s Sasolburg was still choking 
under clouds of noxious gas (Hallowes and 
Munnik, 2006). 
Socio-economic turbulence 
in the 1970s and 1980s
The 1970s brought a new, and far more difficult, global 
economic environment. The post-war era had been one 
of near sustained increase in global and domestic steel 
demand, with world steel consumption increasing 
from around 60 kg/capita in 1950, to over 140 kg/capita 
in 1973. The growth ended with the global oil crisis of 
1973, and a period of immense volatility followed, with 
the levels of demand in 1973 only exceeded again after 
2004 (Ispat Iscor, 2004).
Despite the economic troubles, Iscor continued 
with a major expansion of its Vanderbijlpark plant, 
doubling capacity between 1975 and 1983 (Hallowes 
and Munnik, 2006). The town of Vanderbijlpark 
continued to grow in the 1970s, with an extremely 
rapid average annual increase in population of 
12.68 per cent (although this also had to do with the 
expansion of Sebokeng) (Simkins, 2010). Neighbouring 
Vereeniging, however, experienced population decline 
at a rate of -2.41 per cent, per annum, as its industries, 
with less state protection, were disproportionately 
affected by the market troubles. Overall, and largely 
because of the expansion of the Iscor works, the 
Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark complex increased its 
share of the regional economy (present-day Gauteng) 
in the period 1970–1981, from 5.54 per cent to 6.37 per 
cent (Simkins, 2010).
While the global economic crisis impacted 
negatively on steel, it was a windfall for the synfuel 
industry, as oil prices surged, with Sasol becoming a 
highly profitable industry. Sasol’s major expansion, 
however, took place in Secunda, in present-day 
Mpumalanga, where two new plants were built 
(Sasol II and Sasol III). In Sasolburg, the major 
new development was the completion of the Natref 
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refinery in 1973. Other downstream industries were 
also established, including the Sentrachem plant 
which produces PVC.
In 1979, Sasol became one of the first state-
owned enterprises to be privatised. The company 
was listed on the JSE, with the state retaining 30 
per cent of the shares, and 70 per cent being sold 
to private shareholders. This inaugurated a new 
era for the company, and for the town, with many 
uncertainties. The company moved its headquarters 
from Sasolburg to Rosebank, in Johannesburg, 
which generated considerable anxiety locally, and 
the fear that Sasol would be less committed to its 
place of origin than before (Hallowes and Munnik, 
2006; Sparks, 2012).
The 1980s proved to be a difficult decade 
for the Vaal Triangle. On 31 May 1980, the 
ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 
attacked the Sasol and Natref plants in Sasolburg 
with spectacular visual effect. Damage was 
limited but it was a psychological blow to the 
apartheid government. 
In 1982 and 1983, South Africa plunged into a 
deep recession from which it never fully recovered 
until after the end of apartheid. Iscor was in trouble. 
In 1983, expansion plans at Vanderbijlpark were 
put on hold. Troubles deepened in 1985 after Chase 
Manhattan Bank recalled its loans to South Africa, and 
Iscor lost much of its international market. Faced with 
a serious oversupply of steel, Iscor mothballed its plant 
at Newcastle, and also the two oldest blast furnaces in 
Pretoria. Only Vanderbijlpark was spared (Hallowes 
and Munnik, 2006).
"The company moved its headquarters from  
Sasolburg to Rosebank, in Johannesburg, which 
generated considerable anxiety locally, and the  
fear that Sasol would be less committed to its place  
of origin than before..."
Photographs by Brian Boshoff (Petrochemical complex in Sasolburg)
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The Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark complex continued 
growing economically, but at a lower rate than 
the regional economy. Its share of the regional 
economy fell back in the period 1981–1994, from 
6.37 per cent to 5.94 per cent (Simkins, 2010).50 
The economic slowdown coincided with increased 
political mobilisation in the Vaal townships. In 
September 1984, police in the Vaal Triangle opened 
fire on a crowd protesting the introduction of the 
tricameral parliament, leaving 30 people dead. This 
event sparked a nationwide rebellion, with 600 dead 
within a year, and the government declaring a State 
of Emergency.51
There were also troubles in Sasolburg. In 1987, 
workers at the Sasol I and Natref plants went on an 
unprotected strike and 2 400 workers were dismissed, 
losing their company housing in Zamdela township. 
Although facts remain murky, there were claims 
that around 77 individuals were killed in police 
action during the strike, and comparisons have been 
drawn recently to the killings at Marikana in 2012.52 
Attitudes in the local white community hardened. 
In 1985, the extreme far right Herstigte Nasionale 
Party (HNP) won a parliamentary by-election 
in Sasolburg.53
Volatility in the 1990s until 
the 2008 recession
In 1989, Iscor was privatised and listed on the JSE, 
finally ending the era of state-controlled industry 
in the Vaal Triangle. From then on, industry in the 
Vaal Triangle had to navigate the turbulent winds 
of the national and global economies without direct 
state protection.54
In 1991, Iscor gained full control of the USCO 
plant at Vereeniging, and renamed it the Vereeniging 
Iscor works. However, despite this expansion, the 
newly-privatised corporation was in trouble. Iscor had 
developed behind the barriers of steep tariffs, and with 
the support of a range of state subsidies. It was a highly 
inefficient company in global terms as it provided 
the full range of steel types for the small, protected 
domestic market, which meant many high-cost and 
short-production runs. When South Africa joined 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, tariff 
levels for imported steel were reduced from 30 per 
cent to 5 per cent, with cost benefits for South African 
consumers, but with grave implications for Iscor 
(Hallowes and Munnik, 2006).
In the period 1994–2001, Iscor embarked on a 
major re-engineering process to contain costs and 
increase productivity. Inefficient production units 
were closed; steel grades were reduced from 302 to 50; 
and across its production plants, the workforce was 
reduced from 44 000 to only 12 200. At the same time, 
Iscor, with IDC funding, built a new state-of-the-art 
steel mill at Saldanha (Ispat Iscor, 2004; Hallowes 
and Munnik, 2006).
In 1998, the troubles at Iscor were compounded 
by the ‘Asian Crisis’, which saw global steel markets 
plummeting. In 2001, Iscor was strategically 
unbundled into steel production (remaining as Iscor) 
and mining (Kumba Iron Ore) but still, the future 
of the company was not assured. With the possible 
demise of Iscor, the South African government 
brokered a rescue deal with the international steel 
magnate, Lackshmi Mittal. In 2001, Mittal’s LNM 
Holdings took a 35 per cent share in Iscor, becoming 
a majority shareholder in 2004 (Hallowes and 
Munnik, 2006). A period of corporate restructuring 
followed, with Iscor renamed as Ispat Iscor Ltd, and 
then Mittal Steel Company NV. In 2006, the French 
50. The average annual population growth for the period 1980–1985 was 1.29 per cent for Vereeniging, and 3.44 per cent for Vanderbijlpark. The 
figures for 1985–1991 were 4.07 per cent for Vereeniging, and 3.07 per cent for Vanderbijlpark (Simkins, 2010). 
51. On 3 September, the new tricameral parliament was opened in Cape Town, with representation for white, coloured and Indian people, but 
excluding black Africans. This provoked the Vaal Civic Association to organise boycotts, stayaways and protests. Violence in the Vaal townships 
continued into the early 1990s, with civil conflict between supporters of the ANC and the IFP, including the Boipatong massacre of 1992, in 
which 42 township residents were killed by supporters of the IFP living in hostels. 
52. See the statement by the Khulumani Support Group, 4 September 2012. Online at http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=58219. 
53. Sasolburg was the only parliamentary constituency where the HNP ever gained a seat. The HNP was even more extreme than the 
Conservative Party.  
54. See the ArcelorMittal website: http://www.arcelormittalsa.com
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steel giant, Arcelor, announced its decision to merge 
with Mittal Steel,55 with the new transnational giant 
being named ArcelorMittal, and the South African 
subsidiary named ArcelorMittal South Africa 
(ArcelorMittal SA).56
ArcelorMittal SA began well as global steel 
prices reached an all-time high in 2004, with 
expanding demand from China offering a new 
era of growth. The steel market proved volatile, 
however, as demand slumped in the wake of the 2008 
global crisis. The production of liquid steel at the 
Vanderbijlpark works dropped dramatically from 
nearly one million tons (997 000 tons) to just under 
half a million tons (428 000 tons) (ArcelorMittal, 
2012). The share price of ArcelorMittal SA dropped 
dramatically from around R250 a share in 2007, 
to R70 in 2008.
The economic turbulence through the 1990s 
and 2000s led to a contraction of the economy in the 
Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark complex, which now fell 
under the Sedibeng District Municipality and the 
Emfuleni Local Municipality. Through this period, and 
up until 2008, the economy of the Sedibeng District 
Municipality had largely been tracking changes in the 
national economy, but with a slower growth rate. The 
2009 recession was, however, experienced far more 
severely in Sedibeng than nationally, as the market 
for steel is highly sensitive to growth fluctuations. 
Whereas the national economy experienced a slight 
contraction in 2009 (-1.5 per cent) the contraction 
for Sedibeng’s economy was severe (-7.6 per cent). 
Urban Econ (using Quantec data) calculated a 6 per 
cent decline in the value of manufacturing at constant 
prices between 2006 and 2011, with other sectors 
showing only marginal growth (Sedibeng District 
Municipality, 2012).
Vereeniging had surprisingly high levels of 
population growth in the 1990s57 but this was largely 
because Orange Farm, an area of large-scale state-
subsidised housing development, despite its spatial 
and economic marginality, was incorporated into the 
municipal area. Vanderbijlpark’s population grew 
modestly in the early 1990s, but then contracted 
sharply during the period 1996–2001, with an annual 
change of -7.29 per cent. Vanderbijlpark, the town most 
directly dependent on ArcelorMittal employment, was 
most severely affected by re-engineering processes. 
Simkins (2010) reports that population growth in the 
Vaal was nearly stagnant in the period 2001–2007, 
with population growth for Sedibeng municipality 
only 0.1 per cent, per annum, in this period. The 2011 
Census also indicated marginal growth. However, 
there were differences within the Vaal Triangle, 
with population growth continuing in Sasolburg and 
Zamdela township, and some growth in the towns 
of Vanderbijlpark and Vereeniging as well, but real 
decline in the populations of Sebokeng, Evaton and 
smaller townships. 
While the Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark complex 
has had a turbulent recent history, Sasolburg 
continued to expand as an integrated chemical-
manufacturing complex. Sasol lost its direct state 
55. Mittal Steel was an amalgamation of Ispat International and LNM Holdings. 
56. ArcelorMittal website: http://www.arcelormittalsa.com/Portals/0/The-History-of-ArcelorMittal-South-Africa.pdf 
57. 7.53 per cent per annum for 1991–1996, and 12.61 per cent per annum for 1996–2001 (Simkins, 2010). 
"While major concerns remained, Sasol was 
however able to improve its environmental 
record by piping natural gas from Mozambique, 
partially replacing the use of coal as feedstock."
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support in 1999 when the mechanisms of the Fuel 
Equalisation Fund, which supported Sasol during 
periods of low oil prices, were phased out, but it 
maintained a competitive advantage through its 
access to a private supply of cheap coal (Hallowes 
and Munnik, 2006).58 More importantly, the newly 
privatised Sasol went global, creating a web of 
partnerships with major international players in 
the petrochemical and chemical industries such as 
ChevronTexaco, Total and Mitsubishi, and listing on 
the New York Stock Exchange in 2003. While much of 
Sasol’s expansion was international – in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Australia, and the United States – there 
was significant new investment in Sasolburg. In the 
1990s and into the 2000s, both Sasol and Karbochem 
expanded wax production, with Sasolburg being 
referred to as the emergent “wax capital of the world” 
(Engineering News, 23 May 2003). Later plans aimed 
to double the already significant wax production 
capacity (Engineering News, 16 April 2014). In 
2010, Sasol began construction on its own gas-fired 
power-generating plant that would ensure at least 
60 per cent self-sufficiency for Sasolburg, and in the 
same year, approval was granted for construction 
of a new ethylene purification unit in Sasolburg 
(Engineering News, 22 November 2010).59 The risks 
remain, however, as the future of Sasolburg rests 
largely on boardroom decisions within Sasol that are 
largely beyond the ability of the local council, or local 
communities, to influence.
During this turbulent decade, environmental 
issues moved centre stage. There was, for example, 
the protracted ‘David and Goliath’ battle over the 
alleged destruction of so-called Steel Valley by soil, 
groundwater and air pollution from the ArcelorMittal 
plant. By the late 1990s, many of the 600 small-scale 
farmers in Steel Valley had abandoned their allegedly 
poisoned land, but a handful remained, establishing 
the Steel Valley Crisis Committee and forming 
an alliance with other environmental protection 
groupings nationally in a bitter struggle to compel 
ArcelorMittal to meet its environmental obligations 
(Fourie, 2014). Sasol had also come under increasing 
scrutiny from environmental groupings. Around 2002, 
the Sasolburg Air Quality Monitoring Committee was 
established, which joined up with civic action agencies 
in areas across South Africa affected by industrial air 
pollution (Mail & Guardian, 9 October 2003). Sasol was 
also criticised for its contribution to greenhouse gas 
emissions, and in 2009, Earthlife Africa led climate 
protests in Sasolburg (Earthlife Africa, 2009). While 
major concerns remained, Sasol was however able to 
improve its environmental record by piping natural 
gas from Mozambique, partially replacing the use of 
coal as feedstock.
58. There was also ad hoc support from government including a major investment from the IDC in the 865 km gas line from the Mozambique gas 
fields to Secunda. 
59. See the Sasol website for updated information, www.sasol.co.za.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff  (Sasolburg is still growing)
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The current woes (and some 
glimmers of hope)
There was a partial recovery in the steel industry 
from 2009 to around 2012, but since then, there 
has been steady deterioration. The tough reality 
is that South Africa is a marginal player in the 
global steel market, and is pummelled by external 
forces. South Africa produces around 6.4 million 
tonnes of steel per annum, compared with the 1 
640 million tonnes produced globally, and the 804 
million tonnes produced in China (World Steel 
Association, 2016).
When China’s manufacturing and construction 
industries were booming, the massive production in 
China was not even adequate for local demand, and 
global steel prices increased. However, as China’s 
industries slumped, Chinese steel producers turned 
to export markets to sell surplus production. In three 
years, Chinese exports doubled to 107 million tonnes, 
which is more than total US annual production. By 
mid-2015 there was a 240-million-ton oversupply 
of steel on world markets (World Steel Association, 
2016). As cheap Chinese-produced steel flooded 
international markets, the viability of many steel 
producers was thrown into question. In 2015, for 
example, United States Steel cut 5 000 jobs and warned 
that thousands of others are at risk. (The New York 
Times, 3 May 2016). In the UK, Tata Steel announced 
the sale of its steel plants in South Wales putting 15 
000 jobs at risk.
The largest steel company in the world, 
ArcelorMittal, announced an annual loss of nearly $8 
billion in February 2016. This is, of course, the mother 
company to ArcelorMittal SA, which also experienced 
a severe slump. In July 2015, following a 1 400 per 
cent increase in loss per share in the six months 
to June, ArcelorMittal SA raised the possibility of 
plant closure and entered into emergency talks with 
government (SABC News, 24 July 2015). By mid-2015, 
ArcelorMittal SA had a share price of only around R10, 
a tiny fraction of what it once was, while the declared 
value of ArcelorMittal SA had reportedly collapsed 
from R60 billion at the height of the commodities boom 
in 2007, to little more than R5 billion in mid-2015 
(Business Times, 12 July 2015). Facing job losses of 
around 30 000, including 7 000 at Vanderbijlpark, the 
National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) entered 
the fray, placing pressure on government to intervene 
(SABC News, 24 August 2015). In September 2015, 
South Africa’s second-largest steel producer, Evraz 
Highveld Steel and Vanadium, based in Witbank 
on the Mpumalanga highveld, went into business 
rescue, and there were reports that ArcelorMittal 
SA was on the brink of closing its Vanderbijlpark 
plant (Business Day, 1 September 2015). At year end, 
ArcelorMittal SA announced an R8.5 billion loss, 
compared with a R158 million loss in 2014 (IOL, 
16 March 2016). 
In November 2015, under immense pressure, the 
South African government agreed to place a 10 per 
cent tariff on some steel imports and considered the 
possibility of ensuring that only local steel is used for 
state-funded infrastructure projects (Bloomberg, 6 
November 2016). The tariffs were welcomed, but it was 
not certain whether they would work as it was said that 
Chinese imports were coming in at 25 per cent cheaper 
"There was a partial recovery in the steel industry 
from 2009 to around 2012, but since then, there  
has been steady deterioration. The tough reality is that 
South Africa is a marginal player in the global steel 
market..."
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than the cost of production in South Africa (Mineweb, 
3 September 2015). There was bad news in February 
2016 when Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium 
announced it was closing shop (Engineering News, 
5 February 2016), and in March 2016, around 2 000 
steel workers received retrenchment letters (Witbank 
News, 3 March 2016).
By April 2016 there were mixed signals from 
global steel markets. There were intense, although still 
ongoing, discussions at international level, and, at best, 
preliminary signs of reduced production in China. 
However, 2016 was still looking to be a tough year, 
but with some hope of recovery in 2017 (World Steel 
Association, 2016).
The situation was not as dire across the Vaal 
River in Sasolburg. The low fuel price had knocked 
24 per cent off Sasol’s earnings, but the company was 
proving to be fairly resilient. As Sasol leaned more 
towards chemicals, it had become less dependent on 
oil-price fluctuations (Engineering News, 23 October 
2015). With continued expansion of the petrochemical 
and chemicals complex, Sasolburg was in a relatively 
privileged economic position, and the communities 
living in and around the town had something to defend. 
In 2013, the proposed merger of Metsimaholo Local 
Municipality (Sasolburg) with the poorer Ngwathe 
Local Municipality (Parys) provoked violent protests 
in Sasolburg’s Zamdela township (Business Day, 
30 January 2014).
While the steel industry has been turbulent, 
the Vaal has seen expansion in other industries. 
Since 1951, Meyerton has been the site of the 
Samancor (previously Amcor) metalloy plant. In 
2013, with the support of the DTI Tax Allowance 
Programme, Samancor invested R1 billion in a 
large new furnace at the plant to enable its strategic 
global partner, BHP Billiton, to beneficiate the 
manganese ore it mines in South Africa (Mining 
Weekly, 6 March 2013). In Walkerville, a cluster of 
small holdings north of Meyerton,60 the Dutch brewer, 
Heineken, invested R3.5 billion in a mega brewery 
in partnership with Diageo Highlands and Namibia 
Breweries Ltd. Heineken explored the possibilities 
of investing in the metropolitan municipalities of 
Gauteng, but was finally attracted to Walkerville 
by the availability of large tracts of land and the 
quick approval process offered by the Midvaal 
Local Municipality. The brewery opened in 2010 
(Erasmus, 2010).
Retail has been a visible growth sector 
although some of the apparent growth may have 
come from the shift in activity from the historical 
CBDs of Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark, which 
are experiencing various degrees of decay and 
dilapidation (Sedibeng District Municipality, 
2011), to new large malls on the edge of the towns 
and in the townships. The newly-developed malls 
include River Square Centre (39 322 m2 GLA) and 
Sebokeng Plaza (11 379 m2 GLA) in Vereeniging, and 
Vaal Park (18 500 m2 GLA) and Vaal Mall (48 000 
m2 GLA) in Vanderbijlpark (FGX Studios, 2013). 
There is also anticipated growth in the high-end 
residential sector, with the planned development of 
Vaal River City (‘hydropolis’), a R4 billion investment 
in residential and commercial development, with 
infrastructure planning initiated in March 2015. 
However, the continued success of retail and 
residential development will be strongly affected 
by developments in other sectors of the economy, 
including steel.
Conclusion 
The well-established pattern is of a large metal-
producing complex around Vereeniging and 
Vanderbijlpark that is buffeted by the extreme 
volatility of the global steel market, and a smaller 
petrochemicals cluster around Sasolburg that 
continues to expand and produce profits, but which 
60. Walkerville is roughly halfway between Vereeniging and Johannesburg, within the jurisdiction of the Sedibeng district municipality and 
Midvaal local municipality.
Photograph by Gareth Pon
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is highly capital-intensive and is not a major job 
creator. On the margins of the Vaal Triangle, there 
are points of growth – Meyerton and Walkerville 
– where individual companies have invested 
heavily to benefit from local institutional and 
geographic qualities.
The major lessons come from the long trajectory 
of history. This is a district where the state has driven 
growth through direct investments in infrastructure 
and manufacturing. However, the state’s locational 
decisions followed strategic investments and 
manoeuvres of a brilliant private entrepreneur, 
Sammy Marks, who knew how to draw in the patronage 
of the state. By the 1970s, the Vaal Triangle was 
massively dependent on state-owned industry. The 
main challenges came in the 1980s, when economic 
ideologies shifted away from the acceptance of an 
interventionist state, and when economic growth, 
which provided the demand for the products these 
industries produced, faltered.
The withdrawal of the state from these industries 
had mixed outcomes, even within the Vaal Triangle. 
The steel-making complex was severely affected by the 
rationalisation that followed privatisation and removal 
of protective subsidies, but even in this case, it was the 
state-brokered deal with transnational industry that 
ensured its survival. Sasol was far more successful 
than Iscor in managing the transition from state to 
private ownership, becoming a global player, but also 
continuing to invest in Sasolburg, its home base. The 
new growth that has emerged at points in the Vaal 
Triangle in recent times has been led by the private 
sector, but plainly facilitated by the state – through the 
tax incentives of the DTI in the case of Samancor, and 
the active support of a municipality in the case of the 
Heineken brewery. 
The patterns of development seem set for the 
foreseeable future – at best, the Vaal Triangle may be 
an area of moderate growth, but with volatile swings 
in its economy. The new vision for the district may 
have positive spin-offs over the longer term, but the key 
question is how the ambitious plans for new residential 
development in the area will relate to economic 
change. Will the Vaal Triangle return to growth or 
will new development lead to expanded dormitory 
towns, with increased long-distance commuting to the 
metropolitan core?
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4. Revisiting the decentralised growth points 
(Babelegi and Bronkhorstspruit) 
4.1 Industrial decentralisation 
as context
The immediate context is the legacy of the apartheid 
government’s policies of industrial decentralisation. At 
one level, this experience of industrial decentralisation 
is idiosyncratic, closely related to Verwoerdian 
dreams of ‘grand apartheid’. At another level, however, 
industrial decentralisation policies were common to a 
number of countries internationally, and the outcomes 
and legacies of decentralisation policies in South 
Africa may contribute to a wider understanding of 
the longer-term impacts of now abandoned regional 
industrial policies. 
South Africa’s programme of industrial 
decentralisation was driven mainly by ideological 
and political objectives, but it was partly rationalised 
in terms of a global discourse on ‘regional balance’. 
The Tomlinson Commission Report of 1955,61 argued 
for the decentralisation of industry to selected sites 
within the African homelands, to ensure the economic 
viability of these entities. Verwoerd, however, would 
not accept the notion of ‘white investment’ within 
the homelands, and in 1960, introduced a ‘border 
industry’ programme. White industrialists received 
incentives to locate within a range of “thirty miles 
of Bantu areas”, requiring Africans to commute 
daily across the border into “white South Africa” 
(Harrison, 1998).
The approach was unsuccessful. As Bell 
(1984) observes, the percentage of manufacturing 
employment in major industrial centres actually 
increased between 1956/7 and 1965/6 from 79.6 
to 81.9. This forced a rethink and the Promotion of 
Economic Development of the Homelands Act, 1968, 
allowed for the introduction of white-owned business 
into the homelands on an agency basis, meaning 
that white industrialists could not own land but 
had reasonable tenure security through a leasehold 
system. The first of the industrial growth points 
within a homeland was Babelegi in Bophuthatswana, 
which opened in 1970. This change in policy marked 
a turning point. Bell (1984) refers to a decline in the 
employment concentration in the major industrial 
centres from 81.9 per cent in 1965/6 to 76.9 per 
cent in 1978/9.
There was a further policy shift in the early 
1980s as P.W. Botha’s reformist and pro-market 
administration concentrated incentives in a 
limited number of industrial points with proven 
potential, including those on the edges of major 
metropolitan agglomerations (which become known 
as deconcentration points). The incentives were also 
restructured to reward profitable enterprises. The 
decentralisation process gained momentum in the 
1980s, with the percentage of industrial employment 
in decentralisation/deconcentration points doubling, 
and notable success in places like Isithebe, Newcastle/
Madadeni and Ladysmith/Ezakheni in KwaZulu-
Natal; Phuthaditjhaba and Qwa Qwa in the homelands 
around the Free State; and Babelegi, Bronkhorstspruit-
Ekandustria, Rosslyn, and Brits in present-day 
Gauteng. A significant shift was the relocation of 
labour-intensive manufacturing from East Asia, 
and especially from Taiwan, into the South African 
periphery (Hart, 2002).
Despite this apparent success, there was a 
growing critique of the decentralisation policy as an 
economically inefficient and ineffective programme. 
State incentives were criticised for distorting 
locational decision-making and for creating growth 
points that were not sustainable (for example, Urban 
Foundation, 1991). There was a counterview to this 
classically liberal argument which drew on radical 
thought on the expansion of capitalism, which argued 
that South Africa’s regional policy actively supported 
the interests of industry, assisting firms in moving 
61. Officially known as the Report for the Commission for Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa.
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to low-cost production sites where land and labour 
was cheap. Bell (1984: 15) refers to “spontaneous 
industrial decentralisation” which was facilitated 
by, but not dependent on, the state’s industrial 
incentives. This early assessment was followed in 
the 1990s by other contributions that argued that 
regional industrial policy had enabled industry 
to survive the prolonged recession of the 1980s by 
enabling the move to low-cost locations, and had 
produced a mixed bag of outcomes, including both 
greater levels of labour exploitation, but also new 
opportunities for certain categories of workers such as 
unskilled African women in spatially marginal areas 
(Jaffee, 1988 Rogerson, 1988; Pickles, 1991; Platzky, 
1992; Todes, 1998).
Even as these scholars were pointing to 
unforeseen (possibly) positive outcomes, industrial 
decentralisation policies were abandoned.62 The 
concern with regional balance was not entirely 
lost, however, with post-apartheid Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDIs) (for example, 
the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), 
Industrial Development Zones (IDZs), and 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) promoting 
development outside the major metropolitan 
regions (Todes, 2013).
With the policy shift, scholarly interest in the 
historical industrial development points waned. There 
was some reference to the varied fates of these areas in 
the media but there has been no systematic scholarly 
analysis. As a result, we have little understanding 
of the legacy of the apartheid-era investments in 
decentralised industry. The few available studies 
do point to a significant decline in places, but have 
these points collapsed? Phalatse (2000, 2001) writes 
of “abandoned industrial spaces” in the Mogwase 
industrial area in North West Province, and of the 
effects of the disappearance of industry on the lives 
of the women who previously worked in the factories. 
Greg Mills describes the decline of Dimbaza in the 
former Ciskei homeland: "The Dimbaza industrial 
park wilted and died. Today, there are just three 
factories operating where once there were 200. Many 
buildings have been picked clean, like vrot animals in 
the veld. The railway has stopped running" (Mail & 
Guardian, 17 June 2011).
The inopportune coincidence of the withdrawal 
of incentives, trade liberalisation, accelerated 
urbanisation, and severed relations with Taiwan, 
most likely explains this decline, although there 
are differences in the sparse literature over which 
factors are most important. Without a systematic 
study of former growth points there is little basis for 
comparison. Did some places avoid the worst because 
of real locational advantage? Did some places decline 
but revive in later years? These questions prompted 
us to explore the experience of the former homeland 
growth points on the edge of Gauteng, using Babelegi 
and Bronkhorstspruit (including Ekandustria and 
Ekangala) as our case studies.
4.2 The Babelegi story
Introducing Babelegi
Babelegi is an industrial estate that was established 
under apartheid in the Bophuthatswana homeland. 
It is surrounded by a complex of formal and 
informal settlements, including Hammanskraal, 
Temba, Ramotse and Mandela Village. It lies 56 
km to the north of Pretoria, in Gauteng Province, 
having been transferred from the jurisdiction of 
North West Province. Since the inter-provincial 
transfer, it has fallen under the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality. It is close to the N1 
and also a provincial road, but its rail access was 
recently terminated.
In 2011, the urban complex immediately around 
Babelegi had a population of 102 917, 25,3 per cent 
greater than the population of 82 083 in 2001. The 
major concentrations of people were in Temba (58 
434), Hammanskraal (21 434) and Ramotse (15 
760). With a 2013 GVA of R3.8 million, the measured 
economy is small, dominated by retail, followed 
by manufacturing.
62. The decentralisation programme was significantly downgraded in 1991 and then abolished in 1996.
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Figure 76: Locating the Babelegi-Temba-Hammanskraal complex
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Homeland development and 
displaced urbanisation 
The story of Babelegi is inextricably tied to the 
homeland policies of the apartheid-era South African 
government. Bophuthatswana was formalised as a 
homeland for the Tswana-speaking people in 1961, 
and in 1977 became the second of South Africa’s 
homelands to accept ‘independence’. The need 
to secure an economic base for these homelands 
was a key driver of the industrial decentralisation 
programme. The development of Babelegi, in 
particular, was intended as the economic base of 
the Moretele-Odi block of Bophuthatswana, which 
was the closest to the metropolitan cities of the 
PWV. This was a site of displaced urbanisation, with 
a complex mix of rural densification, peri-urban 
development, and resettlement townships (Rogerson, 
1974; Van Huyssteen, 2001; Van Huyssteen et al., 
2010; Tiro, 2014).
Impressive growth in the  
1970s and 1980s
The development of Babelegi began almost 
immediately after the promulgation of the Promotion 
of Economic Development of the Homelands Act, 
1968, with the layout and physical infrastructure 
of the estate being completed by 1970. There were 
ambitious plans for industrial employment of 40 000 
by the year 2000, and Babelegi did, in fact, develop 
quickly. In 1970, the first ten factories, employing 
1 370 workers, opened their doors. The number of 
workers increased to 8 300 in 1977; 14 500 in 1982; 
and 17 000 in 1994 (Wellings and Black, 1986; Die 
Beeld, 19 June 1994; Tiro, 2014). Babelegi was the 
most successful industrial development point within 
a homeland, and was the only homeland growth point 
where investment by private capital exceeded that 
by the homeland development corporation (Wellings 
and Black, 1986).
Babelegi, like other growth points, had the 
advantage of low cost, non-unionised labour and 
generous state support for industrialists. It was 
reported, for example, that an entry-level wage in 
1971 for a beginner in a clothing factory was R3 
a week, far lower than the R7.50 set down by the 
Industrial Clothing Council of the Transvaal, while 
the Industrial Conciliation Act, which regulated 
labour conditions, was effectively suspended in the 
homeland (Rand Daily Mail, 29 October 1971). The 
incentives included low interest on loans to finance 
assets, cheap factory leasing rates, assistance with 
relocation costs, transport subsidies and tax rebates 
(Wellings and Black, 1986). In these respects, Babelegi 
was no different from the other growth points. But it 
had the considerable additional advantage of relative 
proximity to the metropolitan cities of Pretoria and 
the Witwatersrand, and good links via road and 
rail. Nevertheless, while low-end manufacturing 
dominated in Babelegi, with businesses taking 
advantage of low labour costs and generous 
incentives, there was also higher-end industry, 
including component manufacturing for the emergent 
motor vehicle cluster around Pretoria (Wellings 
and Black, 1986).
As Babelegi grew, so did Temba and other 
settlements in the broader urban complex emerging 
around Hammanskraal. Tiro (2014: 25) reflects 
with an edge of nostalgia, and a sense of irony, on 
this development: 
While Temba predates the industrial estate, it 
is at the same time its product … Things got even 
better for the Temba residents when Babelegi 
was established. The most vivid and abiding 
memory of the time is that of the buzz in the 
streets, with masses of people walking to and 
from work, taxis hooting for passengers and 
buses rumbling past in the mornings. These are 
the days that seem to evoke melancholy among 
locals and make them muse over the good olden 
days. The irony is not lost on me as this was at the 
height of apartheid.
The ‘independence’ of Bophuthatswana in 1977 
was a further boost to the growth of Babelegi. 
This industrial estate was one of the economic 
flagships of the homeland government, and 
received strong support from the Bophuthatswana 
Development Corporation.
Wind down in the 1990s
The crunch came with political change in the 
mid-1990s when Bophuthatswana was re-incorporated 
into South Africa. The new ANC-led government 
withdrew the incentives which had supported industry 
in the homelands, and also sharply reduced tariff 
protection for industries such as clothing, textile 
and footwear, in line with the new obligations that 
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followed South Africa’s membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994. Industries in 
Babelegi thus suffered a double blow, with Taiwanese-
owned industries also being hit by the severing 
of diplomatic relations between South Africa and 
Taiwan in 1997.
Babelegi declined sharply. The first to leave were 
the fly-by-night operators who had little interest 
in the location apart from the low wages, high 
labour subsidies, and tax holidays. The North West 
Development Corporation (NWDC), which took over 
the administration of the estate from Bophuthatswana, 
reported that 6 050 workers were employed in 
Babelegi in June 2012, sharply down from the peak of 
17 000, and that only 86 of the 325 sites in the estate 
still had a functioning enterprise (Tiro, 2014). This 
represented around one-third of the employment in 
the early 1990s but did not indicate total collapse,63 
unlike the case of Dimbaza in the Eastern Cape, for 
example, where only three of 200 factories remained 
open after the removal of incentives (Tiro, 2014). 
The NWDC’s financial reports indicate that Babelegi 
continued to turn a small profit for the provincial 
government (Tiro, 2014).
Nevertheless, for residents living in the greater 
Hammanskraal area, the loss of two-thirds of local 
industrial employment was calamitous. As Tiro 
(2014: 37) reports: 
The residents have watched in horror as the 
industrial complex wilted and, to all intents and 
purposes, became something of a ghost town. 
Often an argument surfaces that under Mangope, 
who was president of Bophuthatswana from 
‘independence’ in 1977 until 1994, things were 
better with Babelegi vibrant and jobs available 
as a result. The argument is simplistic but is 
difficult to dispel nonetheless … Apart from a 
new multi-million-rand shopping mall and the 
odd school, clinic and new informal settlements, 
nothing of serious consequence has happened here 
for some two decades – nothing that has brought 
any tangible joy for the 340 000-odd residents 
of this sprawling conglomerate of settlements, 
falling under the City of Tshwane municipality, 
surrounding Babelegi. If anything, things seem 
to have regressed. The ruinous condition of 
the area’s industrial estate best illustrates the 
state of affairs.
Although Tiro (2014: 37) paints a bleak picture of the 
decline of Babelegi, he also makes the comment that 
“all is not lost”. Some form of renewal is happening 
in Babelegi and this requires careful explanation. In 
the 1990s, even as Babelegi was in decline, a few large 
companies recognised possible competitive advantage 
in the estate. In 1999, for example, Tiger Wheels Ltd 
invested R315 million in a new plant in Babelegi, 
and the Swiss transnational corporation, Nestlé, 
bought a non-dairy creamer factory in Babelegi from 
a struggling company. These investments had very 
different outcomes though.
Industrial closures and 
renewal in the 2000s
The tale of the Tiger Wheels plant in Babelegi 
in the 2000s is grim and has been cited as an 
example of South Africa’s overall failure to compete 
internationally in the manufacturing sector (Ganley 
and Mills, 2011). Tiger Wheels started production of 
cast-aluminium automotive wheels on a small-scale 
in 1972, and in 1979 relocated its production facility 
to Babelegi. The company did well initially, but when 
it experienced difficulties in South Africa, it went 
global, buying out German and American companies 
that had their own production facilities, and opening 
a factory in Poland. By 2006, Tiger Wheels was one of 
the top ten alloy wheel manufacturers worldwide, with 
a peak annual production of 7 000 000 wheels, and an 
annual turnover of R3.8 billion. The company survived 
tough competition from expanding Chinese producers 
since the short, just-in-time lead times required by 
63. There were claims, however, that the Babelegi estate reached a low point of only 2 000 workers (for example, Bloom, 2011).
"The first to leave were the fly-by-night operators who 
had little interest in the location apart from the low 
wages, high labour subsidies, and tax holidays. "
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South Africa’s growing motor vehicle manufacturers 
favoured a domestic producer.64 The trouble had 
already begun in 2000, however, when a key supplier, 
Richards Bay’s aluminium smelter, stopped producing 
locally-sourced alloys that qualified for rebates in 
terms of the DTI’s Motor Industry Development 
Programme (MIDP). With increased input costs, South 
African production sites lost much of their competitive 
advantage (Die Volksblad, 1 March 2000; Ganley 
and Mills, 2011). 
Tiger Wheels reported that losses at its Babelegi 
plant were negating the profits the company was 
making elsewhere, with the unacceptably high 
reject rate identified as the main cause of the losses 
(Tiger Wheels, 2002). The reality was that the plants 
in Germany and the USA were also performing 
poorly, and it was only in low-wage, reasonably 
high-productivity Poland, that the company was 
doing well. Ganley and Mills (2011: 18) write that 
“an unskilled floor sweeper in Babelegi earned 
more than a graduate fresh out of university in 
Poland”. Between 1999 and 2004, 400 workers 
were retrenched at the Tiger Wheels plant, and in 
2004, there was an announcement of a further 700 
retrenchments (NUMSA, 2004). In 2004, a national 
newspaper in India commented on the difficulties 
facing the company and what this indicated 
about South Africa: 
It is hiring again, but not in South Africa, where one 
person in four is jobless. Instead, it has a new plant 
in Alabama, is looking to open another in China and 
may expand its subsidiary’s factory in Poland. South 
Africa’s failure to keep jobs like that at home and to 
stimulate new ones is turning into one of the biggest 
disappointments of the post-apartheid era (The Hindu, 
15 March 2004). 
In 2007, Tiger Wheels’ German subsidiary, ATS 
Beteiligungs, filed for liquidation, and this, together 
with continued losses at Babelegi and the USA 
plants, brought the firm to its knees. In July 2007, 
Tiger Wheels asked the JSE to suspend trading of 
its shares (TMC News, 17 July 2007). The Babelegi 
plant finally closed in 2008, with the company 
blaming a combination of low skills, high labour 
costs and local crime (Tiro, 2014). An international 
news report referred to this as a case of a South 
African firm exporting jobs to a more profitable 
non-South African location (New York Times, 
13 March 2004).
The closure of the Tiger Wheels plant may have 
marked the lowest point in the history of Babelegi 
but there were positive changes in the offing. A 
key institutional change was a decision by the 
Municipal Demarcations Board in 2005 to redraw 
provincial boundaries, transferring Babelegi from the 
institutionally and fiscally weak North West Province, 
to the more powerful Gauteng Province. Babelegi 
became part of the Tshwane Metropolitan Authority 
in Gauteng at the time of the 2009 national and 
provincial elections. 
64. See http://www.tiauto.co.za/about/our-history/
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Past its heyday? Babelegi industrial estate)
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In anticipation of this change, the premier of Gauteng 
announced plans in his 2008 State of the Province 
address for the redevelopment of Babelegi, and 
in 2009, Gauteng Province identified Babelegi as 
one of its three industrial development zones (the 
others being O.R. Tambo International Airport, and 
Ekandustria, near Bronkhorstspruit) (Mashitile, 
2008; Gauteng Province, 2010). By 2010, Babelegi 
was one of the priority development projects in the 
City of Tshwane, with the industrial estate receiving 
strong support in marketing and local management 
from the city administration. This was consistent 
with a strategic decision by Tshwane to prioritise 
the development of the far north of the metropolitan 
area, where a large proportion of its population is 
located, quite distant from the economic hubs of the 
city (Sisulu, Personal communication, 2013).65 Also 
in 2010, Gauteng Province announced its intention to 
promote Babelegi as a future hub for energy-related 
industries (De Bruyn, 2010). The Turnaround and 
Revitalization Strategy for the Babelegi Industrial Park 
(2012), was developed for provincial government by the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
(Beukman, 2012).
There does seem to have been a gradual improvement 
in fortunes since the incorporation of Babelegi into 
Tshwane. In 2006, Dutch immigrant Jack Wijker 
started small-scale production of Puma sports cars 
at Babelegi. Only a handful of cars are produced each 
year, for a small niche of motor enthusiasts, but the 
company’s production is set to increase following 
the 50 per cent stake bought by the Shanduka Group 
associated with politician and business magnate, Cyril 
Ramaphosa (Braun, 2012).66
In 2010, there was a R200 million investment by 
the Indian company, KLT Automotive and Tubular 
Products, which is a leading manufacturer of motor 
vehicle components. A production plant was built in 
Babelegi, with the support of South Africa’s IDC, to 
service the Ford manufacturing plant in Silverton, 
Pretoria (Mail & Guardian, 19 April 2014). In 2012, 
the Pretoria-based company, Unica Iron and Steel, 
announced plans to build a new steel recycling plant 
in Babelegi. In 2013, the Chinese-owned Harvest 
Bags, supplier of woven and knitted vegetable 
bags, arrived in Babelegi, possibly indicating new 
interest from Chinese companies (Harvest Bags, 
65. In terms of Tshwane’s Strategic Investment Attraction, Facilitation and Aftercare Strategy investment applications in Babelegi may  
be fast-tracked (Chauke, 2011). 
66. Puma was a Brazilian specialist car manufacturer that built cars from 1966 until roughly 1995, a period when high import tariffs effectively 
closed Brazil to foreign-built cars. Wijker’s Puma Marketing Company imported Puma cars from Brazil into South Africa after 1986, and from 
1989, having bought moulds for the 1973 Puma 1600 GTE, began local manufacture of the vehicle in Verwoerdburg (now Centurion) near 
Pretoria. Production in Verwoerdburg ceased in 2001, with limited production starting up again in Babelegi in 2006 (Braun, 2012).
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Decline and functionality in Babelegi)
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2013). The announcement of the extension of the 
gas pipeline from the Mozambique gas fields, from 
Secunda in Mpumalanga to Babelegi, also encouraged 
investor interest.
The largest recent investment was in 2012 when 
Nestlé opened two new factories in Babelegi with an 
investment of approximately R500 million, supported 
by the DTI through its Section 12l Tax Allowance 
Programme of the Income Tax Act. The DTI provided 
Nestlé with a R163.5 million tax allowance and R5 
million skills development subsidy as part of an effort 
to revive the old decentralisation points (The Sowetan, 
7 August 2012). Nestlé has had a long association 
with Babelegi, with a local reputation as the employer 
of choice, but the new factories represented a major 
upscaling in investment (Tiro, 2014). The two new 
factories – one producing a range of Maggi products 
(instant soups, stocks, sauces, seasonings and instant 
noodles) and the other, Cheerio and Milo breakfast 
cereals – were jointly opened in July 2012 by the 
global CEO of Nestlé, Paul Bulcke, and South Africa’s 
minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies (Financial 
Mail, 23 August 2012).67
Recent developments strongly suggest a 
restoration of Babelegi’s good fortunes, although it 
is still early days. Without further investigation, it 
is difficult to disentangle the effects of new forms of 
state support, from the DTI and the municipality, 
from other factors. The DTI tax subsidy may well 
have been a deciding factor in the Nestlé investment, 
but it is unlikely to have been the only locational 
factor considered. Low factory rentals also count in 
Babelegi’s favour, and as Tiro reports (2014), Tshwane 
municipality played a key role in persuading KLT and 
Nestlé to invest in Babelegi.
There are, however, still major challenges which 
detract from the perceived advantages of Babelegi 
and the initiatives of government. Beukman (2012) 
refers to a 2011 survey, which revealed that the three 
biggest perceived problems facing industrialists 
in Babelegi were the lack of security (first choice 
of 26 per cent of respondents), the high cost of 
transport (16 per cent) and poor service from the 
North West Development Corporation (NWDC), 
the agency which still managed the estate despite 
the formal transfer of administration to Gauteng 
Province (14 per cent).
Security clearly remains a concern, with the 
Temba police precincts ranking in the top ten of the 
137 policing precincts in Gauteng Province in terms of 
crime rates. Crime includes brazen raids on factories 
by gangs of ten to twenty criminals, and frequent 
cable theft, which has worsened problems with power 
supply (Tiro, 2014). The long period of apparently poor 
management by the NWDC also provided the space for 
illicit activity to flourish within the industrial estate 
(Beukman, 2012). In 2011, the Hawks, South Africa’s 
crack crime-fighting squad, raided an industrial site 
in Babelegi and uncovered a platinum smuggling 
syndicate linked to mafia-style groupings in Italy 
(New Age, 28 September 2011). The problems with 
transport costs have been exacerbated by tolling 
along the N1 and N4, and the decommissioning 
of commuter rail to the area (Sisulu, Personal 
communication, 2013).
While the changes to provincial and municipal 
boundaries have seemingly contributed to Babelegi’s 
improved prospects, problems with management 
67. Also see the Nestlé website, http://www.nestle.co.za/aboutus/history.
"Recent developments strongly suggest a restoration 
of Babelegi’s good fortunes, although it is still early 
days. Without further investigation, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of new forms of state support, 
from the DTI and the municipality, from other factors."
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have not been resolved easily. Seventy-five per cent of 
the industrial land remains in public management, 
reflecting Babelegi’s history as a growth point within 
a homeland where white industrialists were not 
permitted to own land. This may have inhibited 
industry from investing large amounts of ‘sunk 
capital’ in the area, and has left the estate vulnerable 
to poor management by public authorities (Beukman, 
2012). Under better management, however, public 
ownership has advantages. It allows public authorities 
to influence the mix and direction of investment 
strategically, and enables the easy consolidation of 
industrial sites to attract large investors (Masango, 
Personal communication, 2013). The improvement in 
the management of Babelegi has taken time. Although 
provincial and municipal boundary changes made a 
positive difference, the assets on the land were only 
very gradually transferred to the administration of 
Gauteng Province, causing ongoing frustration for 
industrialists.68
The renewal of Babelegi, even if only partial, 
offers some hope to the sprawling complex of 
formal and informal settlements adjacent to 
the industrial estate. As Babelegi has somewhat 
haltingly entered a possible new era of growth, there 
has been some development in the surrounding 
area, with large scale formalisation of informal 
settlements in the areas immediately surrounding the 
industrial estate. 
In recent years, formal retail has emerged as a 
significant sector of new growth. While the informal 
sector has a long history in the area, a new trend 
has been mall development. This include three 
large malls – the Jubilee Mall (38 000 m2), Temba 
City Shopping Centre (18 000 m2) and Kopanang 
Mall (8 600 m2). These developments are positive 
in retaining retail spending in the locality, but may 
also be having a negative impact on local informal 
retail activity. In addition to retail, there is the 
anticipation of other sectors developing in the area 
with Hammanskraal identified as the potential site of a 
large new Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) centre, 
and for tourist- and culture-related developments 
(City of Tshwane, 2012a; Sisulu, Personal 
Communication, 2013).
There are signs of hope but the future of 
Babelegi remains uncertain. A large proportion of the 
Babelegi sites are still derelict and while provisional 
government is talking of a revitalisation programme, 
there are reports of new factory closures with job 
losses of up to 1 000 (Pretoria North Rekord, 21 
January 2016). Violent protests in Hammanskraal 
in May 2016, which followed attempts to evict 
shack dwellers from land falling under a traditional 
authority, led to at least two deaths, and were a 
reminder of the severe social tensions in the area 
(Sunday Times, 24 May 2016).
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Displaced urbanisation: a taxi rank in Hammanskraal)
68. In 2013, a national parliamentary study group visited Babelegi and was petitioned by a frustrated Babelegi Industrial Management Board, 
which told the parliamentarians that the land-ownership dilemma was the source of many of Babelegi’s problems.
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Conclusion 
The Babelegi story is a complex one that does not 
conform directly to the narrative of artificially 
created industrial growth points in former homelands 
collapsing once state benefits are removed. The 
story is rather one of a growth point that emerged 
in a homeland because of a combination of state 
support and actual competitive advantage (low-cost 
labour in a location with reasonable access to the 
large Witwatersrand markets). It experienced 
decline, but not annihilation, once the benefits 
were removed. In the 2000s, institutional changes, 
including incorporation into Gauteng Province 
and the Tshwane metropolitan area benefitted the 
industrial estate, as did new forms of support from 
national government such as the DTI tax benefits. 
There are once again sparks of growth in the area, 
including the investments by Nestlé. A key question 
is what these new or revived forms of economic 
activity may mean in the lives of such a large 
concentration of people living in this area of ‘displaced 
urbanisation’. Other methods of analysis are needed to 
answer this question.
4.3 Bronkhorstspruit (including Ekangala and Ekandustria)
Introducing the study area
Bronkhorstspruit lies 61 km to the east of Pretoria, 
along the N4 East. Bronkhorstspruit was historically a 
small agricultural service centre, but under apartheid 
rule, the Ekandustria industrial estate was established 
to provide an economic base for the KwaNdebele 
homeland, and the townships of Ekangala, Zithobeni 
and Rethabiseng were established to house the 
people who worked in the estate and the town. In the 
post-apartheid era, the urban complex was initially 
fragmented institutionally with Ekangala falling 
under Mpumalanga and the remainder of the area 
within Gauteng. The entire area has since been 
consolidated within Gauteng, however. The area also 
initially fell under district and local municipalities, 
but it has recently been incorporated into the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality.
In 2011, the population of this urban cluster 
was 94 362, 50.6 per cent greater than in 2001, a 
significant growth. The major concentrations of 
people were in Ekangala (48 493), Zithobeni (22 435) 
and Bronkhorstspruit proper (12 468). A new middle- 
to upper-income extension of Bronkhorstspruit 
has developed around the Bronkhorstspruit Dam, 
close to the site of the construction of the Kusile 
power station. The local economy was relatively 
small, with a 2013 GVA of R8.2 billion. The largest 
sector was manufacturing, followed by retail, 
but this excludes the GVA produced from the 
construction of Kusile.
Photograph by Paul Parsons
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Figure 77: Locating the Bronkhorstspruit-Ekandustria-Ekangala urban complex
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An obscure dorp
Before the 1980s, Bronkhorstspruit was a small 
agricultural service centre – an obscure dorp (small 
town). It had some sentimental significance for 
segments of the Afrikaner right wing as the site of 
the opening skirmish of the First Anglo-Boer War 
(1880–1881). The Bronkhorstspruit Dam was built 
in 1950, establishing the town as a minor weekend 
recreational centre for the Greater Pretoria region. 
There was a moment of fame on 17 September 1965, 
when international media reported the landing of an 
UFO outside the town. 
During the second part of the twentieth century, 
the town stagnated. There was a slight increase in 
its contribution to the GDP of what is present-day 
Gauteng – from 0.17 per cent in 1970, to 0.24 per cent in 
1981 – as agricultural productivity improved. But the 
population of the district declined, with mechanisation 
negatively affecting the market of this rural service 
centre (Simkins, 2010).
Part of the grand design
Changes came in the mid-1980s, with the declaration 
of an industrial decentralisation point, adjacent to 
Bronkhorstspruit, in support of the development of 
the new homeland of KwaNdebele. This homeland 
was said to be “an afterthought in the grand design 
of ‘separate development’” (Murray, 1987: 243). It 
didn’t exist before 1977, and after that, only in a very 
fragmented form.69
Despite the miniscule size of KwaNdebele, 
the territorial authority opted in 1982 for national 
independence. To ensure the viability of the new state, 
the South African government tried to enlarge its 
territory from 98 000 hectares to 381 000 hectares by 
incorporating Moutse (previously part of Lebowa) and 
Ekangala township. The incorporation went badly with 
bitter resistance from the residents of these two areas. 
The plans were invalidated in 1989 by an Appeals 
Court ruling (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
1998) but by then, in any event, the entire homeland 
system was faltering.
The viability of the homeland depended on the 
establishment of an economic base. The Ekandustria 
industrial estate – alongside Ekangala township, north 
of Bronkhorstspruit – was established in 1984 by the 
KwaNdebele Development Corporation.70 There were 
ambitious goals of developing an industrial economy 
that would support a city of around 300 000 people. 
This clearly was never attained but Ekandustria did 
have some early success. Within a year there were 22 
factories (New York Times, 10 August 1985) and by 1991 
there were 92 factories employing 10 000 people across 
sectors such as metal products, rubber and plastic, 
wood products, textiles, food, and chemical products 
(Die Beeld, 24 October 1991). As with Babelegi, there 
was the combination of generous incentives for 
industrialists and a supply of low-wage labour, as well 
as relatively good access to the large urban markets in 
Gauteng. Although there were fly-by-night operators, 
there were also significant industrial establishments 
such as Sasol Nitro,71 Steloy Castings, Marley Roofing 
and Elangeni Oil and Soaps.
Taiwanese investors, in particular, found 
Ekandustria to be an attractive location. By 1990, there 
were at least 17 Taiwanese-owned factories there 
(Die Beeld, 26 October 1990). The Bronkhorstspruit 
municipality did not rely on the activities of the 
South African and homeland government, and 
played an active role as a local authority in recruiting 
Taiwanese industrialists. The municipality sent 
official delegations to Taiwan, set up a Travel 
Agency in Taipei, and allocated a newly-established 
residential estate, Cultura Park, for Taiwanese 
residents (Hart, 2002). 
In the period 1985–1991, there was modest 
population growth in Bronkhorstspruit (2.45 per 
cent per annum) after decades of population decline, 
69. The Ndebele people were a small minority in the Transvaal, with most living in the Lebowa homeland or on white-owned farms, but in the 
late 1970s, a Ndebele chief seceded from Lebowa and persuaded the South African government to set up the KwaNdebele territorial authority. 
70. There was a peculiarity in the design of the industrial estate as it was divided into northern and southern sections, with the northern section 
being in the KwaNdebele homeland, and the southern section in ‘white South Africa’. The northern section received subsidies in terms of the 
decentralisation programme and developed to 80 per cent capacity, but the southern section did not receive subsidies and only developed to 10 
per cent capacity (City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, 2012b). 
71. The Sasol Nitro plant was set up as a partnership between Sasol Chemical Industries Ltd and the Australian company, Dyno Nobel, to 
produce organic chemicals used in the making of explosives.
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suggesting the industrial decentralisation policy 
had some impact. The contribution of the locality 
to the economic output of present day Gauteng also 
trended upwards, from 0.24 per cent in 1981, to 
0.31 per cent in 1994 (Simkins, 2010). This impact 
was negligible for Gauteng as a whole, but was 
locally significant.
Industrial decline in the 1990s 
but a local surprise
As with Babelegi, and for the same reasons, 
Ekandustria declined after 1994, with most of the 
smaller factories closing, although larger enterprises 
such as Sasol Nitro and Steloy Castings, which had 
sunk significant assets into the area, remained. 
Bronkhorstspruit was negatively affected and 
population growth for the period 1991–1996 was, 
once again, negative (Simkins, 2010). Taiwanese 
industry was severely affected by the changes. 
Not only did the Taiwanese investors lose the 
incentives, but they were also shaken when South 
Africa switched its diplomatic allegiance in 1997 
from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. 
Taiwanese industrialists closed their factories and 
sold off their residential properties in Cultura Park. 
The Taiwanese school in the suburb was sold to 
provincial government.72
The dalliance with Taiwan did, however, have a 
surprising outcome that persists to the present 
day. During an official visit to Taiwan in 1991, 
Bronkhorstspruit’s municipal manager, Dr Hennie 
Senekal, met the Venerable Master Hsing Yun, head 
of the Fo Guang Shan Buddhist order,73 who expressed 
his interest in establishing a religious and cultural 
centre in Africa. In March 1992, Senekal returned 
to Taiwan to sign a contract with Yun, donating 14 
hectares of municipal land to the Buddhist order.74 
A Buddhist abbot was sent almost immediately to 
Bronkhorstspruit, and work began on a large religious 
complex which included the Nan Hua Temple, the 
Temple Guesthouse, the African Buddhist Seminary 
(ABS), the Nan Hua Village, the Assembly Hall, and 
the Pureland Ch’an retreat centre. This became the 
largest Buddhist centre in Africa and one of the largest, 
internationally, outside of China. This development 
played a key role in returning Bronkhorstspruit to 
growth after 1996. It was not welcomed by all, however. 
On 30 October 2002, there was a spate of bombings 
in Gauteng by members of the extreme right-wing 
Boeremag. There were bombings in Soweto, but also 
an explosion in the Nan Hua Temple which injured two 
security guards.75
72. See http://www.culturahighschool.co.za/index.php/ct-menu-item-3 
73. This is a monastic order of the Pure Land and Linji Chan schools of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. 
74. See http://en.nanhuatemple.org/history.html 
75. South African History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/boeremag-bomb-blasts-rock-soweto-and-bronkhorstspruit, 
accessed 1 March 2015.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Religious economies: the Nan Hua Buddhist temple complex in Bronkhorstspruit)
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The Buddhist presence in Bronkhorstspruit also 
attracted other Eastern-inspired religious activity.  
In 2008, for example, the Oppenheimer family 
and the De Beers Corporation donated the 3 
900 hectare Ezemvelo Nature Reserve to the 
Maharishi Institute, as a location for “a new 
green, consciousness-based, eco-village for 
southern Africa”.76
New confidence in the 2000s
The industrial estate did not collapse completely. Sasol 
Nitro remained an anchor, and in 1998, a steel-casting 
company, PD Foundries, moved to Ekandustria. 
Together with the existing specialist stainless-steel 
foundry, Steloy, this formed the hub of a new metals 
complex (Engineering News, 19 February 1999). In 
1994, Steloy acquired PD Foundries and moved its 
company headquarters to Ekandustria. It had become 
one of the largest privately-owned South African 
foundry groups, supplying over 220 different alloys 
to customers around the world (Engineering News, 
11 April 2014).
From around 2008, there were signs of 
revival in the Ekandustria industrial estate, and 
as with Babelegi, this was at least partly related to 
institutional changes. In the post-apartheid era, 
Bronkhorstspruit-Ekandustria had initially fallen 
under the Metsweding District Municipality and the 
Kungwini Local Municipality. These were poorly-
resourced local authorities that struggled to provide 
adequate planning and management for the area. In 
July 2008, the Municipal Demarcations Board took the 
decision to incorporate Metsweding, and its two local 
municipalities, into the jurisdictions of the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality with effect from the date 
of the municipal elections in April 2011 (Fin24, 8 May 
2011). There were also adjustments to the provincial 
boundary to correct a ‘technical error’ in the original 
demarcation process, which had placed Ekangala in 
Mpumalanga, separating it from Bronkhorstspruit 
and Ekandustria in Gauteng.77 With the entire 
area in Gauteng Province and under the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Council, the prospects for integrated 
development were significantly better. In 2008, the 
Gauteng government commissioned the preparation 
of a rehabilitation strategy for Ekandustria with 
implementation beginning in 2009 (IOL News, 17 
February 2009). In 2012, Tshwane’s Metropolitan 
Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) identified 
Bronkhorstspruit-Ekandustria as a metropolitan node, 
affirming its new status within the region (City of 
Tshwane, 2012b).
These changes boosted confidence in the area. 
The largest new investment was a R1.4 billion 
fluorspar beneficiation plant in Ekandustria, with an 
estimated 1 200 jobs. The production facility, opened 
in 2014, was a direct outcome of the initiative the DTI 
launched in 2009 to counter South Africa’s growing 
trade deficit in chemical production by increasing 
the production of fluorochemicals (Financial Mail, 
2 April 2012). In 2013, construction began on the 
Bronkhorstspruit Biogas Plant, positioning the 
locality as a participant in green economy initiatives 
(Engineering News, 16 April 2013). In 2014, there were 
reports of a Chinese company, Rayal Tiles, investing 
R600 million in Ekandustria, creating 1 000 jobs 
(SABC News, 29 January 2014). Smaller facilities such 
as an agricultural feeding mill, funded as a black-
owned enterprise by the National Development Agency 
(NDA), have also been established (SABC News, 
31 July 2012). 
In early 2016, however, there were reports of high 
job losses in Ekandustria, including an alleged 430 jobs 
lost with the closure of the Plascon Paint plant. This 
was taken up as a political issue in local government 
elections campaigning.78
Boom times (and some challenges)
While there are signs of new growth in the 
manufacturing industry, the current residential 
boom in Bronkhorstspruit is the direct result of 
the construction of the R118.5 billion Kusile power 
station 20 km east of the town in Mpumalanga 
(Eskom, N/D). This is one of the world’s largest 
76. See http://maharishiinstitute.org/academics/meru/; http://www.ezemvelo.co.za/donation-of-ezemvelo-nature-reserve-to-maharishi-
institute-by-mr-and-mrs-oppenheimer/. 
77. The decision was taken to correct the error but there was a six-year delay in implementation, which led to institutional neglect of Ekangala, 
despite growth in the population, driven at least partly by the eviction of agricultural workers from farms in the area (Masango, Personal 
communication, 2013). 
78. See Democratic Alliance video released on YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMZCI1QwMoc.
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current energy projects, and it is expected that, on 
completion, Kusile will be the world’s fourth largest 
coal-fired power station, with a total installed 
capacity of 4 800 MW. The official go-ahead for 
construction was given in 2008, but there have been 
serious production delays, and the synchronisation 
of the first of the six 800 MW units with the national 
grid is now expected in 2017 (Engineering News, 20 
February 2015).
Bronkhorstspruit provides a residential base for 
skilled technicians, professionals, and managerial 
staff on the Kusile construction site, and since 2008, 
there has been resultant growth in the middle- and 
higher-ends of the property market, including 
up-market townhouse developments in the town 
and at the dam, where there is an exclusive golf 
estate (Property24, 28 July 2008; Property24, 27 
November 2009; Masango, Personal communication, 
2013).79 Retail has done well as a result of this boom. 
In 2010–2011, for example, the then Kungwini 
municipality approved 18 898 m2 of shopping space. 
By contrast, in Nigel, only 753 m2 was approved, and in 
Merafong (including Carletonville) only 496 m2 (FGX 
Studios, 2013). 
The recent development of the area has not 
always proceeded smoothly, and there have been 
environmental costs. Within a year of incorporation 
into Tshwane, there were severe service delivery 
protests in Ekangala (and in the smaller townships of 
Zithobeni and Rethabiseng, nearer Bronkhorstspruit) 
that involved the torching of buildings including a 
clinic, library and local hall (SABC News, 5 February 
2014; IOL News, 6 February 2014).80 The mayor of 
Tshwane responded to the protests by indicating 
that his administration had plans to develop the 
Bronkhorstspruit areas as the “greater eastern 
capital” of the bigger capital city, and called for 
patience as incorporation proceeded “with some 
inconveniences and challenges” (IOL News, 6 
February 2014).
The biggest of the environmental challenges 
has to do with the Kusile power station. Calculations 
79. Bronkhorstspruit (then in the Kungwini local municipality) had the highest value of building approvals of all the case areas we studied, with 
the large majority of the applications for buildings of more than 100 000 m2 (StatsSA, 2012). 
80. Bronkhorstspruit’s local development planning function and many of its other administrative functions were removed from the town and 
consolidated in the seat of the municipality in the Pretoria Central Business District. Facing the prospect of commuting long distances from 
Bronkhorstspruit to Pretoria, many civil servants who had been located in offices in the town resigned, and local institutional memory and 
experiential expertise of local conditions was lost.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Real economies in Bronkhorstspruit)
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indicate that Kusile will contribute an additional 
30 million tons annually to South Africa’s CO2 load. 
Critics of the project are of the opinion that the 
damage cost of these emissions could have bought 
an equivalent power-generation capacity using 
renewable power generation technologies (Blignaut, 
2012: 72). Although Kusile – and its sister, Medupi, 
currently being built in the Waterberg – are the first 
two power stations in South Africa to use technology 
that dramatically reduces sulphur dioxide emissions, 
they do further lock South Africa into its carbon-
intensive growth path.
More locally, the development of a small 
chemicals and metal products hub at Ekandustria 
requires ongoing monitoring of environmental 
compliance. The extended period of weak local 
government after the ending of apartheid, 
resulted in local environmental problems with 
reports, for example, of raw sewage polluting 
the Bronkhorstspruit Dam, and levels of E. coli 
allegedly rising to between 300 and 2 000 times what 
is acceptable.81
Conclusion 
The Bronkhorstspruit-Ekandustria-Ekangala story 
is also one of the complex, unanticipated, often 
surprising outcomes, of state strategy. Again, the 
impact of the apartheid-era industrial decentralisation 
strategy cannot be understood simplistically. The 
establishment of Ekandustria as a growth point in the 
1980s did support the growth of Bronkhorstspruit, and 
the removal of state support in the 1990s did lead to 
economic downturn, but the industrial infrastructure 
established at Ekandustria is at least partly 
underpinning a current revival in the fortunes of the 
town, nearly three decades later. The attempt to attract 
Taiwanese investors to the growth point in the 1980s 
also had an unexpected outcome – the construction 
of Africa’s largest Buddhist centre, which has played 
a key role in the regeneration of the town. Much of the 
current development has to do with another form of 
state investment – the construction of a large, coal-
fired power station 20 km out of town – and there has 
been a recent scramble for residential property in the 
town, which is also supporting the commercial and 
recreational sectors. 
81. See http://www.environment.co.za/poisoning-carcinogens-heavy-metals-mining/residents-tackle-the-bronkhorstspruit-
dam-pollution.html.
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Blue bull country: a quiet Sunday in Bronkhorstspruit)
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5. Recreational hubs on the edge (Hartbeespoort)
5.1 Nature on the edge
A number of writers have shown how the development 
of mining and industry in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries produced a ‘crisis of value’ 
for which a partial antidote was available in the 
‘primitive’ or ‘natural’ spaces of the wild (Williams, 
1975; Bunn, 1996; Brooks, 2005). There is a British 
and North American literature which identifies 
the 1920s and 1930s as an important period in an 
emergent ‘ideology of recreation’ (for example, Hays, 
1998; Whyte, 2002; Cloke et al., 2013). In earlier years, 
leisure was the domain of the upper classes, but by 
the early twentieth century, more progressive social 
policies and an expansion in transport infrastructure 
and technology, made leisure and recreation accessible 
to the urban middle and working classes. The natural 
landscape was no longer a place of pre-modern 
backwardness, but rather a place which offered both 
physical, emotional and moral benefits to the harassed 
urban dweller. The 1930s, in the UK, for example, 
saw the rise of the Scouts and Guides movements, 
ramblers associations, and cheap youth hostels, with 
the emergence also of the ‘right to roam’ movement. 
These trends were reinforced significantly after World 
War II with the rapid spread of the private motor 
Photograph by Wikimedia 
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"Hartbeespoort Dam was established in the 1920s 
for agricultural irrigation, but it has developed into 
an important regional recreational hub. The early 
settlements around the dam were Schoemansville, 
Kosmos and Meerhof, but there are now a number of 
upmarket estates such as Pecanwood, The Coves, and 
The Island Estate. "
car, which made weekend trips into the countryside, 
for example, increasingly possible (Whyte, 2002; 
Cloke et al., 2013).
In South Africa, of course, these opportunities 
were mainly limited to white society. From the 
1920s, game reserves and beaches emerged as places 
of recreation, but getting to these places required 
long journeys. There was an increasing demand for 
leisure spaces close to the large urban concentrations. 
Both Brooks (2005) and Bunn (1996) remind us 
of the histories of South Africa’s natural spaces, 
showing how human activity created the enclaving 
of so-called natural space. The ‘natural’ spaces of 
recreation in Gauteng, are even more starkly human 
creations. The primary weekend recreational spaces in 
Gauteng are around the major and minor dams in the 
province that have recreational and nature reserves 
surrounding them, including the Vaal, Hartbeespoort, 
Bronkhorstspruit and Roodeplaat dams. Other 
‘nature areas’ are relatively recent creations. The 
Pilanesberg Game Reserve, for example, was created 
from a number of former white-owned farms, with 
wild animals being brought in during the 1980s 
through a major game translocation programme called 
Operation Genesis. 
We have selected Hartbeespoort as an illustrative 
case. A major recreational space was unintentionally 
recreated from a programme to resettle ‘poor whites’ 
on irrigated land. In later years, the ‘natural quality’ 
of the space was disturbed by a property boom around 
the dam, and also by major problems of pollution, 
largely caused by upstream urban developments. The 
early story of Hartbeespoort Dam is also a striking 
illustration of the huge complexities of large state-
led development. It is a story of political vacillation, 
financial overruns, technical snags, difficulties with 
land rights, natural disaster, and the unanticipated 
consequences of events within the national 
and global arenas.
5.2 The Hartbeespoort story
Introducing the study area
Hartbeespoort Dam was established in the 1920s 
for agricultural irrigation, but it has developed into 
an important regional recreational hub. The early 
settlements around the dam were Schoemansville, 
Kosmos and Meerhof, but there are now a number of 
upmarket estates such as Pecanwood, The Coves, and 
The Island Estate. The dam is only 36 km to the west of 
Pretoria, accessible along a provincial road, but it falls 
under the jurisdictions of North West Province, the 
Madibeng Local Municipality and Bojanala Platinum 
District Municipality.
The population around the dam in 2011 was 
22 376, which was a 206.5 per cent increase on 
population of 7 300 in 2001. This reflected the effects 
of the property boom in the early 2000s. The major 
concentrations of people were in Schoemansville 
(3 627), Ifafi (2 571) and the Pecanwood Estate (1 
618). The economy was predominantly based on 
retail and tourism.
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Figure 78: Locating Hartbeespoort
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State-led construction  
(and its complications)
There was interest in the construction of a dam 
on the Crocodile River from the time of the Zuid 
Afrikaansche Republiek. An influential local 
landowner, General Hendrik Schoeman, apparently 
persuaded President Paul Kruger to construct 
the dam for irrigation and local water supply but 
implementation was interrupted by the outbreak of 
South African War in 1899, and by the sudden death of 
the General in 1901 (Van Vuuren, 2008; Meyer, 2013).82 
After the war, the Transvaal government investigated 
the viability of constructing a dam and agreed to a 
provisional implementation plan. There was another 
delay with the formation of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910, and resulting changes in institutional 
responsibility.
The political impetus for building the dam 
came around 1914 with the desire of the Botha-
Smuts administration to appease the increasingly 
restive white labour, and counter the influence of 
General Hertzog’s newly formed National Party. 
The Hartbeespoort Dam Act was passed hurriedly 
by the Union Parliament in 1914 with the intention 
of providing temporary employment to poor 
whites during the construction of the dam, and 
more permanent livelihood opportunities through 
irrigated smallholder agriculture downstream of 
the dam (Verhoef and Du Plessis, 1990; Van Vuuren, 
2008; Meyer, 2013). 
Construction was planned to begin in 1915 but 
was delayed by the outbreak of World War I and also 
by difficulties in acquiring land. The local farmers 
were only prepared to sell their land at inflated prices 
and government was hamstrung by the lack of powers 
to expropriate land, a problem only resolved with 
the passing of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme 
(Acquisition of Land Act) in 1918. Even so, there 
were tough negotiations around land rights. Johan 
Schoeman, the General’s son, for example, eventually 
relinquished his land only in return for all commercial 
and riparian rights on the water and foreshore, 
a legal provision which was to have important 
implications for future development (Van Vuuren, 
2008; Meyer, 2013).
As World War I came to an end, soldiers  
returned from the front to a country in recession.  
The construction of the dam and the irrigation scheme 
provided employment for around 3 500 white men. 
In 1919, construction was delayed by strikes and 
other labour unrest although this problem resolved 
when the government threatened to employ African 
workers instead. In 1921, floods washed away much of 
the construction. A new engineer was appointed, the 
82. General Schoeman died in 1901 when a lyddite shell he kept in his ashtray exploded after he dropped a match onto it while lighting his 
pipe (Meyer, 2013).
Photograph by Wikimedia Commons
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dam wall was redesigned, and construction proceeded 
rapidly. In 1923 the dam was opened, and in 1925 the 
full irrigation scheme was completed (Van Vuuren, 
2008; Meyer, 2013).
The irrigation scheme involved a 544 km 
network of canals supporting 160 km2 of irrigated 
land that produced tobacco, wheat, lucerne, fruit and 
vegetables. In 1924, this intensified agriculture led 
to the proclamation of the small agricultural service 
town of Brits, on the banks of the Crocodile River, 
north of Hartbeespoort. The immediate purpose of 
the dam was to unlock the agricultural potential of 
the district, providing opportunities to poor whites 
(on 8 hectare plots) who would otherwise move into 
the cities. A major consequence of the development 
was the creation of a major recreational hub in 
easy access to the emerging metropolitan cities 
of Johannesburg and Pretoria (Verhoef and Du 
Plessis, 1990). 
The irrigation scheme had a difficult genesis, 
with complicated institutional conflicts surrounding 
it and a lack of adequate funding, but the pro-white 
labour Pact government, which came to power in 
South Africa in 1924, provided new impetus to the 
scheme. The small-scale farmers survived the effects 
of a collapse in the international tobacco price in 
1928, and the Great Depression of the 1930s, and 
gradually worked their way to relative prosperity, 
with most of the farmers and their descendants 
becoming landowners by the 1950s. Verhoef and Du 
Plessis (1990: 80) conclude that “[t]he Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Settlement proves that the resettlement 
of socially and economically dislocated people can 
have very successful results”. They note, too, that the 
African farmers who were living along the banks of 
the Crocodile River were relocated to other areas, 
and were not provided the support given to the white 
settler farmers. 
Property developments in the  
1920s and 1930s (and slower  
growth through to the late 1960s)
The development of Hartbeespoort as a recreational 
hub owes much to the entrepreneurial scheming of 
Johan Schoeman, who developed the townships of 
Schoemansville, Kosmos and Meerhof along the dam 
shore. He ceded some of his boating and fishing rights 
to buyers of stands in these townships but he kept the 
commercial rights to himself until his retirement in 
the early 1950s.
Schoemansville was proclaimed in 1922 and 
developed as the largest settlement and business 
hub along the dam. This was followed by Meerhof 
(around the railway siding) in 1935, and upmarket 
and secluded Kosmos in 1937.83 Schoeman’s son, 
Lincoln, later developed the township of Ifafi. The 
stand holders in these townships were all granted 
riparian rights (i.e. access to the water and to boating 
"The immediate purpose of the dam was to unlock 
the agricultural potential of the district, providing 
opportunities to poor whites (on 8 hectare plots) 
who would otherwise move into the cities. A major 
consequence of the development was the creation of a 
major recreational hub in easy access to the emerging 
metropolitan cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria."
83. Wedged in between the Magaliesberg and the dam, the stand holders of Kosmos had direct access to the water, allowing them to build their 
own boat houses. It was a charming village that soon attracted a cluster of artists – painters, sculptors, actors and writers. In the 1930s, stands in 
Kosmos were selling for £200, compared with £60 in Schoemansville and £70 in Meerhof (Meyer, 2013).
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and angling).84 Immediately south-east of the dam was 
the farm, Pelindaba, owned by Gustav Preller, which 
was frequented by the literary and artistic elite of 
the Transvaal.85
The riparian rights in these townships were 
staunchly defended by Schoeman and the stand 
holders. Johan Schoeman also took full advantage 
of his monopoly of commercial rights. He owned the 
Agnes Hotel, where weekenders stayed, as well as the 
Meerhof Café at the railway siding, where weekenders 
waited for transport to the hotel. He rented trains 
that transported his patrons around the dam and also 
controlled all commercialised boating (Meyer, 2013). 
Under the patronage of Schoeman, the dam become a 
popular weekend getaway. It also attracted its share 
of the rich and famous including the Prince of Wales, 
later King Edward VIII. In his article, Meyer (2013) 
includes a photograph of bathers enjoying “the pristine 
waters of the dam”. 
Once the Vaal Dam was completed in 1937, there 
was direct competition to Hartbeespoort’s role as 
a recreational hub. There was also a question, for 
a whole decade, as to which of the two dams would 
become the aviation hub for the region. At the time, 
Imperial Airways, which dominated the long-distance 
route between London and Johannesburg, was using 
flying boats. Schoeman, however, insisted he had the 
riparian rights and refused permission for landings. 
Imperial Airways established their short-lived flying 
boat base at Deneysville on the Vaal Dam instead 
(Meyer, 2013). 
In the post-war era, Hartbeespoort remained a 
popular weekend getaway. It was a place for holiday 
and youth camps, with the fortunate few owning 
weekend cottages. There was also a growing cluster of 
artists living in the area. In 1954, for example, Alexis 
Preller, one of South Africa’s leading artists moved to 
the family farm near Hartbeespoort, and a number of 
other artists established studios in Kosmos. However, 
the property development which had characterised the 
earlier decades ended, with significant new residential 
development only resuming from the late 1960s. The 
focus of formal recreational development had shifted 
to the Vaal Dam (Meyer, 2013).
The secluded hills of the Magaliesberg around 
the dam did however provide the location for covert 
developments. In 1961 the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) of the United 
States of America, built its Deep Space Station 51 
near Hartbeespoort.86 Also in 1961, South Africa’s 
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), which had 
been established in 1948, moved its headquarters 
to the farm Pelindaba, which it bought from the 
Preller family. In 1965, Safari I, South Africa’s 
84. Schoeman also developed the small township of Melodie, where riparian rights were not granted. 
85. Preller was a leading literary figure in the Transvaal. His associates included J.H. Pierneef (who popularised Hartbeespoort in his art), Frans 
Oerder, Erick Mayer, Coert Steynberg and Eugene Marais (who committed suicide at Pelindaba in 1936) (Holm, 2005). 
86. After its closure in 1974, it became a radio astronomy observatory run by the CSIR, and later by the National Research Foundation (NRF). It 
is currently known as the Hartbeeshoek Radio Astronomy Observatory (HartRAO) [www.hartrao.ac.za].
Photograph by Paul Saad
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first atomic reactor, was opened at this site 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2015).
Economic growth and environmental 
crisis from the late 1960s
Renewed property development in the late 1960s was 
partly prompted by the expanding nuclear programme, 
as the growth of the Pelindaba complex brought 
scientists and skilled personnel into the area.87 
Industrial development around Brits and at Rosslyn, 
as part of the government’s industrial decentralisation 
programme, also brought managerial staff and white-
collar workers into the area. 
New residential development (for example, 
Kosmos Extension) led to improved facilities such as 
local schools and shops. A cluster of tourist attractions 
also emerged, supplementing the long-established 
boating and angling activities. These included the 
Snake and Animal Park in Schoemansville in the late 
1960s; the Ann van Dyk Cheetah Centre (later De 
Wildt Cheetah Centre) opened in 1971; the first Harties 
Aerial Cableway, constructed in 1973;88 and balloon 
safaris from 1981. The growth was also supported by 
the development of Sandton, a high-income residential 
complex north-west of Johannesburg, in relative 
proximity to Hartbeespoort, and Lanseria airport 
which opened in 1974. In 1970, the dam wall was raised 
by 2.44 m, increasing the dam’s volume from 160 
million m3 to 205 million m3. Hartbeespoort continued 
to attract artists. Norman Catherine moved to 
Hartbeespoort in 1973, and collaborated with Walter 
Battiss on the construction of his home, the “primitive-
futuristic fantasia” known as Fook Manor.89 Jeremy 
Taylor, satirical singer and actor, also lived in the 
area, and wove his experiences of Hartbeespoort 
into his lyrics.
However, while Hartbeespoort appeared to prosper, 
an environmental crisis unfolded. Massive amounts of 
industrial and sewage effluent were dumped into the 
Crocodile River and its tributaries, especially from 
the Jukskei River, with its headwaters in the inner 
city of Johannesburg. There was also contamination 
by the insecticides used in the agricultural sector, 
and additional fears of radioactive contamination 
from Pelindaba.90 From the early 1960s, the dam 
had become increasing eutrophic (meaning nutrient 
enriched). There were cattle deaths along the 
shores of the dam in 1974, and blue-green algal 
blooms appeared, which affected the taste and 
odour of the water and posed growing health threats 
to humans (Jarvis, 1988; Department of Water 
Affairs, 2004).
Alien invasive water hyacinths got into the dam 
and by 1978, 80 per cent of the water surface was 
covered with this weed. Angling, boating and other 
water sports were brought to a near halt, and the 
area faced possible disaster in terms of any future 
development. Various methods were attempted to 
clear the dam, and eventually crop-sprayer aircraft 
were used to chemically poison the hyacinth. This 
was a controversial action, which had various 
negative consequences, as the decomposing hyacinth 
released its own nutrients into the water, which fed 
the blue-green algae. In 1985, the dam was classified 
as hyper-eutrophic (excessively nutrient enriched). 
In the mid-1980s, however, the Department of Water 
Affairs introduced effluent standards within the 
catchment of the dam, and this led to an approximate 
20 per cent reduction in phosphorus loads, but 
with considerable variation across the seasons 
(Jarvis, 1988; Department of Water Affairs, 2004; 
Lake, 2011).91 
87. A full-scale nuclear device (minus highly-enriched uranium) had been produced by 1977, and in 1982, South Africa’s first operational nuclear 
bomb was produced. The programme was terminated by F.W. de Klerk in 1989, but the South African government only admitted the existence of 
the programme in 1993 (GlobalSecurity.org, 2015). 
88. The cableway was closed in 2005 after it had fallen into disrepair, but in 2010 a Swiss company invested R50 million in its restoration [http://
www.hartiescableway.co.za/]. 
89. See http://www.normancatherine.co.za. 
90. Radioactive contamination was generally denied by officials but was monitored on an annual basis by the Atomic Energy Board (for 
example, Atomic Energy Board, 1976). 
91. South Africa suffered a severe drought in the period 1982–1987, which saw the levels of the dam plummet from 100 per cent to 22 per 
cent, and greater concentrations of pollution. However, the drought ended with floods, and the dam refilled with significantly reduced 
pollution levels.
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“South Africa’s Riviera” in 
the 1990s and 2000s
The 1990s began with improved water quality, and 
better prospects overall for South Africa as a political 
solution for the country was in sight. The property 
market was depressed from the early 1980s until the 
mid-1990s, when, with stronger investor confidence 
in South Africa, a stronger currency, lower interest 
rates, and a growing middle-income sector, boom-time 
conditions returned (Clark and Daniel, 2009). For 
Hartbeespoort, key factors also included the growing 
market for second homes, as weekend or holiday 
getaways (Visser, 2004; Hoogendoorn et al., 2005; 
Visser and Hoogendoorn, 2015), and the steep rise of 
the timeshare industry in South Africa (Pandy and 
Rogerson, 2013).
The late 1990s and early 2000s were the heyday 
of growth at Hartbeespoort, with excited discussion 
at the time of the dam as “South Africa’s Riviera” 
(Die Beeld, 16 April 2003). Although there were small 
gated lifestyle estates such as Lakeside and Eagle’s 
Landing in the early 1990s, the real game-changer 
was the development of the exclusive Pecanwood 
Estate between 1996 and 1999, one of the first of South 
Africa’s large inland golf estates. This estate, built 
around the signature Jack Nicklaus golf course, first 
brought the millionaires to Hartbeespoort.92 
With the development of Pecanwood, property 
prices along Hartbeespoort tripled within three years, 
and the waterfront became one of the most expensive 
areas of real estate in the country. Pecanwood was 
followed by a number of other exclusive lifestyle 
estates, although not at the same scale, for example, 
Caribbean Golf Club, Port d’Afrique, K’Shane Lake 
Lodge, The Coves, The Islands Estate, and Bay Golf 
Estate.93 The developments were, however, not all 
for the very wealthy, with growth also providing 
for the middle class (for example, the Xanadu Eco 
Estate). Although the area remained predominantly 
a weekend getaway with second homes, there were 
trends towards permanent residence, especially in 
the 50+ age group.
92. See http://pecanwoodhartbeespoort.co.za. 
93. While Hartbeespoort did attract the extremely wealthy, with some properties fetching around R40 million, there was also a fair spread of 
property prices with properties from around R450 000 (http://www.chaseveritt.co.za/hartbeespoort?type=1).
Photographs by Brian Boshoff (On the dam: Hartbeespoort)
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The residential development was accompanied 
by further development in tourist facilities and 
by growth in retail and other services. The Lesedi 
Cultural Village opened in 1993 followed by the 
Elephant Sanctuary in 1999, and the reopening of 
the cableway in 2010. There were three significant 
retail developments – Sediba Plaza (11 000 m2); 
Village Mall (24 000 m2); and Chameleon Village, 
which opened around 2005 as South Africa’s largest 
indoor market. These were linked to a cluster of new 
tourist attractions such as a niche brewery, a reptile 
park, and a lion park. There were also numerous 
restaurants, spas, new art galleries, and other 
upmarket services, supporting the lifestyle market 
around the dam. Pecanwood College opened as an elite 
private school.
Growing challenges in the area eventually stifled 
the growth trajectory, however. The massive property 
and related development, drawn to the area because of 
its natural beauty and tranquillity, was invariably self-
defeating. By the 2000s, Hartbeespoort was no longer 
tranquil – the area was packed with human activity, 
and the roads to Johannesburg and Pretoria were 
congested, especially over weekends (Visser, 2004). 
This coincided, from 2008, with a general slump in the 
property market.
As Long and Hoogendoorn (2013) explain, the 
persistence of environmental problems contributed 
to a widely-perceived decline in the attractiveness 
of Hartbeespoort, and to the drop in property values. 
Extensive blue-green algae blooms returned to the 
dam between 2000 and 2003 (Ross, 2010). This 
time, however, there was stronger local action, with 
residents forming the Hartbeespoort Water Action 
Group (HWAG).94 The government tried to respond. 
Around 2004, the Harties Metse A Me initiative was 
launched by the national Department of Water Affairs 
to improve water quality, but it was widely criticised 
for its high cost and poor returns (Engineering News, 
28 March 2008; Ross, 2010).95 The real difficulty is 
that the environmental problems are largely a product 
of what happens beyond the locality. Effluent from 
inner city Johannesburg, for example, which makes 
its way into the dam via the Jukskei and Crocodile 
Rivers, can hardly be dealt with through an initiative 
local to Hartbeespoort. In 2015, there were renewed 
problems when the Madibeng local municipality 
blamed a water shortage in Brits and other parts of 
the municipality on algae blooms in the dam that 
were delaying the purification process (Times Live, 
16 January 2015).
Contemporary concerns are not only 
environmental. Hartbeespoort has been criticised 
for being a white enclave that has failed to transition 
to the new South Africa. In 2011, the Hartbeespoort 
subplace was 59.4 per cent white, although a 
closer look shows an even more extreme picture.96 
Around the dam are sub-enclaves, many of which 
are overwhelmingly white: Schoemansville, Ifafi 
and Port d’Afrique are more than 80 per cent white, 
94. The HWAG used a combination of tactics from laying criminal charges against government for criminal neglect after raw sewage was found 
pumping into the dam, to joint public-private environmental initiatives (Ross, 2010). 
95. By 2013, however, that there were reports of an improvement, mainly as a result of an innovative initiative to harvest algae by hand, which 
provided employment to between 80 and 140 workers (IOL News, 7 January 2013; Engineering News, 8 November 2013). In 2015, however, there 
were media reports of water shortages after a severe algae bloom interrupted the water purification process (Times Live, 16 January 2015). 
96. The subplace includes a rural district to the north of the dam which is 95 per cent black African. Excluding this area, Hartbeespoort is 
overwhelming white within a city-region that is overwhelmingly black in its demography.
"The massive property and related development, 
drawn to the area because of its natural beauty and 
tranquillity, was invariably self-defeating."
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and Pecanwood, West Lake, Meerhof and the Coves 
are between 60 and 70 per cent. Only middle-range 
Xanadu Eco Estate is relatively balanced, racially, 
while Island Estate and Caribbean Beach are majority 
African, suggesting some inroads by the emerging 
African elite (StatsSA, 2011).
In 2000, Hartbeespoort was incorporated into 
the Madibeng local municipality, which includes Brits 
and a number of informal settlements, townships and 
mining compounds. The mainly white Hartbeespoort 
has a complex relationship within the Madibeng 
local municipality, which administers an area 
that, overall, is 90 per cent African. The difficulties 
have been compounded by incidents of racism at 
Hartbeespoort,97 disputes around land claims,98 and 
the poor performance of the municipality.99 In 2010, 
the Hartbeespoort Inhabitants Forum announced 
its intention to establish a Section 21 company to 
take over some of the functions of the municipality, 
with threats by white residents of a rates boycott 
(Kormorant, 3 February 2010; Times Live, 7 March 
2010). In 2015, there were demands by Hartbeespoort 
residents for their own municipality (Business Day, 
1 October 2015).
97. An example is the blatantly advertised “all-white boat cruise”, http://www.wherevent.com/detail/De-Grandiose-House-All-white-Party-
Cruise-in-Hartbeespoort-dam, accessed 3 April 2015. 
98. For example, a black community which had lodged a land claim was furious when the land was sold off to a luxury estate developer before 
the claim was addressed (Mail & Guardian, 9 July 2010). 
99. A major issue is the maintenance of the water supply. In 2010, raw sewage was pumped into the dam after poorly-maintained municipal 
pumps stopped working (Kormorant, 3 February 2010; Times Live, 7 March 2010).
Photograph by Brian Boshoff (Gauteng's Riviera?)
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Conclusion
The Hartbeespoort story is presented above as an 
illustration of growth on the spatial edge of a city-
region produced by the demand for recreational space. 
It is not a simple story, with many twists and turns 
over time, occasioned by both local factors and the 
changing context within which this local development 
happened. There are many insights or lessons that 
could be drawn from this tale, but arguably, the 
most pressing is around the relationship between 
environmental quality and the sustainability of 
development processes. The troubles at Hartbeespoort 
are the consequence of many decades of environmental 
neglect, not only in the vicinity of the dam, but more 
importantly, over the wider catchment. There is now 
no easy solution, but the future of Hartbeespoort as a 
place of natural attraction does depend on a long-term, 
systematic, multi-faceted programme to improve 
water quality in the upper catchment of the Crocodile 
River, and also more rigorous management of 
development around the dam.
Photograph by Nick Roux
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6. Conclusions
The diverse stories of development in the 
perimetropolitan belt of the GCR, challenge both 
the hyped-up literatures on edge city development, 
which posit the edge as the new focus of growth, 
and the simplistic applications of agglomeration 
theory, which suggest that the spatial periphery 
will invariably lose out to the spatial core. Change 
processes are clearly variant and complex across 
both space and time, responding to many contextual 
factors at different scales, and to multiple local 
contingencies. 
However, although there is complexity, and 
also specificity of each case, there are broad trends, 
and insights that may be carried across contexts, 
even beyond national borders. A general insight, 
for example, is how important it is to have an 
understanding of history or temporality. In all the 
cases we studied, current developments are layered 
on earlier developments, and their trajectories and 
prospects are significantly shaped by what happened 
before. Issues of timing are also important. The 
success in one locality and failure in another may often 
be explained by the temporal context within which the 
initiative happened. 
The various sites along the (constantly moving) 
edge of the GCR add to a gradually expanding 
international picture of what is happening along 
the edges of city-regions. The GCR edge may 
not offer much information on private-sector-
led edge city development100 but it does offer 
other insight for local and global study which 
arguably includes:
• The development trajectories of regions and 
localities with mining as the initial growth trigger;
• The shaping power of the state in providing 
public infrastructure (but with a strong influence 
from other actors);
• The impacts of direct state investment (and 
disinvestment) in industrial activity;
• The extended impacts of state programmes to 
incentivise dispersal of industry from the core to the 
edge of the city-region; 
• The significance of institutions and governance 
arrangements in the shaping of space; 
• The shift towards the wholesale and retail sectors as 
a driver of growth;
• The sustainability implications of both economic 
growth and decline.
The GCR may be unique, globally, in the scale 
of mining-related activity, historically, but it is only 
one of many instances where mining has influenced 
the development of an urban agglomeration. The key 
question for many mining-based settlements, globally, 
is what their prospects are for diversifying economies 
to survive the boom-bust cycle associated with 
extractive economies. The experience of Johannesburg 
in the metropolitan core makes a powerful point 
in this regard, but there are also important lessons 
from the spatial edge. The contrasting cases of 
Carletonville and Nigel-Heidelberg in the GCR reveal 
both the extreme difficulties and the possibilities 
for economic diversification. There are many 
contingencies in both cases, and it is impossible 
to transfer lessons from these contexts to others 
too tightly, but there are suggestive implications. 
Most important, perhaps, is the need to invest in 
diversification when mining is still flourishing. In 
Nigel, for example, early industrialisation proved 
critical in sustaining the local economy when mining 
inevitably declined. 
The second insight relates to the shaping power 
of the state in providing base infrastructure that 
directs patterns of development. The state’s role 
in providing water, power and transport (road and 
rail) was immensely important in providing the 
spatial backbone that shaped development patterns, 
and, to a large degree, development trajectories still 
follow the broad patterns that were established more 
than a century ago. However, the role of the state in 
providing infrastructure cannot be separated from 
interactions with private actors. The early patterns 
of infrastructure investment were not the product 
100. The edge cities in Gauteng that correspond most closely to the Garreau ideal are more closely tied, spatially, to the metropolitan core. In 
the 1970s, Sandton City may appropriately have been considered as an edge city. Today, developments in Midrand, Waterfall, Modderfontein, 
and Centurion may be usefully viewed through an edge city lens. In relation to large-scale private-sector-led growth, perimetropolitan GCR 
is a banal space.
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of rational planning by the state on the proverbial 
blank slate, but rather the consequence of complex 
relational engagements. In the Vaal Triangle, 
for example, the private entrepreneur, Sammy 
Marks, played an astonishing role in shaping state 
investment in the Vaal Triangle, through a network 
of patrimonial linkages with the state, and there 
are other also examples, such as the role of local 
landowners in the development of Hartbeespoort 
Dam and environs.
The third set of insights relates to the role of 
the state in setting up industry, and to the effects on 
localities when the state disinvests. The locational 
imperatives of state and privately-owned industry 
differ, with the state being more amenable, for example, 
to locating industry on geographical peripheries. 
This was the case of the Vaal Triangle, where 
strategic imperatives (for example, war-time steel 
production, and self-sufficiency in petroleum products) 
intermingled with strategic spatial objectives such 
as regional balance. However, once again, there 
was a blurred relationship between the rationales 
and activity of government and the private sector. 
Location of industry in the Vaal clearly did have an 
economic rationale (in the supply of water and power 
for steel-making, and access to transport networks). 
But, locational decision-making by the state was also 
manipulated by the interests of private entrepreneurs 
such as Sammy Marks.
The more important current question for 
the GCR, and for many localities globally, is what 
happens to localities created through direct state 
investment when the state disinvests. State-owned 
industry may have been inefficient, but it was often 
relatively stable, buttressed by various forms of 
strategic support. Localities often grow rapidly when 
state-owned industries are established, and then 
experience decades of relative insecurity when the 
state disinvests. 
Fourth, the GCR offers insights into the possible 
futures of places in South Africa, and internationally, 
that were created through industrial dispersal and 
growth pole policies. The studies of Babelegi and 
Bronkhorstspruit show that the impacts of state 
policy (including industrial incentives) should be 
explored over an extended period. While Babelegi 
and Bronkhorstspruit suffered degrees of decline 
after the removal of industrial incentives, the 
industrial infrastructure established in an earlier 
period arguably now provides the base for new 
economic activity. There are also surprise outcomes 
of earlier initiatives such as the ‘faith-based economy’ 
of Bronkhorstspruit that followed Taiwanese 
investment in the 1980s.
The fifth area of insight is around the role 
of governance and institutions in supporting 
spatial development. There are strong indications, 
for example, that post-apartheid border 
changes that brought localities into Gauteng 
Province, and into metropolitan municipalities, 
have played a role in the restoration of local 
growth processes.
The sixth area relates to the rise of wholesale 
and retail trade as a driver of growth. Conventionally, 
this sector is regarded as one of derived growth, 
that tracks the development of more basic sectors 
such as mining or manufacturing. Our case studies 
suggest, however, that wholesale and retail may be 
drivers of growth in their own right. New malls are 
being established, for example, in areas where other 
sectors are highly vulnerable, or even, in real decline. 
This development often stimulates the growth of 
the construction and property sectors, and leads 
residents to spend more locally, increasing the local 
circulation of income. This is consistent, for example, 
with arguments around the rise of consumer spending 
power in the townships, and the capacity of new malls 
to tap into this expansion (McGaffin and Gavera, 
2011). On the downside, however, new malls may 
negatively affect small- to medium-sized independent 
"... post-apartheid border changes that brought 
localities into Gauteng Province, and into 
metropolitan municipalities, have played a role  
in the restoration of local growth processes."
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business in the formal and informal sectors, and 
could impact on CBDs  already facing varying 
degrees of decline.
A seventh set of insights relates to the role of 
environmental quality in ensuring the sustainability of 
growth on the spatial edge. There is acknowledgement 
in the international literature that locations on 
the edge are often disproportionately vulnerable 
to environmental deterioration, as management 
processes are frequently weaker in these localities 
than in the spatial core. There may indeed be short- to 
medium-term economic benefits in having weak or 
overly flexible environmental controls, but the lesson 
from the edge of the GCR is that the long-term effects 
could be severely damaging. Places like Carletonville-
Khutsong, Steel Valley in the Vaal, and Hartbeespoort 
Dam provide sobering lessons.
Finally, a key conclusion from this report is that 
the experience of history should talk to the present, 
including to policies and plans for the future. 
Drawing the lessons is not always simple, but it 
is necessary. The report shows, for example, that 
government interventions in the metropolitan 
periphery may have large-scale impacts, but 
these impacts are often not what is planned 
or anticipated.
Photograph by Clive Hassall
298
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
 Bibliography
ABRAHAMS, D. (2007). The Military as an Economic 
Agent in Local Economic Development: The Case of 
South Africa, Urban Forum, 18: 13-30.
ADDIE, J. AND KEIL. R. (2015). Real Existing 
Regionalism: The Region between Talk, Territory 
and Technology, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 39(2): 407-417.
ADELL, G. (1999). Theories and Models of the Peri-
urban Interface: A Changing Conceptual Landscape, a 
Report of the Development Planning Unit, University 
College, London. Available at http://discovery.ucl.
ac.uk/43/1/DPU_PUI_Adell_THEORIES_ 
MODELS.pdf.
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC 
CONSULTANTS (PTY) LTD AND KAY, K. (2009). 
Industrial Land Study for the City of Johannesburg, 
Department of Development Planning and Urban 
Management, Directorate of Development Facilitation: 
1 & 2. Johannesburg: City of Johannesburg, 
Department of Development Planning and  
Urban Management.
AGUILAR, A. (1999). Mexico City Growth and 
Regional Dispersal: The Expansion of Largest Cities 
and New Spatial Forms, Habitat International,  
23(3): 391-412.
AGUILAR, A. (2008). Peri-urbanization, Illegal  
settlements and Environmental Impact in Mexico  
City, Cities, 25: 133-145.
AGUILAR, A. AND WARD, P. (2003). Globalization, 
Regional Development, and Mega-city Expansion in 
Latin America: Analyzing Mexico City’s Peri-urban 
Hinterland, Cities, 20(1): 3-21.
AHUJA, G. AND MAJUMDAR, S. (1998). An 
Assessment of the Performance of Indian State- 
owned Enterprises, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
9(2): 113-132.
ALEXANDER, A. (2009). Britain’s New Towns. Garden 
Cities to Sustainable Communities. Routledge: London.
AMIN, S. (1976). Unequal Development: An Essay on 
the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. New 
York: Monthly Review Press.
ANDERSON, A. (2000). Paradox in the Periphery: An 
Entrepreneurial Reconstruction? Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development: An International Journal, 
12(2): 99-109.
ANDERSSON, M. AND KARLSSON, C. (2007). 
Knowledge in Regional Economic Growth – The Role 
of Knowledge Accessibility, Industry and Innovation, 
14(2): 129-149.
ANONYMOUS 1. (2013). Interview conducted with 
community leader in Khutsong by Yasmeen Dinath and 
Khangelani Moyo, 13 March.
ANONYMOUS 2. (2013). Interview conducted with 
community leader in Khutsong by Yasmeen Dinath and 
Khangelani Moyo, 13 March.
ARCELORMITTAL. (2012). ArcelorMittal South 
Africa Vanderbijlpark Works. Presentation. Available 
at http://southafrica.arcelormittal.com/Portals/0/
Vanderbijlpark%20Works%20presentation%20
%E2%80%93%20UBS%20visit%20%203% 
20Oct%202012.pdf.
ATOMIC ENERGY BOARD. (1976). Environmental 
Radioactivity at the National Nuclear Research 
Centre, Pelindaba. Available at http://www.
iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_
Public/08/303/8303307.pdf.
BANISTER, D. AND BERECHMAN, Y. (2001). 
Transport Investment and the Promotion of  
Economic Growth, Journal of Transport  
Geography, 9(3): 209-218.
299
PART B
BARCHIESI, F. AND KENNY, B. (2002). From 
Workshop to Wasteland: De-industrialisation and 
Fragmentation of the Black Working Class on the East 
Rand (South Africa) 1990–1999, International Review 
of Social History, 47: 35-63.
BEAUREGARD, R. (1995). Edge Cities: Peripheralizing 
the Center, Urban Geography, 16(8): 708-721.
BEAUREGARD, R. (1997). The Unavoidable 
Incompleteness of the City, American Behavioral 
Scientist, 41: 327-341.
BELL, T (1984). The State, the Market, and the 
Interregional Distribution of Industry in South Africa: 
Report for the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty 
in South Africa, Carnegie Conference paper No. 
243. Available at http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/
bitstream/handle/11090/196/1984_bell_ccp243.
pdf?sequence=1, accessed 29 June 2015.
BEUKMAN, E. (2012). Presentation: Turnaround 
Strategy and Revitailisation of the Babelegi Industrial 
Park. TITIIC 2012 edn. CSIR Enterprise Creation for 
Development, Pretoria.
BIGALE, L. (2011). Consol Nigel Glass Factory, South 
Africa, Engineering News, November 25.
BINNS, T. AND NEL, E. (2003). The Village in the 
Game Park: Community Response to the Demise of 
Coal Mining in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa Economic 
Geography, 79: 421–66.
BLIGNAUT, J. (2012). Climate Change: The 
Opportunity Cost of the Kusile and Medupi Power 
Stations, Journal of Energy in Southern Africa,  
23(4): 67-75.
BLOCH, R. (1993). Regenerating the East Rand: 
Promoting Growth and Opportunity in the South 
African Industrial Heartland, Unpublished report for 
the Urban Foundation, Office for Metropolitan and 
Industrial Research, Germiston.
BLOOM, J. (2011). Stinkwater: A Forgotten 
Community, Politicsweb, September 27. Available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za.
BONNER, P. (1990). Desirable or Undesirable Basutho 
Women? Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of 
Basutho Women to the Rand, 1920–1945, in C. Walker 
(ed.), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, 
Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, pp. 238-240.
BONTJE, M. (2004). From Suburbia to Post-
suburbia in the Netherlands: Potentials and Threats 
for Sustainable Regional Development, Journal of 
Housing and the Built Environment, 19(1): 25-47.
BONTJE, M. AND BURDOCK, J. (2005). Edge 
Cities, European-style: Examples from Paris and the 
Randstad, Cities, 22(4): 317-330.
BOOYSENS, I. AND VISSER, G. (2010). Tourism 
SMME Development on the Urban Fringe: The Case of 
Parys, South Africa, Urban Forum, 21(4): 367-385.
BRAUN, T. (2012). Puma. Neurstadt: Books on Demand 
GmbH.
BROOKS, S. (2005). Images of ‘Wild Africa’: Nature 
Tourism and the (Re)creation of Hluhluwe Game 
Reserve, 1930–1945, Journal of Historical  
Geography, 31(2): 220-240.
BRYCESON, D. AND MACKINNON, D. (2012). Eureka 
and Beyond: Mining’s Impact on African Urbanisation, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies,  
30(4): 539-550.
BUIRE, C. (2014). Suburbanisms in Africa? Spatial 
Growth and Social Transformation in New Urban 
Peripheries: Introduction to the Cluster, African 
Studies, 73(2): 241-244.
BUNN, D. (1996). Comparative Barbarism: Game 
Reserves, Sugar Plantations, and the Modernization 
of South African Landscape, in K. Darian-Smith, L. 
Gunner and S. Nuttall (eds), Text, Theory, Space: Land, 
Literature and History in South Africa and Australia. 
London: Routledge, pp. 37-52.
BURNLEY, I. AND MURPHY, P. (1995). Residential 
Location Choice in Sydney’s Perimetropolitan Region, 
Urban Geography, 16(2): 123-143.
300
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
BURNLEY, I. AND MURPHY, P. (2005). Sea Change: 
Movement from Metropolitan to Arcadian Australia. 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
CAPASSO, M., CEFIS, E. AND FRENKEN, K. (2011). 
Spatial Differentiation in Industrial Dynamics: A 
Core–Periphery Analysis Based on the Pavitt- 
Miozzo-Soete Taxonomy. Internal Report, Ecis 
Working Paper, No. 11.01. Eindhoven: Technische 
Universiteit Eindhoven.
CASTELLS, M. AND HALL, P. (1995). Technopoles 
of the World: The Making of Twenty-first Century 
Industrial Complexes. London: Routledge.
CDE. (1997). The East Rand: Can South Africa’s 
Workshop be Revived? Report of the Centre for 
Development and Enterprise in the Big Cities Series. 
Available at http://www.cde.org.za/.
CERVERO, R. (1995). Planned Communities, Self-
containment and Community: A Cross-National 
Perspective, Urban Studies, 32(7), 1135-1161.
CHASKALSON, M. (1986). The Road to Sharpeville, 
African Studies Seminar Paper, No. 199. Available 
at http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/
handle/10539/8519/ISS-75.pdf?sequence=1.
CHAUKE, C. (2011). Tshwane Strategic Investment 
Attraction, Facilitation and Aftercare Plan (2011–
2016). Department of Economic Development,  
City of Tshwane.
CITY OF EKURHULENI. (2011). Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework Review 
2010/11: 1,2,3. City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality, Ekurhuleni.
CITY OF MERAFONG. (2015). A Large Sinkhole has 
Developed in Carletonville. Available at http://www.
merafong.gov.za/2015/06/15/4181/.
CITY OF TSHWANE. (2008). Draft Spatial 
Development Framework for the Far North Eastern 
Region of the City of Tshwane. City of Tshwane.
CITY OF TSHWANE. (2010). Service Delivery and 
Budget Implementation Plan July 2010 to June 
2011. Available at http://www.tshwane.gov.za/
sites/Departments/Financial-Services/SDBIP/
SDBIP2010_11.pdf.
CITY OF TSHWANE. (2012a). Tshwane Metropolitan 
Spatial Development Framework, June 2012.  
City of Tshwane.
CITY OF TSHWANE (2012b). Tshwane Regional 
Spatial Development Framework Region 7.  
City of Tshwane.
CLARK, A. AND DANIEL, T. (2009). Forecasting 
South African House Prices, Investment Analysts 
Journal, 64: 27-34.
CLOKE, P., CRANG, C. AND GOODWIN, M. (2013). 
Introducing Human Geographies, Second Edition. 
Abington: Routledge.
COHEN, P. (2010). Lessons from the Nationalization 
Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in France, Dissent, 
Winter 2010. Available at http://www.dissentmaga-
zine.org/article/lessons-from-the-nationalization- 
nation-state-owned-enterprises-in-france.
COMAROFF, J. AND COMAROFF, J. (eds). (2006). 
Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
CONSOL GLASS. (2013). Consol Nigel. Available at 
http://Hammanskraal.consol.co.za/irj/go/km/docs/
site/pages/consol_nigel.html, accessed 13 June 2013.
COPUS, A. (2001). From Core–Periphery to 
Polycentric Development: Concepts of Spatial and 
Aspatial Peripherality, European Planning Studies, 
9(4): 539-552.
CRANKSHAW, O. (1996). Social Differentiation, 
Conflict and Development in a South African 
Township, Urban Forum, 7(1): 53-67.
301
PART B
CREAMER, M. (2008). Gold Fields Ready to Pass 
on Rose-growing Baton as R50m Expansion Unfolds 
[Homepage of Mining Weekly], 11 July. Available at 
http://Hammanskraal.miningweekly.com/article/
gold-fields-ready-to-pass-on-rosegrowing-baton-as-
r50m-expansion-unfolds-2008-07-11, accessed  
20 June 2013.
CURLE, J. (1905). Gold Mines of the World.  
London: Routledge.
DAVOUDI, S. (2003). Polycentricity in European 
Spatial Planning: From an Analytical to a Normative 
Agenda, European Planning Studies, 11(8): 979-999.
DE BRUYN, C. (2010,). Gauteng seeks private sector 
funding for infrastructure projects [Homepage of 
Engineering News], 22 February. Available at http://
Hammanskraal.engineeringnews.co.za/article/
gauteng-seeks-private-sector-funding-for-infrastruc-
ture-projects-2010-02-22, accessed 16 June 2013.
DE JAGER, C. AND BOSOGA, D. (2011). Merafong 
Regional Spatial Development Framework 2011. 
Merafong City.
DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS. (2004). 
Hartbeespoort Dam Remediation Project. Available 
at https://www.dwa.gov.za/Harties/documents/
ActionPlanVol1Oct04p2.pdf, accessed 1 April 2015.
DEWAR, D., TODES, A. AND WATSON, V. (1986). 
Industrial Decentralization Policy in South Africa: 
Rhetoric and Practice, Urban Studies, 23(5): 363-376.
DOAN, P. AND ODURO, C. (2012). Patterns of 
Population Growth in Peri-urban Accra, Ghana, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
36(6): 1306-1325.
DOUGLASS, M. AND HUANG, L. (2012). Globalizing 
the City in Southeast Asia: Utopia on the Urban Edge – 
The Case of Phu My Hung, Saigon, IJAPS, 3(2): 1-42.
DÖVÉNYI, Z. AND KOVÁCS, Z. (2006). Budapest: 
The Post-Socialist Metropolitan Periphery Between 
‘Catching up’ and Individual Development Path, 
European Spatial Research and Policy, 13(2): 23-40.
DUNN, J. (2006). Comeng 1: A History of 
Commonwealth Engineering 1921–1955. Kenthurst: 
Rosenberg Publishing.
DURANTON, G. AND PUGA, D. (2001). Nursery 
Cities: Urban Diversity, Process Innovation, and the 
Life Cycle of Products, American Economic Review, 
91(5): 517-525.
EARTHLIFE AFRICA (2009) Press release. 
Climate Protest at Sasolburg Plant, 8 December. 
Available at http://earthlife.org.za/2009/12/
press-release-climate-protest-at-sasolburg-plant/.
EKERS, M., HAMEL, P. AND KEIL, R. (2012). 
Governing Suburbia: Modalities and Mechanisms  
of Suburban Governance, Regional Studies,  
46(3): 405-422.
EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY. 
(2005). Ekurhuleni Growth and Development Strategy 
2025. Germiston: City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality, Directorate of Communications  
and Marketing.
EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY. 
(2010a). Development Guide. Germiston: City of 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, Directorate of 
Communications and Marketing.
EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY. 
(2010b). A Ten Year History of Ekurhuleni 2000–
2010. Germiston: City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality, Directorate of Communications  
and Marketing.
EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. (2011a). 
Premier Nomvula Mokonyane Launches Maize 
Triangle. [Homepage of Emfuleni Local Municipality]. 
Available at http://Hammanskraal.emfuleni.gov.
za/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti-
cle&id=201:premier-nomvula-mokonyane-launch-
es-maize-triangle-&catid=1:emfuleni-news&Itemid=2, 
accessed 13 June 2013.
EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. (2011b). 
Emfuleni Local Municipality Integrated Development 
Plan 2011–2012. Emfuleni Local Municipality.
302
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
ERASMUS, H. (2010). Midvaal R59 Corridor: Vaal 
Flow, Building Africa, May. Available at. http:// 
www.myvirtualpaper.com/doc/brookepattrick/ 
ba_may_2010/2010050601/27.html#26, accessed  
30 March 2015.
ESKORT. (N/D). Our history. Available on http:// 
www.eskort.com/index.cfm?Aid=1885891806.
ESKOM. (N/D) Kusile Power Station Project. Available 
on http://www.eskom.co.za/Whatweredoing/
NewBuild/Pages/Kusile_Power_Station.aspx. 
 
FEAGIN, J. 1990. Extractive Regions in Developed 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis of the Oil Capitals, 
Houston and Aberdeen, Urban Affairs Review,  
25(4): 591-619.
FGX STUDIOS. (2013). Mall Listings: Tsakane Mall 
[Homepage of FGX Studios]. Available at http://
Hammanskraal.mallguide.co.za/malls/gauteng/
tsakane/tsakane-mall/1204, accessed 13 June 2013.
FIRMAN, T. (2009). The Continuity and Change in 
Mega-urbanization in Indonesia: A Survey of the 
Jakarta-Bandung Region (JBR) Development, Habitat 
International, 33: 327-339.
FISHMAN, R. (1987). Bourgeois Utopias: Visions 
of Utopia, in Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of 
Suburbia, 3-17. New York: Basic Books.
FLOUD, R. AND MCCLOSKEY, D. (1994) The 
Economic History of Britain Since 1700, Vol. 3. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
FOURIE, M. (2014). GroundUp: Vaal Environmental 
Justice Alliance Claims Court Victory, Daily  
Maverick, December 24.
FREUDENBURG, W. AND FRICKEL, S. (1994). 
Digging Deeper: Mining-dependent Regions in 
Historical Perspective, Rural Sociology,  
59(2): 266-288.
FREUND, B. (2015). Twentieth-century Social and 
Environmental Planning in the Vaal Triangle and its 
Consequences. Paper presented at a Colloquium on 
the Peripheries of the Gauteng City-Region, School 
of Architecture and Planning, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
FREY, W. AND SPEARE, A. (1988). Regional and 
Metropolitan Growth and Decline in the United States. 
New York: Russel Sage Publications.
FRIEDMANN, J. AND MILLER, J. (1965). The Urban 
Field, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 
31(4): 312-320.
FUJITA, M. AND THISSE, J. (2013). Economics 
of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location and 
Globalization (Second Edition). New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
GABORIT, P. (2010). European New Towns: Image, 
Identities, and Future Perspectives, P.I.E. Brussels: 
Peter Lang.
GANLEY, H. AND MILLS, G. (2011). From ‘Whoosh-
Bonk’ to Formula One Systems and Specialists: A 
Modern Recipe for High Tech Engineering Success, 
Discussion paper 2011/02, The Brenthurst  
Foundation, Johannesburg.
GARREAU, J. (1991). Edge City: Life on the New 
Frontier. New York: Anchor Books.
GAUTENG PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE. (2010). Provincial 
Economic Review and Outlook 2010. PR307/2010. 
Johannesburg: Gauteng Provincial Government.
GEREFFI, G., HUMPHREY, J. AND STURGEON, 
T. (2005). The Governance of Global Value Chains, 
Review of International Political Economy,  
12(1): 78-104.
303
PART B
Photograph by Clive Hassall
304
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
GEYER, H. (1989). Apartheid in South Africa and 
Industrial Deconcentration in the PWV Area, 
Planning Perspectives, 4(3): 251-269.
GEYER, H. (1996). Expanding the Theoretical 
Foundation of Differential Urbanization, Tijschrift 
voor Economische en sociale geografie, 87(1): 44-58.
GEYER, H. (JR), GEYER, H., DU PLESSIS, D. AND 
VAN EEDEN, A. (2012). Differential Urbanization 
Trends in South Africa: Local and Regional 
Equivalents, Environment and Planning A,  
44: 2940-2956.
GILBERT, L, AND DE JONG, F. (2015). Entanglements 
of Periphery and Informality in Mexico City, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
39(3): 518-532.
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (2015). Pelindaba Nuclear 
Research Center 25°48'S 27°54'E. Available at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rsa/pelindaba.
htm, accessed 2 April 2015.
GOLDFIELDS. (2012). Integrated Annual Review. 
Available at https://www.goldfields.co.za/
reports/2012/ir.pdf.
GOTZ, G., WRAY, C. AND MUBIWA, B. (2014). 
The ‘Thin Oil of Urbanization’? Spatial Change 
in Johannesburg and the Gauteng City-Region, in 
P. Harrison, G. Gotz, A. Todes and C. Wray (eds), 
Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg  
after Apartheid. Wits University Press:  
Johannesburg: 42-62.
GROUNDWORK. (2003). National Report on 
Community-based Air Pollution Monitoring in 
South Africa: Air Pollution in Selected Industrial 
Areas in South Africa, 2000–2002. Available at 
http://www.groundwork.org.za/specialreports/
AirMonitoringReport2003.pdf.
HALL, S. (2014). Industrial Closure, Regional 
Development and Local Planning: Multiple 
Narratives of Change from the Experience of 
Longbridge, Birmingham, Local Economy. doi: 
10.1177/0269094213483968.
HALLOWES, D. AND MUNNIK, V. (2006). Poisoned 
Spaces: Manufacturing Wealth, Producing Poverty, 
Groundwork Report. Available at http://www.ground-
work.org.za/reports/gWReport2006.pdf.
HAMEL, P. AND KEIL, R. (2015). Introduction: 
Governance in a Suburban World, in P, Hamel and 
R. Keil (eds.), Suburban Governance: A Global View. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
HARRISON, P. (1998). Regional Policy: South  
African Challenges and Global Networks. Report 
prepared for the Centre for Development and 
Enterprise, Johannesburg.
HARRISON, P. AND TODES, A. (2016). Satellite 
Settlement on the Spatial Periphery – Lessons 
from International and Gauteng Experience. Paper 
presented at the Southern African Cities Conference 
held at the Durban University of Technology,  
Durban, 13-17 March.
HARRISON, P. AND ZACK, T. (2012). The Power of 
Mining: The Fall of Gold and Rise of Johannesburg. 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies,  
30(4): 551-570.
HART, G. (2002). Disabling Globalization: Places 
of Power in Post-apartheid South Africa. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
HART, G. AND PARTRIDGE, T. (1966). Factors in 
the Development of the Urban Fringe North-West of 
Johannesburg, South African Geographic Journal, 
48(1): 32-44.
HART, J. (1991). The Perimetropolitan Bow Wave, 
Geographical Review, 81(1), 35-51.
HARVEST BAGS (2013). Company Website. Available 
at http://www.harvestbags.co.za/wcontact.php, 
accessed 20 April 2015.
HAYS, S. (1998). Explorations in Environmental 
History: Essays. Pittsburgh: University of  
Pittsburgh Press.
305
PART B
HEIDELBURG GP. (2014). Small Town with ‘Big City’ 
Benefits. Available at http://www.heidelberggp.co.za/.
HENDERSON, R. (1974). Industrial Overspill from 
Glasgow: 1958–1968, Urban Studies, 11(1): 61-79.
HOLLOWAY, J. AND HONES, S. (2007). Muji, 
Materiality, and Mundane Geographies, Environment 
and Planning A, 39: 555-569.
HOLM, A. (2005). HOEV se opname van besien-
swaardighede Hartbeespoortdam: Omgewings- en 
Erfenisvereeniging van Hartbeespoortdam. Available 
at http://www.bobbejaanskloof.co.za/xcustom.
php?page=16619, accessed 2 April 2015.
HOOGENDOORN, G., MELLETT, R. AND VISSER, G. 
(2005). Second Homes Tourism in Africa: Reflections 
on the South African Experience, Urban Forum, 
16(2-3): 112-154.
ISARD, W. (1956). Location and Space-economy: A 
General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market 
Areas, Land use, Trade, and Urban Structure. Boston: 
The Technology Press of MIT.
ISPAT ISCOR. (2004). Investor Pack. Available at 
www.arcelormittalsa.com/Portals/0/investor_pack_
aug_04ab5.ppt.
IYER, S., KITSON, M. AND TOH, B. (2005). Social 
Capital, Economic Growth and Regional Development, 
Regional Studies, 39(8): 1015-1040.
JAFFEE, G. (1988). Commuter Labour: Changing 
Women's Lives, Changing Households, Agenda: 
Empowering Women for Gender Equity, 3:3-9.
JARVIS, A. (1988). Ecological Problems in the 
Hartbeespoort Dam, Journal of the Limnological 
Society of Southern Africa, 14(2): 82-86.
JENKINS, P. (2003). In Search of the Urban–Rural 
Front-line in Post-war Mozambique and Angola, 
Environment & Urbanisation, 15(1): 121-134.
JENKINS, P. (2013). Urbanization, Urbanism and 
Urbanity in an African City: Home Spaces and House 
Cultures. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
JOHANNESBURG CITY COUNCIL. (1956).  
Seventy Golden Years. Johannesburg: Felspar 
Publishing Company.
KARAN BEEF. (2013). The Group [Homepage of Karan 
Beef]. Available at http://karanbeef.co.za/AboutUs, 
accessed 13 June 2013.
KASARDA, J. AND LINDSAY. G. (2011). Aerotropolis: 
The Way We'll Live Next. New York: Farrar,  
Strauss and Girrar.
KESTING, M. AND WESTCOTT, A. (eds). (2009). Sun 
Tropes: Sun City and (Post) Apartheid Culture in South 
Africa. Koln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther Konig.
KHARE INC. (2005). Duduza Local Spatial 
Development Framework 2005. Germiston: Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality.
KIRSHNER, J. (2014). Reconceptualising Xenophobia, 
Urban Governance and Inclusion: The Case of 
Khutsong, in C. Haferburg and M. Huchzermeyer (eds), 
Urban Governance in Post-Apartheid Cities: Modes of 
Engagement in South Africa’s Metropoles. Stuttgart: 
Borntraeger Science Publishers.
KIRSHNER, J. AND POKELA, C. (2010). Khutsong 
and Xenophobic Violence: Exploring the Case of the 
Dog that Didn’t Bite. Centre for Sociological Research: 
University of Johannesburg. Available at http://www.
gcro.ac.za/sites/default/files/News_items/Xeno_
reports_July2010/case_studies/5_Khutsong_ 
reprint_lowres.pdf.
KITCO METALS INC. (2013). Charts and Data 
[Homepage of Kitco Metals Inc.]. Available at http://
www.kitco.com/scripts/hist_charts/yearly_graphs.
plx, accessed 6 October 2013.
306
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
KOK, P. (1998). South Africa’s Magnifying Glass: 
A Profile of Gauteng. Report. Cape Town: Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC).
KRUGMAN, P. (1991). Increasing Returns and 
Economic Geography, Journal of Political Economy, 
99(3): 483-499.
KRUGMAN, P. (1995). Development, Geography, and 
Economic Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
KRUGMAN, P. and VENABLES, A.J. (1996). 
Integration, Specialization, and Adjustment, European 
Economic Review, 40(3-5): 959-967.
KUHN, A. (2012). Gauteng Agriculture  
Services: SA's Most Populous Region, Match Deck, 
http://www.matchdeck.com/article/684-gauteng- 
agriculture-services-sa-s-most-populous- 
region#/index.
LAKE, S. (2011). Drought and Aquatic Ecosystems: 
Effects and Responses. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
LALL, S. AND CHAKRAVORTY, S. (2005). Industrial 
Location and Spatial Inequality: Theory and Evidence 
from India, Review of Development Economics,  
9(1): 47-68.
LANG, R. (2003). Edgeless Cities: Exploring  
the Elusive Metropolis. Washington D.C.: The  
Brookings Institution.
LANG, R. AND LEFURGY, J. (2003). Edgeless Cities: 
Examining the Noncentered Metropolis, Housing 
Policy Debate, 14(3): 427-460.
LEIGH, R. (1968). Vereeniging History.  
Available at http://www.vaaltriangleinfo.co.za/
history/vereeniging/.
LESEDI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. (2008).  
Annual Report 2007–2008. GT423. Heidelberg:  
Lesedi Local Municipality.
LESEDI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. (2011). Annual 
Report July 2010 to June 2011: Development and 
Planning. Draft Annual Report edn. Heidelberg: Lesedi 
Local Municipality.
LESEDI LOCAL MUNICIPAILTY. (2012). Lesedi  
Local Municipality IDP 2012–2016. Heidelberg:  
Lesedi Local Municipality.
LEVITT, T. (1965). Exploit the Product Life Cycle, 
Harvard Business Review, 43:81-94.
LI, H., CHANG, P., AND CHENG, Y. (2009). Economic 
Vulnerability of Mining City: A Case Study of Fuxin 
City, Liaoning Province, China, Chinese Geographical 
Science, 19(3): 211-218.
LI, H., LO, K., AND WANG, M. (2015). Economic 
Transformation of Mining Cities in Transition 
Economies: Lessons from Daqing, Northeast China, 
International Development Planning Review,  
37(3): 311-328.
LIN, C. (2001). Metropolitan Development in a 
Transitional Socialist Economy: Spatial Restructuring 
in the Pearl River Delta, China, Urban Studies, 38(3): 
383-406.
LIN, C. (2004). The Chinese Globalizing Cities: 
National Centers of Globalization and Urban 
Transformation, Progress in Planning, 61(3): 143–157.
LOCHNER, L. (2013). Resources Policy and Mine 
Closure in South Africa: The Case of the Free State 
Goldfields, Resources Policy, 38(3): 363-372.
LOCHNER, L. AND CLOETE, J. (2013). Labour 
Migration, Settlement and Mine Closure in South 
Africa, Geography, 98: 77-84.
LONG, D. AND HOOGENDOORN, G. (2013). Second 
Home Owners' Perceptions of a Polluted Environment: 
The case of Hartbeespoort, South African 
Geographical Journal, 95(1): 91-104.
307
PART B
LORKIN, J. (2015). From Boom to Bust in Australia's 
Mining Towns, BBC News, 4 January.
MABIN, A. (2013). The Map of Gauteng: Evolution of a 
City-region in Concept and Plan, Occasional Paper No. 
5, Gauteng City-Region Observatory, Johannesburg.
MABIN, A., BUTCHER, S., AND BLOCH, R. (2013). 
Peripheries, Suburbanisms and Change in Sub-
Saharan African Cities, Social Dynamics: A Journal of 
African Studies, 39(2): 167-190.
MACNAB, R. (1987). Gold their Touchstone: Gold 
Fields of South Africa 1887–1987: A Centenary Story. 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
MAKHURA, D. (2015). State of the Province Address. 
Available at http://www.brandsouthafrica.com/
news/1158-moving-gauteng-forward-in-2015-the-
state-of-the-province-address, accessed 5 April 2015.
MARKUSEN, A. AND PARK. S.O. (1993). The State as 
Industrial Locator and District Builder: The Case of 
Changwon, South Korea, Economic Geography,  
69(2): 157–181.
MASANGO, S. (2013). Interview conducted with 
local area planner for  Region 7 in the City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality by Yasmeen Dinath and 
Khangelani Moyo, 13 March.
MARTIN, R. AND SUNLEY, P. (2006). Path 
Dependence and Regional Economic Evolution, 
Journal of Economic Geography, 6(4): 395-437.
MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, C., WU, C., SCHATZ, L., 
TAIRA, N., AND VARGAS-HERNANDEZ, J. (2012). 
The Shrinking Mining City: Urban Dynamics and 
Contested Territory, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, 36(2): 245-60.
MASHITILE, P. (2008). State of the Province Address 
by the Premier of Gauteng, Paul Shipokosa Mashitile, 
Gauteng Legislature, 16 February 2008. Available at 
http://www.gautrain.co.za/newsroom/2009/02/state-
of-the-province-address-by-the-premier-of-gauteng/.
MASSEY, D. (1995). Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social 
Structures and the Geography of Production, Second 
Edition. New York: Routledge.
MBIBA, B. AND HUCHZERMEYER, M. (2002). 
Contentious Development: Peri-urban Studies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Progress in Development Studies,  
2(2): 113-131.
MCGAFFIN, R. AND GAVERA, L. (2011).  
Taking Stock: The Development of Retail Centres in 
Emerging Economy Areas. Impact on Local Consumers, 
Local Businesses and the Local Economy, July:  
Urban Land Mark.
MENDELSOHN, R. (1991). Sammy Marks: The 
Uncrowned King of the Transvaal. Cape Town:  
David Philip Publishers.
MERAFONG CITY LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. (2010). 
Local Integrated Transport Plan 2012 2013 (Second 
Draft LITP). Merafong City Local Municipality and 
West Rand District Municipality.
MERAFONG CITY LOCAL MUNICIPALITY. 
(2011). Draft Integrated Development Plan 2011–2016. 
Merafong City Local Municipality.
METH, P. (1998). Rethinking the Dumping Grounds: 
The Case of Bilanyoni. PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge.
MEYER, W. (2012). Early Hartbeespoort: The 
Transformation of a Rural Retreat; Kosmos: 
Schoeman’s Special Retreat, and The Building 
of Hartbeespoort Dam: Forgotten Feature to be 
Resurrected, Kormorant, 17 January.
MEYER, W. (2013) Magaliesberg Kaleidoscope. 
Pretoria: IRMEY.
MICHEL, D. AND SCOTT, D. (2012). The La Lucia-
Umhlanga Ridge as an Emerging ‘Edge City’, South 
African Geographical Journal, 87(2): 104-114.
308
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
MORRIS, R. (2006). The Mute and the Unspeakable: 
Political Subjectivity, Violent Crime, and ‘the Sexual 
Thing’ in a South African Mining Community, in  
J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff (eds), Law and Disorder  
in the Postcolony. University of Chicago Press:  
Chicago: 57-101.
MUBIWA, B. AND ANNEGARN, H. (2013).  
Historical Spatial Change in the Gauteng City- 
Region, Occasional Paper, No. 4, Gauteng City- 
Region Observatory, Johannesburg.
MUNNIK, V. (2012). Discursive Power and 
Environmental Justice in the New South Africa: The 
Steel Valley Struggle Against Pollution (1996–2006), 
PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. Available at http://cer.org.za/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/11/Munnik-PhD-Steel-Valley-
struggle-2012.pdf.
MURPHY, P. AND BURNLEY, I. (1993). Socio-
demographic Structure of Sydney’s Perimetropolitan 
Region, Journal of Australian Population Association, 
10(2): 127-144.
MURRAY, C. (1987). Displaced Urbanization: South 
Africa’s Rural Slums, African Affairs, 86(344): 311-329.
NDAZAMELA, P. (2015). Private Sector Must Now 
Join the Party in IDC Space, Business Day, 3 February.
NEL, E. AND BINNS, T. (2002). Decline and Response 
in South Africa’s Free State Goldfields: Local 
Economic Development in Matjhabeng, International 
Development Planning Review, 24(3): 249-269.
NELSON, A. (1992). Characterizing Exurbia, Journal 
of Planning Literature, 6(4): 350-368.
NESTLÉ SOUTH AFRICA. (2011). Nestlé to Invest 
R500m in SA: Add Two Factories to Local Portfolio. 
Available at http://Hammanskraal.nestle.co.za/
media/pressreleases/nestletoinvestr500minsaad-
dtwofactoriestolocalportfolio, accessed 16 June 2013.
NEWMAN, P AND KENWORTHY, J. (1989). Gasoline 
Consumption and Cities: A Comparison of U.S. Cities 
with a Global Survey, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 55(1): 24-37.
NIEUWOUDT, A. (2014). The Rosslyn Automotive 
Supplier Park: A Critical Assessment from a Supply 
Chain Perspective. Available at http://dasresultat.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2014-SAPICS-A-Nieu-
woudt-White-Paper-Final.pdf
NORTH WEST PARKS AND TOURISM BOARD. 
(1997). The Bojanala Region of the North West Province: 
Babelegi [Homepage of Linx Africa]. Available at http://
Hammanskraal.tourismnorthwest.co.za/bojanala/
babelegi.html, accessed 13 June 2013.
NORTH WEST PROVINCE. (2004). Hartbeespoort 
Dam Remediation Project (Phase One). Available 
at https://www.dwa.gov.za/Harties/documents/
ActionPlanVol2Oct04.pdf, accessed 2 April 2015.
NORTON, R. AND REES, J. (2007). The Product 
Cycle and Spatial Decentralization of American 
Manufacturing, Regional Studies, 41(S1): 61-71.
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS (NUMSA). 
(2004). Press release, 24 November. Available at http://
www.numsa.org.za/article/tiger-wheels-to-retrench-
700-workers-in-order-to-introduce-new-technology/.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD). (2013). State Owned 
Enterprise in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Engines of Development and Competitiveness, 
OECD Publishing. Available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264202979-en.
PANDY, W. AND ROGERSON, C. (2013). The 
Timeshare Industry of Africa: A Study in Tourism 
Geography, Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic 
Series, 21: 97-109.
309
PART B
Photograph by Clive Hassall
310
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
PARKS, V. (2009). Access to Work: The Effects of 
Spatial and Social Accessibility on Unemployment 
for Native-born Black and Immigrant Women in Los 
Angeles, Economic Geography, 80(2): 141-172.
PECK, J. (2011). Neoliberal Suburbanism: Frontier 
Space, Urban Geography, 32(6): 884-919.
PELSER, A., VAN DER MERWE, A. AND KOTZE, 
P. (2012). Rethinking Sustainability of Small Towns: 
Towards a Socio-technical Approach. Small Town 
Geographies in Africa: Experiences from South  
Africa and Elsewhere. New York: Nova Science 
Publishers & Hauppauge.
PHALATSE, M. (2000). From Industrialisation to 
De-industrialisation in the Former South African 
Homelands, Urban Forum, 11(1):141-161.
PHALATSE, M. (2001). Abandoned Industrial Spaces 
in Post-apartheid South Africa: The Implications 
for Women in Mogwase, South African Geographical 
Journal, 83(2): 167-172.
PHELPS, N. (1998).  On the edge of something big: 
edge-city economic development in Croydon, South 
London, Town Planning Review, 69(4): 441-465.
PHELPS, N. (2004). Clusters, Dispersion and the 
Spaces in Between: For an Economic Geography of the 
Banal, Urban Studies, 41(5-6): 971-989.
PICKLES, J. (1991). Industrial Restructuring, 
Peripheral Urbanization and Rural Development in 
South Africa, Antipode, 23: 68-91.
PLATZKY, L. (1992). The Development Impact of 
South Africa’s Industrial Location Policies: An 
Unforeseen Legacy. PhD thesis submitted to the 
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
QUANTEC. (2015). Quantec Easydata. Available at 
www.easydata.co.za.
RANDOLPH, R. AND GOMES, P. (2007). Mobilidade e 
expansão do Rio de Janeiro para áreas perimetropoli-
tanos, Cadernos Metrópole, 17:59-80.
ROGERSON, C. (1974). Growth Point Problems: The 
Case of Babelegi, Bophuthatswana, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 12(1): 126-130.
ROGERSON, C.M. (1988). Regional Development 
Policy in South Africa, Regional Development  
Dialogue, 9: 228-255.
ROGERSON, C. (1990). Sun International: The 
Making of a South African Tourismus Multinational, 
GeoJournal, 22(3): 345-354.
ROGERSON, C. (2005). Ekurhuleni: Towards 
a Local Industrial Policy for Driving Pro-poor 
Growth and a People-centred Economy, Case 
study prepared for the World Bank-Netherlands 
Partnership Program, Evaluating and Disseminating. 
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLED/Resources/339650-1144099718914/
ProPoorEkhurleni.pdf.
ROGERSON, C. (2007). Tourism Routes as Vehicles 
for Local Economic Development in South Africa: The 
Example of the Magaliesburg Meander, Urban  
Forum, 18: 49-68.
ROGERSON, C. (2011). Mining Enterprise, 
Regulatory Frameworks and Local Economic 
Development in South Africa, African Journal 
of Business Management. Available at http://
www.academicjournals.org/journal/AJBM/
article-abstract/1B8C36823581.
ROGERSON, C. (2012). Mining-dependent  
Localities in South Africa: The State of Partnerships 
for Small Town Local Development, Urban Forum, 
23(1): 107-132.
ROGERSON, C AND ROGERSON, J (1997). 
Intrametropolitan Change in the Witwatersrand, 
1980–1994, Urban Forum, 8: 17-42.
ROGERSON, C. AND ROGERSON, J. (1999a). 
Intrametropolitan Industrial Change on the 
Witwatersrand, 1980–1994, Urban Forum,  
8(2): 195-223.
311
PART B
ROGERSON, C. AND ROGERSON, J. (1999b). 
Industrial Change in a Developing Metropolis: The 
Witwatersrand 1980–1994, Geoforum, 30: 85-99.
ROSS, N. (2010). The World Steps Up to the Water 
Quality Challenge: Communities, Governments Find 
Solutions. Report for the Pacific Institute. Available 
at http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
water_quality_case_studies3.pdf.
RUDOLPH, R. AND BRADE, I. (2005). Moscow: 
Processes of Restructuring in the Post-Soviet 
Metropolitan Periphery, Cities, 22(2): 135-150.
SCOTT, A. (1988). Flexible Production Systems and 
Regional Development: The Rise of New Industrial 
Spaces in North America and Western Europe, 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
12(2): 171-186.
SEDIBENG DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY. (2011). 
Sedibeng District Municipality Integrated Development 
Plan, 2011/12. Sedibeng District Municipality.
SEDIBENG DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY. (2012). 
Sedibeng Growth and Development Strategy. Available 
at http://www.sedibeng.gov.za/gds2/gds2_4.html.
SEEKINGS, J. (1990). Broken Promises: Discontent, 
Protest, and the Transition to Confrontation in Duduza, 
1978–1985, Wits History Workshop, 6–10 February. 
Available at http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/
handle/10539/8079/HWS-380.pdf?sequence=1.
SEIDMAN, G.W. (1993). Shafted: The Social Impact 
of Down-scaling on the Free State Goldfields, South 
African Sociological Review, 5(2): 14-34.
SIMKINS, C. (2010). Population Growth, Migration, 
Economic Growth and Poverty in Gauteng since the 
1970s, Southern Africa Labour and Development 
Research Unit, Working paper No. 47. Cape Town: 
SADRU, University of Cape Town.
SIMON, D., MCGREGOR, D. AND NSIAH-GYABAAH, 
K. (2004). The Changing Urban–Rural Interface of 
African Cities: Definitional Issues and an Application 
to Kumasi, Ghana, Environment and Urbanization, 
16(2): 235-248.
SISULU, M. (2013). Personal communication 
conducted with Deputy Director of Spatial Strategic 
Planning in Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality by 
Peter Njiro, 13 March 2013.
SMIT, W. (1998). The Rural Linkages of Urban 
Households in Durban, Environment and 
Urbanization, 10(1): 77-88.
SOJA, E. (1996). Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles 
and Other Real-and-Imagined Places. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers.
SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE. (2011a). 
1946 African Mine Workers Strike, 21 March. 
Available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/
african-mine-workers-strike-1946
SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE. (2011b). 
Sharpeville Massacre, 21 March 1960, 21 March. 
Available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/
sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960.
SPARKS, S. (2012). Apartheid Modern: South Africa’s 
Oil from Coal Project and the History of a South 
African Company Town. PhD thesis, Department of 
Anthropology and History, University of Michigan. 
Available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/
handle/2027.42/91528/sparkss_1.pdf?sequence=1.
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (STATS SA). (2012). 
Selected Building Statistics of the Private Sector as 
Reported by Local Government Institutions, 2011. 
P5041.3. Pretoria: Stats SA.
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (STATS SA).  
(2015). Statistics by Place. Available at  
http://www.statssa.gov.za/.
312
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
STORPER, M. (1997). The Regional World:  
Territorial Development in a Global Economy.  
New York: Guilford Press.
STURGEON, T. (2003). What Really Goes on in Silicon 
Valley? Spatial Clustering and Dispersal in Modular 
Production Networks, Journal of Economic Geography, 
3(2): 199-225.
SUNLEY, P. (2009). Relational Economic Geography:  
A Partial Understanding or a New Paradigm? 
Economic Geography, 84(1): 1-26.
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
(DTI). (2012). Half a Billion Rand Investment Projects 
Launched in Babelegi [Homepage of The Department 
of Trade and Industry]. Available at http://
Hammanskraal.thedti.gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=2470, 
accessed 16 June 2013.
THE HERITAGE PORTAL. (2014). The Great 
Discovery of the West Wits Line. Available at http://
www.heritageportal.co.za/article/great-discovery-
west-wits-line-part-two, accessed 20 April 2015.
TIGER WHEELS LTD. (2002). Press release, 
2 September. Available at http://www.
sharenet.co.za/free/sens/disp_news.phtml?t-
date=20020902143051&seq=1665&scheme=default.
TIRO, G. (2014). Son of Babelegi. Masters Research 
report, Department of Journalism Studies, University 
of Witwatersrand. Available at http://wiredspace.wits.
ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/17054/FinalDraft.
pdf?sequence=2.
TODES, A. (1998). Socio-spatial Effects of Economic 
Restructuring: The Case of Newcastle, Society in 
Transition, 29(1-2): 40-57.
TODES, A. (2000). Reintegrating the Apartheid city? 
Urban Policy and Urban Restructuring, in S. Watson 
and G. Bridges (eds), A Companion to the City: 617-629. 
London: Blackwell.
TODES, A. (2013). Spatial Targeting: Lessons from 
South African Experience, Report for the Workshop on 
Spatial Targeting, hosted by South Africa’s National 
Treasury and National Planning Commission, 3-4 
October 2013. Available at http://led.co.za/sites/
default/files/cabinet/orgname-raw/document/2013/
alison_todes_-_background_paper_on_spatial_
targeting_17092013.docx_.pdf.
TODES, A. (2014). New African Suburbanisation? 
Exploring the Growth of the Northern Corridor of 
eThekwini/KwaDukuza, African Studies,  
73(2): 245-270.
TODES, A., KOK, P., WENTZEL, M., VAN ZYL, J., 
AND CROSS, C. (2008). Contemporary South African 
Urbanisation Dynamics, UNU-WIDER Conference: 
Beyond the Tipping Point. African Development in an 
Urban World, Cape Town, June.
TRAPIDO, S. (1984). Putting the Plough to the Ground: 
The History of Tenant Production on the Vereeniging 
Estates, 1896–1920, University of the Witwatersrand, 
African Studies Institute.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION. 
(1998).Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  
South Africa Report: Volume 2. Available at  http://
sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/finalreport/volume2/
volume2.pdf
TUROK, I. (1990). Public Investment and Privatisation 
in New Towns: A Financial Assessment of Bracknell, 
Environment and Planning A, 22, 1323-1336.
TUROK, I. (2012). Urbanisation and Development 
in South Africa: Economic Imperatives, Spatial 
Distortions and Strategic Responses, Urbanisation 
and Emerging Population Issues Working paper No. 
8. London: International Institute for Environment 
and Development, United Nations Population Fund, 
Population and Development Branch.
313
PART B
URBAN FOUNDATION. (1991). Regional 
Development Reconsidered. Urban Debate 2010, No. 3. 
Johannesburg: Urban Foundation.
VAN EEDEN, E. (1992). Ekonomiese Ontwikkeling 
en die Invloed Daarvan op Carletonville, 1948–1988: 
'n Historiese Studie. Available at http://dspace.nwu.
ac.za/handle/10394/10795.
VAN EEDEN, E. (1997). So Long, Gold Mines, Long 
Live Industries? A Case Study of Carletonville’s Battle 
for Survival, South African Journal of Economic 
History, 12(1-2): 103-127.
VAN EEDEN, E. (1998) The history of Gatsrand from 
the settling of the trekker community circa 1839 until 
the proclamation of Carletonville in 1948, submitted 
for a Masters degree to the Potchefstroom University 
for Christian Higher Education. Available at https://
dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/10805.
VAN EEDEN, E. (2010). Using a Transdisciplinary 
Approach for Environmental Crisis Research in 
History, TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary 
Research in Southern Africa, 6(1): 191-208.
VAN HUYSSTEEN, E. (2001). Other Experiences of 
Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation: A 
Narrative of Planning and Development Histories in 
Hammanskraal-Temba, Acta Structilia, 8(1): 33-52.
VAN HUYSSTEEN, E., ORANJE, M. AND 
MEIKLEJOHN, C. (2010). Draft Paper: An 
Appreciative and [More] Nuanced Reading of Rural 
Settlements in South Africa: A Key to Unlocking the 
Nation’s Rural Development Challenge?, Planning 
Africa Conference, Durban 2010: Rural Development 
and Rural–Urban Inter-Relationships.
VAN VUUREN, L. (2008). Taming the Poort, Water 
Wheel, May/June. Available at http://www.ewisa.
co.za/misc/DamNWHartebeespoort/Harties%20
history%20WW%20May-June%2008.pdf, accessed  
1 April 2015.
VAN WINDEN, W., VAN DER MEER, A., AND VAN 
DEN BERG, L. (2004). The Development of ICT 
Clusters in European Cities: Towards a Typology, 
International Journal of Technology Management, 
28(3-6): 356-87.
VERHOEF, G. AND DU PLESSIS, A. (1990). State 
Involvement in the Rehabilitation of Poor Whites 
by Means of Land Resettlement at Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Scheme, South African Journal of Economic 
History, 5(1): 67-80.
VERNON, R. (1981). State-owned Enterprises in 
Latin-American Exports, in W. Baer and M. Gillis, 
Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: The 
Experience of Latin America, Bureau of Economic and 
Business Research. Urbana-Champaign: University of 
Illinois, pp. 98-114.
VICKERMAN, R. SPIECKERMANN, K. AND 
WEGENER, M. (2009). Accessibility and Economic 
Development in Europe, Regional Studies, 33(1): 1-15.
VISSER, G. (2004). Second Homes: Reflections on an 
Unexplored Phenomenon in South Africa, in C. Hall 
and D. Muller (eds), Tourism, Mobility, and Second 
Homes: Between Elite Landscape and Common Ground, 
196-214. Cleveland: Channel View Publications.
VISSER, G. AND HOOGENDOORN, G. (2015). A 
Decade of Second Home Tourism Research in South 
Africa: Research Prospects for the Developing World?, 
South African Geographical Journal, 97(2): 111-122.
WANG, Y.P., WANG, Y., AND WU, J. (2009). 
Urbanization and Informal Development in China: 
Urban Villages in Shenzhen, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 33(4): 957-973.
WARD, C. (1993). New Town, Home Town: The Lessons 
of Experience. London: Gulbenkion Foundation.
WELLINGS, P. AND BLACK, A. (1986). Industrial 
Decentralization in South Africa: Tool of Apartheid  
or Spontaneous Restructuring, GeoJournal,  
12(2): 137-149.
314
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
WHYTE, I. (2002). Landscale and History Since  
1500. London: Reaktion Books.
WILLIAMS, R. (1975). The Country and the City. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WINDE, F. AND STOCH, E.J. (2010). Threats and 
Opportunities for Post-closure Development in 
Dolomitic Gold Mining Areas of the West Rand 
and Far West Rand (South Africa): A Hydraulic 
View. Part 1: Mining Legacy and Future Threats, 
Water SA. Available at http://www.readperiodicals.
com/201001/1965015121.html#ixzz3YK5Pa500.
WOLFE, D. AND GERTLER, M. (2004). Clusters 
From the Inside and Out: Local Dynamics and Global 
Linkages, Urban Studies, 41(5/6): 1071-93.
WORLD STEEL ASSOCIATION. (2016). World Steel 
Figures 2016. Available at https://www.worldsteel.org/
dms/internetDocumentList/bookshop/2016/World-
Steel-in-Figures-2016/document/World%20Steel%20
in%20Figures%202016.pdf.
WU, F. (2016). Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications 
for Global Urban Studies, The Professional Geographer, 
68(2): 338-348.
YAPING, W. AND MIN, Z. (2009). Urban Spill Over vs 
Local Urban Sprawl: Entangling Land-use Regulations 
in the Urban Growth of China’s Megacities, Land Use 
Policy, 26: 1031-1045.
YU, X. AND NG, C. (2007). Spatial and Temporal 
Dynamics of Urban Sprawl Along Two Urban–Rural 
Transects: A Case Study of Guangzhou, China, 
Landscape and Urban Planning, 79: 96-109.
ZEKOVIĆ, S., SPASI, N., AND MARI, T. (2007). 
Development of New Economic Poles in Metropolitan 
Areas: Belgrade Example, Spatium, 15016: 21-27.
315
PART B
Photograph by Clive Hassall
316
UNEVEN SPACES: CORE AND PERIPHERY IN THE GAUTENG CITY-REGION
317
PART B
GAUTENG CITY-REGION OBSERVATORY
6th Floor University Corner
11 Jorissen St (Cnr Jorissen and Jan Smuts)
Braamfontein
Johannesburg
Gauteng, South Africa
tel +27 11 717 7280
email info@gcro.ac.za
www.gcro.ac.za
